State v. Gottfreedson

• Decision Date: 30 March 1901
• Citation: 64 P. 523,24 Wash. 398
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. GOTTFREEDSON.

64 P. 523

24 Wash. 398

STATE v. GOTTFREEDSON.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 30, 1901

Appeal from superior court, Okanogan county; C. H. Neal, Judge.

Frank Gottfreedson was convicted of horse stealing, and he appeals. Reversed.

Edward B. Simmons, for appellant.

A. W Barry, for the State.

DUNBAR, J.

Appellant was informed against for horse stealing in Okanogan county. The part of the information which it is necessary to review is as follows: 'Frank Gottfreedson is hereby accused by A. W. Berry, prosecuting attorney in and for Okanogan county state of Washington, in the name and by the authority of the state of Washington, and on oath, by this information, of the crime of horse stealing, committed as follows, to wit: That on the ___ day of _____, 1899, and within three years next before the filing of this information,' etc. A demurrer was interposed to the information for the reason that it did not substantially conform to the requirements of the Code and that the facts charged did not constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled, and the order of the court overruling the demurrer is the first alleged error; the contention being that no sufficient date was alleged. We think the information is sufficient if the time is alleged at any time within the statute of limitations. The insertion of a definite date however, or a date as definite as could be ascertained by the pleader, would be a better practice, and would accord fairer treatment to the defendant.

We think, however, the court erred in compelling the defendant who offered himself as a witness, to testify that he had been convicted of horse stealing. The statute provides that no person offered as a witness shall be excluded from giving evidence by reason of the conviction of a crime, but such conviction may be shown to affect his credibility. When it was shown that the defendant had been convicted of a crime the demands of the statute had been met; for the purpose of the statute is only to affect the credibility of the witness, and not to prejudice the minds of the jury by parading before them the fact that the witness had been guilty of the exact crime for which he was then on trial. The tendency of such testimony as that on the minds of the jury would not be so much to affect the witness' credibility as to cause the jury to conclude that, because he had before been convicted of horse stealing, the probabilities were that he was guilty of stealing the horse in question. Upon this same line, the state introduced testimony tending to show that the defendant in this case had stolen another horse at the same time he is alleged to have stolen the one for which he was standing his trial. It appears that, at the time the horse which the defendant was charged with stealing was turned out on the range, another horse, owned by one Proebstal, was turned out, which was afterwards traced into the possession of the defendant; and the prosecuting attorney, in his statement, told the jury that he would show that the horse mentioned in the information and the one belonging to Proebstal were both turned out on the public range together, and that they were both later found, the Proebstal horse in the possession of the defendant, the Errickson horse (the one described in the information) in the possession of one Carson, who had secured the same from the defendant; both said horses having been stolen by defendant and taken to Ferry county, Wash. Witness McClure, among other things, testified as follows: 'On my return with the mare I saw defendant at Curlew Ferry, and told him I had replevied her. He said he got her from a man. I do not now remember who it was he said he got her from. He said he traded two pack horses for the Proebstal horse. Mr. Simmons: We object to any statement as to the Proebstal horse, and move the court to strike out that part of the statement, on the ground that the same is irrelevant, improper, and immaterial, and is an attempt to prove a different alleged offense than the one set forth in the information, and for which we are being tried. The Court: Motion denied. Mr. Simmons: We except. Mr. Berry: Did he (defendant) say anything about the value of the Proebstal horse? Mr. Simmons: We object upon the same grounds as before stated. The Court: He may answer. Witness: He said he had been offered $125 for the Proebstal horse. Mr. Simmons: We except. Witness: He made no objection to our taking it along. He told us where he got it, but I do not now remember. He said he traded two pack horses for it,--the Proebstal horse,--and took a bill of sale of it. Mr. Simmons: Same objection as to all of these statements relative to the Proebstal horse, and we move to strike the same out, and that the court instruct the jury not to consider them. The Court: They may stand. Mr. Simmons: Exception.' The same character of testimony was reiterated by witness Patterson, over the objections of the defendant, and also by the witness Proebstal. The general rule is well established that proof of the commission of a separate and distinct crime will not be admitted for the purpose of aiding the conviction of defendant for the crime charged. There are exceptions, however, to this general rule, as where the testimony shows a connection between the transaction under investigation and some other transaction, and where they are so interwoven that the omission of the...