State v. Corrigan

• Decision Date: 24 November 1914
• Citation: 171 S.W. 51,262 Mo. 195
• Parties: THE STATE v. JULIA CORRIGAN, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

171 S.W. 51

262 Mo. 195

THE STATE v. JULIA CORRIGAN, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, First Division

November 24, 1914

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. James E. Withrow Judge.

Affirmed.

Richard F. Ralph for appellant.

(1) Defendant's requested instruction should have been given or, if the court deemed it improper in form, should have been treated as a request for proper instruction covering the subject-matter and it became and was the duty of the court to comply with the same. It is the duty of the court, made such by both statute and long established practice, to instruct the jury upon all questions arising in the case which are necessary for their information in giving a verdict, and a failure so to do has always been held as error; particularly is this true where a proper instruction is either offered or asked and the subject-matter particularly pointed out to the court at the time. State v. Clark, 147 Mo. 20. Just such an instruction was given and held proper in State v Adams, 179 Mo. 339. An instruction of like nature was given by the court in State v. Gibson, 108 Mo. 579. And whenever it is the duty of the trial court upon a proper request to instruct upon any question of law arising upon the evidence, it is equally obligatory upon it of its own motion to instruct the jury upon such a matter whether requested to do so or not. State v. Taylor, 118 Mo. 153. The asking of an instruction improper in form is in effect asking that a proper instruction upon the subject-matter be given. State v. Stonum, 62 Mo. 596; State v. Patrick, 107 Mo. 172. (2) The prosecutrix, in connection with the alleged act of intercourse had by her, was allowed to testify, over objection, as to the amount of pain it caused her, where she felt the pain, what kind of pain it was, as to her body being bloody or not; in short, all details that would ordinarily be asked a prosecutrix where the defendant stood charged with the crime of rape. These matters did not and could not enter into the essence of the offense charged against the defendant and could only have been offered for the sole purpose of inflaming the minds of the jury, appealing to their passion and prejudice. (3) The court erred in allowing witness Rupp, deputy sheriff, to testify regarding a visit he made the home of defendant in 1913, some two months after the acts charged against the defendant are said to have been committed, and in attempting to close the house. He may have attempted to close it, honestly thinking it to be a house of prostitution, and may have been mistaken. What he thought or what he did concerning the house in January, 1913, did not have the slightest bearing upon what may have occurred there in December, 1912. (4) The court erred in allowing the defendant to be cross-examined regarding matters in noways arising from her examination in chief and regarding matters totally irrelevant to any issue in the case, over objection, and the State's attorney was permitted to interrogate her repeatedly as to her running a house of prostitution in Columbia, and as to her running a house of prostitution at Jefferson City, such crossexamination not being predicated upon the testimony of any witness and not growing out of the testimony of the defendant in chief in any manner, shape, or form. That such testimony was prejudicial to the defendant is apparent, assuming as we must, that the jury was composed of clean minded men; the very nature of the offense charged would tend to some extent to prejudice them and this testimony could not fail to increase that prejudice and to more highly inflame their passions. State v. Lovitt, 243 Mo. 520. (5) The court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence in rebuttal regarding the reputation of prosecutrix; her reputation had in nowise been attacked by the defense and the only shadow of excuse that can be assigned in justification of the court's action is that Lillian Cameron, a witness for defendant, testified that she met prosecutrix on the street and prosecutrix told witness that "she intended to go out on Lucas avenue that day." This we submit was not an attack upon the reputation or character of prosecutrix; the court could not assume that such language, as a matter of fact, indicated any evil or unlawful intent or purposes on the part of prosecutrix nor could the jury place any such construction upon it.

John T. Barker, Attorney-General, and Lee B. Ewing, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

(1) The instructions fully cover the case and follow approved precedents. State v. Baldwin, 214 Mo. 290; State v. Jones, 191 Mo. 652; State v. Adams, 179 Mo. 337. (2) The evidence in this cause shows a taking away from the custody of the parents, within the meaning of the law, within the city of St. Louis. Therefore, the circuit court of that city had jurisdiction of this case. State v. Johnson, 115 Mo. 480; State v. Bussey, 58 Kan. 679. (3) The evidence was amply sufficient to support the verdict and showed that defendant was guilty of the commission of the crime charged, in the city of St. Louis. State v. Baldwin, 214 Mo. 290; State v. Johnson, 115 Mo. 480; Kelley's Crim. Law & Prac. (3 Ed.), sec. 550; State v. Bussey, 58 Kan. 679; People v. Crook, 61 Cal. 478; State v. Jamison, 38 Minn. 21; State v. Chisenhall, 106 N.C. 676. (4) The testimony of Lillian Cameron was such an assault upon the reputation of prosecuting witness as to justify the court in admitting testimony in rebuttal tending to show the good reputation of prosecutrix for chastity and virtue. State v. Lovitt, 243 Mo. 510; State v. Dipley, 242 Mo. 476; State v. Jones, 191 Mo. 653. If there was any error in the cross-examination of defendant as to whether or not she had said she was going to send prosecutrix to Jefferson City, the error was harmless. State v. Foley, 247 Mo. 635; State v. Barrington, 198 Mo. 77.

FARIS, J. Walker, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.

OPINION

FARIS, J.

From a conviction in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis of a violation of section 4476, and a sentence therefor to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of five years, defendant, after the usual motion for a new trial, has appealed.

The specific charge is that defendant took away one Rosa Routhiser, a female under the age of eighteen years, from her father for the purpose of prostitution.

Such of the facts in the case as are necessary to understand the points raised by the appeal and discussed in the opinion, are as follows:

Rosa Routhiser (called hereafter for brevity, the prosecutrix) resided with her parents in the city of St. Louis and was at the time of the commission of the alleged offense not quite fifteen years old. She had studied stenography and in the latter part of November, 1912, while in the waiting room of Schaper Brothers in said city, was accosted by defendant who asked her if she wanted a position. She replied in the affirmative and added that she was willing to do almost anything. Defendant asked her thereupon what she meant, and prosecutrix replied that she was a stenographer looking for employment. Defendant then said to her, "If you are looking for employment you can come out to my house to work;" advising her that her house was in St. Charles, Missouri, and that in order to reach there prosecutrix should take a Wellston car, get off at the end of the line and go into a candy kitchen located there and say she was going to Julia Corrigan's house and that car fare would thereupon be given to her. Prosecutrix did not at the time accept this offer, but within a few days thereafter, namely on Wednesday, December 4, 1912, she left her home, went down town in the city of St. Louis, there took a Wellston car, rode to the end of the car line, made inquiry at the candy kitchen, where she received twenty-five cents from a Greek in charge of the store. She then took a car to St. Charles and went to the house of defendant, which the proof shows to have been at the time, and since, and for a long time prior, a house of prostitution, wherein she was admitted by the defendant, who took her into a room, took her outer clothing off, put a short apron on her and told her she must get used to everything, as defendant was later on going to send her to Jefferson City where she likewise had a house.

In the house of defendant there were, besides prosecutrix, five or six other girls. This house contained a dance hall with benches about the wall and was furnished with an electric piano. In this hall while prosecutrix remained at defendant's house, the girl inmates and divers men who came there, engaged in dancing. On Friday morning, December 6, 1912, following the advent into this house of prosecutrix, a roughly dressed man, partially drunk, and whose name is unknown, came to defendant's house and she sent him up to a bedroom. Defendant then sent prosecutrix up to this room, where the latter received two dollars from the man. Prosecutrix was then sent back to this room by the defendant and the man therein threw prosecutrix upon the bed and had forcible sexual intercourse with her. The details of this rape are shown in full and at length in the record. To the admission of these details as well as to the fact of rape, defendant strenuously objected and now makes serious contention that such admission is reversible error.

From the intercourse had with this strange drunken man prosecutrix contracted a serious sexual disease, although some considerable effort was made upon the trial to show by a physician, one Dr. Fiegenbaum, who examined and prescribed for prosecutrix, that her infection with this disease could not have occurred at the time of her intercourse in the house of defendant, but that she must have been infected prior to her going to defendant's...