State v. Costell
| Decision Date | 13 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 14-15-11 |
| Citation | 2016 Ohio 3386 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JON JAMES COSTELL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Paula Brown for Appellant
David W. Phillips for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jon James Costell ("Costell"), appeals the April 20, 2015 judgment entry of sentence of the Union County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from the overdose death of Debra Costell ("Debra") on September 25, 2013. Debra was a bedridden paraplegic suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), depression, and two stage IV decubitus ulcers—bed sores. Debra, who lived at home with her husband, Costell, received in-home healthcare from home-healthcare aids and nurses until she was hospitalized in July 2013. When Debra returned home on August 21, 2013, she received only in-home nursing care until her death. Debra was prescribed a number of medications, including Tramadol, to treat her pain, and Sertraline, to treat her depression. Debra's nurses were responsible for staging her pillbox with her daily prescribed medications, and Costell was responsible for administering to Debra her medications from her pillbox and her as-needed medications, which were not staged in her pillbox. Debra's cause of death was determined to be acute intoxication from the combined effects of Tramadol and Sertraline. Among other medications, Debra was prescribed 100 milligrams—1 pill—of Sertraline per day, and prescribed 50 milligrams up to 3 times per day as needed—up to 3 pills—of Tramadol.
{¶3} On June 22, 2014, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Costell on four counts, including: Count One of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), (F) and 2929.02(A), an unclassified felony; Count Two of failing to provide for a functionally impaired person in violation of R.C. 2903.16(A), (C)(1), a fourth-degree felony; Count Three of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(B), (D)(4) a third-degree felony; and Count Four of involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), (C), a first-degree felony. (Doc. No. 1).
{¶4} On July 23, 2014, Costell appeared for arraignment and entered pleas of not guilty to the counts of the indictment. (Doc. No. 4).
{¶5} The case proceeded to a jury trial on April 13-16, 2015. On April 16, 2015, the jury found Costell guilty as to the counts in the indictment. (Doc. Nos. 109, 110, 111, 112); (Apr. 16, 2015 Tr. at 68-70). On April 20, 2015, the trial court sentenced Costell to life in prison with parole eligibility after serving 25 years on Count One and 36 months in prison on Count Three, and it ordered that Costell serve the terms consecutively. (Doc. No. 115); (Apr. 20, 2015 Tr. at 13). The parties agreed that Counts Two and Four merged with Count One. (Id.); (Id. at 12).
{¶6} On May 13, 2015, Costell filed his notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 126). He raises nine assignment of error for our review. For ease of our discussion, wewill first review together Costell's eighth and sixth assignments of error; followed separately by his second and first assignments of error; then together his fifth, seventh, and ninth assignments of error; and finally together his third and fourth assignments of error.
The Trial Court Erred When it Did Not Grant Defendant's Rule 29 Motion at End of State's Case and at End of the Trial.
Assignment of Error No. VI
The Verdict Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence and Defendant's Conviction Was Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence.
{¶7} In his eighth assignment of error, Costell argues that the trial court erred by denying his Crim.R. 29 motion because the State "never proved [Costell] caused Debra's death." (Appellant's Brief at 33). In his sixth assignment of error, Costell argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence and based on insufficient evidence.
{¶8} "Under Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Tatum, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-10-18, 2011-Ohio-3005, ¶ 43, citing State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261, 263 (1978). "A motion for acquittal tests the sufficiency of the evidence." Id., citing State v.Miley, 114 Ohio App.3d 738, 742 (4th Dist.1996). As such, we will review together Costell's arguments under his sixth and eighth assignments of error that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶9} Manifest "weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts." State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 (1997). Accordingly, we address each legal concept individually.
{¶10} "An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997), fn. 4. Accordingly, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact." State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33, citing State v. Williams, 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No.4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19 (), citing Thompkins at 386.
{¶11} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, "'weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.'" Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, "[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence 'weighs heavily against the conviction,' should an appellate court overturn the trial court's judgment." State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
{¶12} It appears that Costell is challenging only his aggravated-murder conviction under R.C. 2903.01(A) in his sixth and eighth assignments of error. R.C. 2903.01(A) provides, "No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another * * *." Accordingly, to prove that Costellcommitted aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(A), the State was required to prove: (1) Costell acted purposely; (2) Costell acted with prior calculation and design; and (3) Costell caused Debra's death. See R.C. 2903.01(A); State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98528, 2013-Ohio-1181, ¶ 24; State v. Neeley, 143 Ohio App.3d 606, 620 (1st Dist.2001). "A person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain result * * *." R.C. 2901.22(A). The Supreme Court of Ohio defines "prior calculation and design" as requiring "evidence of 'more than the few moments of deliberation * * * and * * * a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill.'" State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, ¶ 38, quoting State v. Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 11 (1978).
{¶13} Because it is the only element Costell challenges on appeal, we review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting only whether Costell caused Debra's death, and whether the jury clearly lost its way in concluding that Costell caused Debra's death.
{¶14} At trial, the State presented the testimony of 25 witnesses. The testimony relevant to Costell's sixth and eighth assignments of error is summarized below.
{¶15} As its first witness, the State presented the testimony of Union County Sheriff's Office 9-1-1 dispatcher Rebecca Heath ("Heath"), who testifiedthat she received a 9-1-1 emergency call from Costell at 5:31 a.m. on the morning of September 25, 2013 while she was working as a dispatcher. (Apr. 13, 2015 Tr., Vol. II, at 196-197, 201). Heath identified State's Exhibit 1 as a true and accurate audio recording of Costell's 9-1-1 call, which was subsequently played for the jury. (Id. at 197-198, 202). Heath testified that Costell seemed calm at times and at other times he seemed to be "somewhat unwilling or abrupt." (Id. at 202, 203). According to Heath, Costell seemed to be "a little calmer than most." (Id. at 203).
{¶16} Next, Todd L. Simmons ("Simmons"), a firefighter and EMT for Union Township, testified that he responded to the Costell residence on September 25, 2013 as a result of Costell's 9-1-1 call. (Id. at 206, 208). According to Simmons, Costell "said he didn't do CPR on her, but * * * he said he did try to do rescue breaths." (Id. at 212). Heath testified that Costell did not "seem...
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