State v. Coyle

• Decision Date: 01 March 1913
• Citation: 130 P. 316,8 Okla.Crim. 686,1913 OK CR 42
• Parties: STATE v. COYLE ET AL.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

130 P. 316

8 Okla.Crim. 686, 1913 OK CR 42

STATE v. COYLE ET AL.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

March 1, 1913

Syllabus by the Court.

The anti-trust law of 1908 (Comp. Laws 1909, §§ 8800-8819) is not void for uncertainty, but the definitions of "trusts," "monopolies," and "unlawful combinations in restraint of trade and against public policy" therein contained are sufficient to define the offenses prescribed by said statute.

An exception in favor of labor unions from an anti-trust law (Comp. Laws 1909,§§ 8800-8819) may constitute such a reasonable classification as will not invalidate such law upon the ground that it discriminates against and does not afford equal protection to all of the citizens of the United States.

In an indictment or information for any offense named in our anti-trust legislation it is sufficient to state the purpose or facts of the trust, monopoly, or unlawful combination in restraint of trade, and that the accused is a member of acted with or in pursuance of it, or aided or assisted in carrying out its purpose without giving the name or description of such trust, monopoly, or unlawful combination or stating how, when, or where it was created.

For indictments for violating the provisions of our anti-trust law (Comp. Laws 1909, §§ 8800-8819), which are held not to be bad for duplicity and to sufficiently state the offense charged, see opinion.

Motion for rehearing. Denied.

For former opinion, see 7 Okl. Cr. 50, 122 P. 243.

Charles West, Atty. Gen., and C.J. Davenport, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Flynn Chambers, Lowe & Richardson, of Oklahoma City, and Devereaux & Hildreth, Dale & Bierer, and C. G. Horner, all of Guthrie for appellees.

FURMAN J.

Counsel for appellees have filed a printed brief of 105 pages in support of their motion for a rehearing, in which the entire field of legal learning has been exhausted and everything has been said which ingenuity could suggest and argument could enforce from their standpoint.

Without intending in the least to be disrespectful to any court, yet it is a fact well known to the legal profession and to the country, that many of our appellate courts, both state and federal, have in the past been largely dominated by men, who, before their elevation to the bench and while they were practicing lawyers, were more or less under monopolistic influences. It matters not how honest, able, and learned a judge may be, his decisions are more or less colored by the viewpoint from which he considers questions which are submitted to him. Two judges of equal learning, ability, and integrity considering the same question from different viewpoints may, and often do, reach different conclusions. So the question of the viewpoint from which a case is considered is of the utmost importance. The viewpoint of a judge can sometimes be discovered by inquiring into his antecedents. All judges were once lawyers. A lawyer is necessarily and involuntarily affected by the views and interests of his clients with whom he is identified and upon whom he is dependent for his income. In fact, the lawyer who cannot sympathize with his clients, and who does not make their cause his cause, never attains eminence at the bar.

It is no secret that corporations and monopolies are active and tireless in their efforts to secure control of the appellate courts of this country and thereby by judicial construction defeat the will of the people as expessed in legislation. As these influences are powerful and well organized, they often succeed in securing the election or appointment of judges who are under obligations to them for past favors. This evil has been carried to such an extent and has become so open and notorious that many good people have almost lost hope and have largely ceased to have confidence in the fairness, impartiality, and integrity of the courts where corporations, trusts, and monopolies are concerned. This constitutes one of the most alarming conditions now existing in America. A judge may desire to be entirely honest, yet if he is under influences which are antagonistic to the rights of the people, he will make an exceedingly dangerous judge. We are repeatedly told in the Bible that "a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise and pervert the words of the righteous." Deut. xvi, 19; Ex. xxiii, 8. So we have the highest possible authority for the statement that, although a judge may ordinarily be a wise and righteous man, yet, if he has been the recipient of favors at the hands of trusts and monopolies, he cannot safely be relied upon to reach just and correct conclusions in cases where their interests are involved, and that in such cases his eyes may become blind to the rights of the people and his judgment may become perverted without his being aware of the fact. It may not be popular in some circles to say this, but we believe that it is the absolute truth and that this is the main cause of the manifest bias of many of our courts against all anti-trust legislation.

In view of the antecedents of many of the appellate judges of the United States and the general disposition which exists among American lawyers and courts to blindly follow precedents, and the further fact that trusts and monopolies always secure the services of the best lawyers obtainable who have the ability to make the worse appear to be the better cause, we are not surprised at the number and respectability of the authorities supporting the contentions of counsel for appellees. But we are of the opinion that they prove too much, for if they are to be followed it would be almost impossible to frame a law which would reach and destroy conspiracies in restraint of trade and commerce. To sustain the contentions of counsel for appellees would be in effect to decide that in the state of Oklahoma trusts and monopolies are practically above and superior to the law, and that they may at pleasure through their combinations and conspiracies grind the people like grain beneath the upper and nether stone, take from the mouth of labor the bread which it has earned, and divert the stream of wealth produced by hard and honest toil from its rightful channels and pour it into the undeserved and already overflowing coffers of the few.

In this case, as in all other such cases, appellees are represented by lawyers who have few equals and no superiors in the United States and who have their clients' interests at heart. They have certainly used every legal weapon at their command in their presentation of their side of the case. With this we find no fault. It is as it should be. We admire and commend their zeal and ability. But we are not unmindful of our duty to the entire people of Oklahoma, and that we should carefully consider the ground upon which we act and the consequences and effects of the decision which they have asked us to render. If we concede the premises which they have laid down and follow the precedents which they have cited, we freely admit that we would be involved in a maze of perplexities from which we would find it difficult to extricate ourselves and escape from the conclusions at which they would have us arrive. We differ radically with counsel for appellees at the very threshold of the case as to the principles which should control in its decision. It would therefore be useless consumption of time to consider in detail the cases which they have cited and the arguments which they have made. As we understand it, the ancient learning of the common law has outlived the conditions which brought it into existence and has survived the reasons upon which it was based. In the early case of Slater v. United States, 1 Okl. Cr. 275, 98 P. 110, this court announced that precedents should be weighed and not counted, and that we would not follow any precedent unless we understood and approved the principles upon which it was based, and that a multiplicity of errors did not make right that which was based upon false premises and was therefore erroneous at its very inception.

In the case of Byers v. Territory, 1 Okl. Cr. 702, 103 P. 534, this court said: "Justice demands that in the administration of law its processes should never be allowed to become a game of skill between contending counsel. There has been entirely too much of this in the past. It has resulted in the miscarriage of justice in many cases and has bred a spirit of disgust for law and contempt for courts in the public mind." In the same case this court also said: "Appellate courts should faithfully and fearlessly do their duty and decide every question presented with reference to the substantial merits of the case in which it arises. In this way only can justice be administered. Ignoring justice and deciding cases upon technicalities has not only largely lost the courts the confidence and respect of the people, but it has also greatly alarmed the profession of law itself."

We have endeavored to adhere strictly to these principles in passing upon all questions submitted to us. As applicable to the questions now before the court, we reiterate what was said in the case of Turner v. State, 8 Okl. Cr. 11, 126 P. 452, as follows:

"These statutes are largely a radical departure from the old common law with reference to criminal law and criminal procedure, and were evidently intended to place criminal law in Oklahoma upon the strong, sound, and safe basis of common sense, reason, and justice. It is on account of these statutes that some parties are unable to understand the policy of this court. We are simply trying in good faith to discharge the obligation of our oaths of office, for we have sworn that we would support the Constitution and laws of Oklahoma. If those who are disposed to criticise this court for its policy would place themselves

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