State v. Craddick

• Decision Date: 04 January 1911
• Citation: 112 P. 491,61 Wash. 425
• Parties: STATE v. CRADDICK.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

112 P. 491

61 Wash. 425

STATE v. CRADDICK.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 4, 1911

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; J. D. Hinkle Judge.

J. E Craddick was convicted of receiving money through false pretenses, and he appeals. Affirmed.

J. F. Blake and John Willey, for appellant.

Fred C Pugh and D. W. Hurn, for the State.

DUNBAR J.

The information in this case charges that the defendant J. E Craddick and John Doe, alias Sahara, unlawfully and by false and fraudulent representations, received from one Ed. Thompson $800 in money; that they represented that the Pinar Del Rio Mining Company was the owner of a gold mine situated in Okanogan county, Wash.; that said mine had been opened, and that a ledge of ore about 75 feet in width had been discovered; that the extent of said ledge had not been ascertained, because the same had not been cut out to its full extent; that said mine was located adjacent to, and immediately connected with, another mine of the same character, and was close to and in the immediate vicinity of the Alden mine, the Alden mine being one of the richest gold mines in the country; and that said Pinar Del Rio was located a short distance north of Oroville, state of Washington, in close proximity to a railroad; whereas, in truth and in fact, the said Pinar Del Rio mine had not been opened, and no ledge of ore of any kind or character had been struck, and said mine was not adjacent to or connected with any mine of like character or any other mine whatever, and was not close to or in the immediate vicinity of the said Alden mine, but was at least 25 miles distant therefrom; that in fact said mine was not located near Oroville, but was at least 75 miles distant therefrom; and in fact said mine was not located near any railroad line, but was at least 75 miles distant from a railroad line; that Thompson, then and there relying upon said representations and pretenses, paid to said Craddick and said Sahara the sum of $800, etc. It is the claim of the state that the false and fraudulent representations and pretenses charged against the defendant in the information are the direct result of a conspiracy entered into between Conlin, alias Sahara, Sampson, alias Haas, and defendant Craddick, to defraud generally any and all persons who might become patrons of the clairvoyant, Sahara, and, through his seductive influences and deceptive practices, seek of him advice as to how to make good, safe, and profitable investments of their savings. Under the arrangements made between them, Sahara was to furnish the purchasers, the defendant Craddick, the alleged profitable securities, and Sampson was the go-between, the man who introduced the one selected by Sahara as the probable victim to Craddick; and the spoils were to be divided equally between Sahara and Craddick, after the payment to Sampson of his commission out of the transaction. It appears that, in furtherance of the combination and to furnish investments, stock called 'Brittle Silver' was used for a time, and after that stock had become too generally known, the Pinar Del Rio Mining Company was organized, and represented to be the owner of a gold mine in Okanogan county, of promising wealth such as we have described. The transaction between this trio and Thompson was proven. Thompson, after having been steered into Sahara's offices, consulted him concerning profitable investments. Sahara, after going into an alleged clairvoyant state, pretending to occult knowledge and vision, interspersing his performances with all the little tricks of the trade used for deceiving victims, pretended to Thompson to see by the aid of this extraordinary occult power a man who had stock to sell, the purchase of which would be very profitable to Thompson. This man was Craddick, the defendant in this case, and the result of the whole conspiracy was that, by reason of these representations and this fraudulent performance, Thompson, who was rather a credulous, ignorant Swede, invested his $800 in this worthless stock.

There could seem to be, from the testimony in this case, but one conclusion as to the guilt of this appellant, and his participation in this conspiracy to defraud. There are, however, some technical questions that are raised by the appellant which we will notice.

It is alleged that the court erred in permitting evidence tending to show a conspiracy between Sahara, Sampson, and Craddick; in permitting evidence tending to show the commission of a similar offense in inducing or attempting to induce Eric Johnson to invest in mining stock held by defendant; in permitting evidence tending to show the commission of a similar offense in inducing or attempting to induce J. M. Wallace to invest in mining stock held by the defendant; in permitting evidence tending to show the commission of a similar offense in inducing or attempting to induce an unnamed person who had lumber to sell to invest in mining stock held by the defendant. These four assignments may all be considered together, and in this is embraced the question, whether these alleged offenses were distinct, separate, and apart from the case as made, or attempted to be made against the defendant, to such an extent that they could not be accepted in evidence as competent proof on the case charged, viz., the attempt to defraud Thompson. It is claimed that these were separate and distinct negotiations, in no way tending to prove the crime charged, and appellant relies upon the rule announced by this court in State v. Bokien, 14 Wash. 403, 44 P. 889; State v. Gottfreedson, 24 Wash. 398, 64 P. 523; and State v. Oppenheimer, 41 Wash. 630, 84 P. 588.

There is no doubt that the general rule is firmly established that it is not competent to show the commission of another distinct crime by the defendant, for the purpose of proving that he is guilty of the crime charged. This would only go to the extent of proving his character, and under the general rule a defendant's character cannot be put in question, except through his initiative. Under such circumstances, the defendant would be called upon to defend himself against crimes of which he had had no notice, and the effect of such testimony, as has often been said, would be to divert the minds of the jurymen from the main question in issue, viz., whether the particular crime charged was proven. As we interpret the cases above cited from this court, they only sustain the general rule recognizing the exception that, when the testimony offered tends to prove a general scheme for the perpetration of a crime similar to the one with which the defendant is charged, the testimony is admissible. In the prosecution of criminal actions a criminal intent must be found to exist, and such proof is admitted, because the establishment of such a scheme, and crimes committed in pursuance thereof, affords grounds for inference against the defendant as to intent in the matter under examination. But, of course, the class of cases must be cognate, or it would result, as we have said, in convicting a man of one crime, because he had been shown to be guilty of another.

In State v. Bokien, supra, we held that, in a prosecution for obtaining goods under false pretenses by the giving of a check upon the bank in which the defendant had no funds, it was error to allow the prosecution to introduce testimony of other checks having been given by defendant to other persons when he had no funds or deposits. In State v. Gottfreedson, supra, it was held, in...