State v. Houkom

• Decision Date: 09 December 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20210058,20210058
• Citation: 967 N.W.2d 801
• Parties: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Allison Marie HOUKOM, Defendant and Appellant
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

967 N.W.2d 801

STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.Allison Marie HOUKOM, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20210058

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

FILED DECEMBER 9, 2021

Joshua J. Traiser, Assistant State's Attorney, Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.

Monty G. Mertz, Fargo, N.D., for defendant and appellant.

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Allison Houkom appeals from a criminal judgment finding her guilty of giving false information to a law enforcement officer under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03(1). Houkom argues the district court erroneously denied her pre-trial motion to dismiss. She also argues the district court misinterpreted N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03(1). Lastly, she argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she interfered with an investigation or materially misled an officer by giving a false name. We reverse, concluding that under a correct application of the statute there was insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict.

I

[¶2] On October 18, 2019, Officer Matt Oldham of the West Fargo Police Department attempted to serve a warrant on a male at a residence in West Fargo. Houkom was in the driveway of the residence smoking a cigarette. Oldham approached Houkom and asked if the male he was looking for was inside the residence. She stated she did not know. Oldham then asked Houkom if she lived at the residence. She responded that she did not. Oldham then proceeded to ask Houkom for her name. She responded with "Kaylinn Marie Schmainda." When Oldham asked for her date of birth, Houkom responded that he did not need it. Oldham then contacted dispatch to check the name. Approximately a minute later, Houkom informed Oldham that she had given him a false name because she had an outstanding warrant. Houkom then provided her correct name, and Oldham determined the warrant was from Minnesota and was non-extraditable. Houkom was arrested and charged with false information under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03(1).

[¶3] Prior to trial, Houkom moved to dismiss, arguing the information failed to allege that her false statement interfered with Officer Oldham's investigation or materially misled him. The court denied the motion and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. The court found Houkom guilty.

II

[¶4] Houkom argues the district court erroneously denied her pre-trial motion to dismiss the information. Her motion argued the information was fatally deficient because it failed to allege how the false name she provided to a law enforcement officer interfered with an investigation or materially misled an officer. Houkom was charged with one count of false information to law enforcement under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03(1). The statute provides:

A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if that person:

1. Gives false information or a false report to a law enforcement officer which that person knows to be false, and the information or report may interfere with an investigation or may materially mislead a law enforcement officer[.]

The information charging Houkom stated:

on or about October 18, 2019: The defendant willfully gave false information to a law enforcement officer which the defendant knew to be false, and the information may have interfered with an investigation or may have materially misled a law enforcement officer to-wit: that on or about the above-stated date, the defendant: Allison Marie Houkom, gave law enforcement a false name knowing such information to be untrue and misleading.

[¶5] "The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the information or indictment. It is not a device for summary trial of the evidence, and facts not appearing on the face of the information cannot be considered." State v. Conrad , 2017 ND 79, ¶ 6, 892 N.W.2d 200 (quoting State v. Perreault , 2002 ND 14, ¶ 7, 638 N.W.2d 541 ). "Further, for purposes of the motion, all well-pleaded facts are taken to be true." Id. An information is adequate if it is "sufficiently specific to provide the defendant with notice of the pending charges to enable the defendant to prepare a defense." State v. Montplaisir , 2015 ND 237, ¶ 9, 869 N.W.2d 435. An information does not require exact specificity but only "enough specificity so that the defendant can prepare a meaningful defense." State v. Kirkpatrick , 2012 ND 229, ¶ 25, 822 N.W.2d 851. Additionally, if an information "sets forth the offense in the words of the statute," it is generally sufficient. Montplaisir , at ¶ 9.

[¶6] Houkom argues the information needed to set forth how her false statement interfered with an investigation or materially misled Officer Oldham. Our case law does not require such specificity.

The information set forth the charged offense using the words of the statute. In Montplaisir , we held that an information tracking the language of a statute the defendant was alleged to have violated was adequate. Id. at ¶ 13. Here, the information tracked the language of the statute by alleging that Houkom's false name "may have interfered with an investigation or may have materially misled a law enforcement officer." The information then identified the essential facts constituting the offense by alleging a specific statement by Houkom in which she gave a false name knowing it to be false. We conclude this is enough specificity to allow Houkom to prepare a meaningful defense. The district court did not err in denying Houkom's pre-trial motion to dismiss.

III

[¶7] Houkom also argues that the district court erroneously interpreted N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03(1) and that under a correct interpretation there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. M.J.W. , 2020 ND 183, ¶ 9, 947 N.W.2d 906. "Construction of a criminal statute is a question of law, fully reviewable by this Court." State v. Buchholz , 2005 ND 30, ¶ 6, 692 N.W.2d 105. "Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined by statute or unless a contrary intention plainly appears." State v. Bearrunner , 2019 ND 29, ¶ 5, 921 N.W.2d 894 (citing N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02 ). "We interpret statutes to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence, and do not adopt a construction which would render part of the statute mere surplusage." Buchholz , 2005 ND 30, ¶ 6, 692 N.W.2d 105.

[¶8] Houkom relies on the legislative history of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03 to argue the district court misinterpreted the false information statute. She argues the legislative history shows the statute was designed "to save officers from pursuing statements or information that sends them on a ‘wild goose chase.’ " Because Houkom corrected her false statement a minute later, she argues Officer Oldham was not sent on a "wild goose chase." Houkom's legislative history analysis was premature. To consider extrinsic aids such as legislative history, we must first find the statute to be "ambiguous because it is susceptible to differing but rational meanings." Buchholz , 2005 ND 30, ¶ 6, 692 N.W.2d 105. Houkom does not argue that the statute is ambiguous. We find the statute's language clear on its face and unambiguous. See also Michael v. Trevena , 899 F.3d 528, 534 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating "we think the plain language of the statute is clear enough"). Having concluded the statute is not ambiguous, we decline to consult the legislative history or further consider Houkom's "wild goose chase" argument premised on that history.

[¶9] Subsection 1 of the statute contains three elements, all of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the State to support a conviction. The first element is "[g]ives false information or a false report to a law enforcement officer." It is undisputed that Houkom provided a false name to a law enforcement officer. The second element is "which that person knows to be false." It is also undisputed that Houkom knew the name she provided to Officer Oldham was not in fact her name. The third element is "the information or report may interfere with an investigation or may materially mislead a law enforcement officer." This is the only disputed element of the offense. Given the use of the word "or" within the statute, the State could satisfy this element either by proving the false name Houkom provided may have interfered with Officer Oldham's investigation of serving a warrant on the man he was seeking to locate or that Officer Oldham may have been materially misled by Houkom's false name. "The word ‘may’ is usually used ‘to imply permissive, optional, or discretional, and not mandatory action or conduct.’ " State v. Glaser , 2015 ND 31, ¶ 18, 858 N.W.2d 920. By using the word "may," the statute only requires the State to prove the possibility that Officer Oldham's investigation could have been interfered with or that Officer Oldham could have been misled by Houkom's false name.

[¶10] Houkom argues that N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03(1) implicitly contains a minimum time to constitute interference with an investigation or materially mislead an officer. Under this view, the third element could not be satisfied because Houkom gave her correct name to Officer Oldham only one minute after giving him the false name—too short a time to have interfered or materially misled. While Houkom apparently retracted the falsification "before the falsification substantially affected the proceeding or the matter" of finding the male, Houkom failed to raise a retraction defense pursuant to § 12.1-11-04(3). "This Court has repeatedly held that issues not raised or considered in the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Moe v. State , 2015 ND 93, ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d 510. Thus, we will not consider a retraction defense. Limiting our consideration to the argument raised on appeal, we conclude that falsification continuing for only a minute may have the potential to interfere with an investigation or materially mislead an...