State v. Corn
| Decision Date | 06 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 16160-9-III,16160-9-III |
| Citation | 95 Wn.App. 41,975 P.2d 520 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Michelle Reane CORN, Respondent and Cross-Appellant. |
Andrew K. Miller, Benton County Prosecutor, Kennewick, for Appellant.
Lenell R. Nussbaum, Seattle, for Respondent.
Joe King (Appearing Pro Se), Official Court Reporter, Tri-Cities, for Other Parties.
Michelle Corn was charged with first and second degree manslaughter for the stabbing death of her boyfriend, Darin Haney. After the jury began deliberations, the prosecutor discovered that an erroneous instruction related to the law of self-defense had been given to the jury. The trial court conferred with counsel for both parties and submitted a corrected jury instruction. After the jury found Ms. Corn guilty of first degree manslaughter, the trial court granted Ms. Corn's motion for a mistrial. On appeal, the State challenges the court's decision to grant a new trial contending any error was cured by the corrected jury instruction. The State further contends Ms. Corn waived her right to object to the instruction by failing to object when the erroneous instruction was given and by failing to object to the court's decision to submit the corrected instruction to the jury. Ms. Corn cross-appeals challenging the decision of the trial court to admit the statements she made to police after her arrest. Ms. Corn contends her written statement should be suppressed because she was denied due process and her right to counsel when the police denied her access to her attorney.
We conclude the original self-defense instruction created an error of constitutional magnitude and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial. Furthermore, based upon Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), and State v. Earls, 116 Wash.2d 364, 805 P.2d 211 (1991), we conclude the statement Ms. Corn made to the police after her arrest is admissible.
On November 21, 1995, in response to a 911 call, two Kennewick police officers entered the apartment of Michelle Corn and discovered a man lying on the floor. Ms. Corn was on her knees next to him holding a phone receiver that was covered with blood. Ms. Corn asked the officers to "Please help him." The man, Darin Haney, was transported to the hospital by paramedics. He died later that evening of a single knife wound to the heart.
Mrs. Corn was taken into police custody. Before she was advised of her Miranda 1 rights and interrogated, she made statements concerning the fatal incident to the police officers that were assigned to hold, but not interrogate, her. Detective Kenneth Taylor, who was assigned to interrogate Ms. Corn, advised her of her Miranda rights at 12:01 a.m. and again at 12:52 a.m. Both times Ms. Corn waived her rights. Ms. Corn signed a written statement at approximately 2:30 a.m. Twice during her interrogation, Ms. Corn asked Detective Taylor for information concerning the condition of Mr. Haney. On both occasions, Detective Taylor informed Ms. Corn that Mr. Haney's condition was grave. At the time of the second inquiry, Detective Taylor knew Mr. Haney was dead, but decided to withhold this information from Ms. Corn.
After Ms. Corn was taken into custody, her family retained an attorney to represent her. The attorney called the police department and infored them that: (1) he had been retained by Ms. Corn's brother; (2) he wanted to talk to Ms. Corn; and (3) he wanted all interrogations to stop. In response, the attorney was told he would not be able to see his client because Ms. Corn had not requested counsel. He then called Andy Miller, the prosecuting attorney, at home and reiterated his demand to see his client. Mr. Miller advised him the police could prevent him from seeing his client unless she requested counsel.
When the attorney arrived at the police station, he was informed that Ms. Corn was at the hospital. He stated that he wanted to see her as soon as she returned to the station, and that he did not want her talking to police officers. When Ms. Corn returned from the hospital, the police did not inform her of the presence of the attorney. The police did not tell the attorney that Ms. Corn was at the station until the interrogation had been completed. The police also delayed informing Ms. Corn of Mr. Haney's death until after the interrogation was completed and her written statement was signed.
Ms. Corn was initially charged with manslaughter in the second degree, but later the charge was amended to manslaughter in the first degree. Prior to trial, the court concluded that Ms. Corn's statements to the police officers, including the written statement, were admissible for purposes of CrR 3.5. The court concluded that Ms. Corn knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived her rights. The court also concluded these statements were voluntarily made and the police had no duty to inform Ms. Corn of the attorney's attempts to contact her because Ms. Corn's brother, and not Ms. Corn, had retained the attorney. The court also concluded that while Ms. Corn had been misled during the interview about Mr. Haney's condition, she was aware that he was in "grave condition" and that she faced "potential serious legal consequences."
Ms. Corn testified at trial that she began dating Mr. Haney in March 1995. By late April, Mr. Haney was regularly spending the night at Ms. Corn's apartment. Ms. Corn and others testified that the relationship between Mr. Haney and Ms. Corn included violence. According to Ms. Corn, on November 21, 1995, Mr. Haney stopped by the Village Tavern, where she worked. After her shift was over, Ms. Corn and Mr. Haney stayed at the tavern and drank beer with two friends. When Mr. Haney tried to get in a fight with another patron, Ms. Corn persuaded him to leave.
According to Ms. Corn, Mr. Haney then drove them over to a restaurant. As they entered the parking lot, the car Mr. Haney was driving struck a car that was trying to leave. After the accident, Mr. Haney and Ms. Corn argued about his driving without a license or insurance. Ms. Corn told him to stop the car. She got out and walked back to the apartment. Once there, Ms. Corn realized she did not have her key. Mr. Haney drove up. She asked him for the key. He unlocked the door and entered the apartment where they continued their argument. Ms. Corn then told him to leave or she would leave. Mr. Haney left, slamming the door behind him.
Ms. Corn began tidying up the apartment. As she was putting silverware from the drying rack into the drawer, she felt someone shove her from behind and say, "Fuck you!" Ms. Corn was terrified and jumped "about 20 feet." She stated, "he scared me almost out of my skin." It was Mr. Haney, although his voice sounded strange, lower than usual. Mr. Haney continued the argument about the car accident. Ms. Corn had three knives in her hand from the drying rack. She again told him to leave or she would. She began walking from the kitchen toward the door. Mr. Haney, ahead of her, turned as if he were leaving. But then he turned around and began yelling. He grabbed her arms and started shaking her. The knives fell to the floor.
According to Ms. Corn, Mr. Haney grabbed her by the hair, pulling her head back until she was forced to the floor. Then he straddled her and began to choke her. All Ms. Corn could think of was the memory of not being able to breathe when he had choked her on an earlier occasion. Ms. Corn got a foot underneath her and managed to push Mr. Haney backward off of her. She grabbed one of the knives, stood up, and said, "Leave." As Ms. Corn stepped toward Mr. Haney, he rushed at her. Mr. Haney fell back against the wall, then fell forward into Ms. Corn's arms. She caught him and held him up, thinking he was joking. She then lowered him to the floor. Realizing he as hurt, she called 911.
The jury was instructed on manslaughter in the first and second degree. The court also instructed on the defense theories of self-defense and accident. The following instructions were given:
It is a defense to a charge of manslaughter in the first and second degree that the homicide was justifiable as defined in this instruction.
Homicide is justifiable when committed in the lawful defense of the slayer when:
(1) the slayer reasonably believed that the person slain intended to commit a felony or to inflict death or great personal injury;
(2) the defendant reasonably believed that there was imminent danger of such harm being accomplished; and
(3) the slayer employed such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar conditions as they reasonably appeared to the slayer, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances as they appeared to her, at the time of and prior to the incident.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not justifiable. If you find that the State has not proved the absence of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
A person is entitled to act on appearances in defending herself, if that person believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that she is in actual danger of great bodily harm, although it afterwards might develop that the person was mistaken as to the extent of the danger.
Actual danger is not necessary for a homicide to be justifiable.
(Emphasis added).
Although most of the court's instructions were proposed by the defense, the court also gave instructions 20 and 21, which were proposed by the State:
Great bodily harm means bodily injury that creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent disfigurement, or that causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ.
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