State v. Costello
| Decision Date | 13 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. C7-00-436.,C7-00-436. |
| Citation | 646 N.W.2d 204 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Gerard J. COSTELLO, Petitioner, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Theodora Gaitas (# 271810), Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
Michael A. Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, Eileen Wells, Mankato City Attorney, Christopher Cain (# 223797), Assistant Mankato City Attorney, Mankato, MN, for Respondent. Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
This appeal arises from the conviction of appellant Gerard J. Costello for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, driving under the influence of alcohol, driving after cancellation, and giving a false name to a peace officer. We granted review to decide whether the district court erred by allowing jurors to question witnesses during Costello's trial. The court of appeals held that the practice of questioning by jurors is allowed under the district court's inherent trial-management power and affirmed the convictions. We reverse and remand to the district court for a new trial.
On September 28, 1999, two Mankato police officers responded to reports of a disturbance in a boarding house. One of the officers, Officer Daniel Padilla, went to the back of the house to ensure that no one exited the house through the back door. As he came around the house, Officer Padilla observed appellant Costello backing a truck out of a parking space. He signaled for Costello to stop, and approached the vehicle to investigate. As he spoke with Costello, Officer Padilla noted an open, partially filled can of beer on the floor of the cab, and observed that Costello smelled of alcohol, his speech was slurred, and his eyes were bloodshot. When Officer Padilla asked for identification, Costello initially gave a false name and date of birth. After he was told that he would be charged for giving a false name to a peace officer, Costello gave his actual name and date of birth.
Officer Padilla ran the correct identification through dispatch and discovered that Costello's license had been cancelled as inimical to public safety. Costello was then arrested and ultimately charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, driving under the influence of alcohol, driving after cancellation, and giving a false name to a peace officer. At trial, Costello asserted the defense of necessity, arguing that he was driving only because he was afraid of some other tenants in the boarding house who had threatened to assault him.
Before trial began, the district court informed the parties of its intention to allow jurors to question witnesses during the trial. Costello lodged a blanket objection to the practice, and the state said that it had "[n]o objection to [Costello's] request." When the court noted, "In other words, you join in [Costello's] request," the prosecutor merely responded, "Well, I don't want to be too cooperative * * *." The record reflects that the court noted the objection, but did not engage in any further discussion of the matter.
In its preliminary instructions to the jury at Costello's trial, the court gave the following instruction:
Questions by jurors. In this trial you will be allowed to submit questions for the witnesses. This is a procedure that I'm applying on a case by case basis, so if you're in another trial, you may not be provided this opportunity. If you have a question for a particular witness, you must write it down. Unless your handwriting is very legible, please print. Don't sign the question. Signal the bailiff, who will bring your question to me. Now, keep in mind that your question must be submitted before the particular witness leaves the witness stand. In order to be sure that I'll not miss a question, before I excuse a witness I'll try to remember to make a general inquiry of you as to whether you have any questions. Sometimes I forget, so the final burden is on you if you have a question, to make sure that I see your hand. But I also want to stress that it's not necessary for you to ask any questions, and I've had more than one trial where not one question was asked by a juror. All right? So, just an opportunity, that's all it is. I'll apply the same rules of evidence to any of your questions that I apply to those asked by the attorneys. If I decide that a particular question cannot be asked, I'll tell you. You shouldn't speculate as to why your question was not asked. And if I decide not to ask a particular question, I hope you won't interpret it as some sort of an adverse reflection upon you or the person asking it. Like I say, it's an opportunity. You may avail yourself of it; a lot of folks don't. And if you do, then the same rules apply and I'll let you know.
During the course of the trial, jurors submitted at least five questions to the court.1 One question was redundant and one question was disallowed because of an objection by the state. Ultimately, the court posed three questions: one to Officer Padilla, one to Costello's girlfriend, and one to Costello himself.
The first question was posed to Officer Padilla after re-cross examination by the defense. Jurors had submitted two questions during his testimony: "When you first saw the pickup—did it appear to be moving with any urgency, as if to get away in a hurry?" and "Did [Costello] appear eager [to] get out of there (the parking lot, etc.)?" The court asked the first question:
Costello was allowed to ask follow-up questions about whether the truck appeared to be in gear; the prosecutor declined to ask any follow-up questions.
The second question was posed to Costello's girlfriend after cross examination by the state. Jurors had submitted two written questions during her testimony: "Had either of the [other tenants] ever made any threats to you or [Costello] on any previous occasions?" and "Did you in any way inform [Costello] of [the other tenant's] threat to you and to him?" The prosecutor objected to the question about previous threats, and the court sustained the objection, stating that the question "gets a little too far afield on the issue at hand." The court did, however, ask the other question:
Sua sponte, the court followed the juror's question with another question:
Again, Costello asked a follow-up question; the state declined to ask further questions.
The third written juror question was posed to Costello after redirect examination by defense counsel: "Mr. Costello, what was your intended destination when you attempted to leave the parking lot?" The court asked:
Neither party asked any follow-up questions to the third juror question.
Costello was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, driving under the influence of alcohol, driving after cancellation, and giving a false name to a peace officer. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the practice of allowing juror questioning was within the district court's trial-management authority and would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. State v. Costello, 620 N.W.2d 924, 927-28 (Minn. App.2001). Costello appealed to this court, arguing that juror questioning violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury under both the state and federal constitutions, and therefore resulted in reversible error.
Costello's appeal turns on a legal question, which we review de novo. State v. Cheng, 623 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn.2001). While the issue of whether a district court can permit jurors to question witnesses during criminal trials is one of first impression, in State v. Crawford, 96 Minn. 95, 104 N.W. 822 (1905), this court analyzed the effect of a spontaneous juror question on "the substantial rights of the defendant." Id. at 99, 104 N.W. at 823. While the conviction was upheld despite a question asked by a juror during trial, the facts in Crawford are distinguishable from the facts in this case both because the questioning in Crawford was not solicited by the court and the defendant in that case did not raise an objection. Id. at 100, 104 N.W. at 824. Moreover, the policies underlying the court's reasoning in Crawford—suspicion that reversal based on technical court rules could cause "peaceful and law-abiding citizens to become lawless, and to join in the barbarous method of punishing crime by a resort to the court of Judge Lynch"—are, thankfully, less apposite today. Id. at 102, 104 N.W. at 825. Therefore, the issues we must address are, first, whether the district court's juror-questioning policy lay within its inherent trial-management authority; second, whether such a policy can be applied without upsetting the balance between the state and defendants that is guaranteed by an adversarial system; and, third, the effect of juror questioning on this particular defendant's case.
A district court clearly has the inherent power to "govern[ ] that which is essential to [its] existence, dignity, and function," but...
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