State v. Craft

• Decision Date: 11 June 1923
• Docket Number: No. 23672.,23672.
• Parties: STATE v. CRAFT.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

253 S.W. 224

299 Mo. 332

STATE v. CRAFT.

No. 23672.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

June 11, 1923.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Butler County; Almon Ing, Judge.

Thomas J. Craft was convicted of robbery in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Henson & Woody, of Poplar Bluff, for appellant.

Jesse W. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and J. Henry Caruthers, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

WALKER, J.

Appellant was charged with others, by information in the circuit court of Butler county, with robbery in the first degree, under section 3307, R. S. 1919. A severance was granted, and he was tried, found guilty, and his punishment assessed at 10 years imprisonment in the penitentiary. From this judgment he appeals.

On the 2d day of February, 1921, the Bank of Qulin, Butler county, was robbed by two armed men, afterwards shown by their confessions to have been O. D. Brown and Rolla Nicholson. On the afternoon of the day stated, they entered the bank, which was at the time in charge of the assistant cashier, and commanded him and two others, named Adkins and Yates, who were in the bank; to throw up their hands. Adkins and Yates were then ordered into the vault, and the cashier was required to open the safe. Something more than $3,000 was taken therefrom by the robbers, who then ordered the cashier into the vault, and he and Adkins and Yates were locked in. The robbers then went out at the rear door of the bank, mounted the horses of Adkins and Yates, which had been hitched there, and rode away. A short time thereafter those confined in the value with the aid of a screwdriver or monkey-wrench, which had been known by Yates to be in the vault, succeeded in loosening the bolts of the vault door from the inside, and made their exit therefrom. About two hours thereafter Brown and Nicholson were apprehended about 6 miles from Qulin. They were brought to Poplar Bluff and lodged in jail. Two or three days thereafter they made a confession in which they implicated Adkins, Yates, and the appellant as accomplices in the robbery. Nicholson, on the witness stand at the trial of Adkins and Yates, who were tried before the appellant, testified that his confession was false and that neither the appellant nor either of the others named had any connection with the crime. At that trial Adkins and Yates were each convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment in the penitentiary. At the appellant's trial Nicholson did not testify for the state, but his confession was introduced to affect his credibility as a witness for the appellant. Aside from Brown's testimony no witness testified to the appellant's complicity in the robbery, the evidence being otherwise circumstantial. The material facts concerning the confessions were that appellant and Brown began to discuss plans for the robbery of the bank in the latter part of the year 1920. The perpetration of the crime was postponed from time to time until about the 1st of February, 1921, when appellant went to where Brown was working at the Crown Bar in Poplar Bluff and told him he had another man in the deal, who proved to be Nicholson; the latter joined them soon thereafter, and the three discussed the robbery while they were eating their lunch that day. Some time during that afternoon or night they went to the Butler County Railroad, where Nicholson had left a railroad speeder which he stated he had brought from Qulin, which was distant about 16 miles. Appellant had before that time procured disguises and overalls to be used in the holdup. He also gave Brown an automatic pistol to be used for a like purpose. Some time during that night they proceeded on the speeder to Qulin, reaching there at 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning of February 2, 1921. On their arrival, by prearrangement, they went to the barn of rates, where they were to remain concealed until the crime was to be committed. The appellant went to a hotel and obtained some bedclothes to be used by them during their stay in the barn. The morning of their arrival at Qulin, and while they were in the barn, Yates came out and they asked him to request the appellant to bring them something to eat and some cigarettes. Upon appellant's arrival later, they made the same request of him, which he complied with. While appellant was there, Adkins came and Brown turning to Nicholson said, "what in the h_____l is he doing here?" Nicholson replied, "He is one of the boys; I am going to ride his horse off." To which Brown replied, "I have been wondering how Nicholson would get away, as I am to ride Yates' mare away after the job is pulled off." During the afternoon, Yates, Nicholson, Brown, and the appellant were together in the barn. They discussed the arrangement of the robbery, fixed the time of its commission, ant put on the disguises to see how they would look, or, in other words, held a rehearsal. It was agreed that appellant and the others, who did not actually participate in the robbery, were to misdescribe Brown and Nicholson to divert any suspicion of their participation in the crime, and the false descriptions were agreed upon. As prearranged, Adkins and Yates got their horses and rode out into the country for a time, and upon returning hitched them at a rack in the rear of the bank. They then went into the bank and asked the assistant cashier if he would not calculate the interest on a note the bank held against them, as they desired to renew it. The entrance to the bank was visible from the barn where Brown and Nicholson were concealed. While the interest was being calculated Adkins stepped out of the bank door and held up his hand, which had been agreed on as the signal to Brown and Nicholson to come on, which they did, and the robbery was committed as has been stated.

The evidence on behalf of the appellant was in effect as follows:

Nicholson testified in the appellant's case that the latter had nothing to do with the robbery; that the witness did not go with him and Brown to Qulin; and that he did not see the appellant on the day the bank was robbed. Adkins and Yates denied any knowledge of the crime, or that Brown and Nicholson were concealed in Yates' barn. Appellant denied any knowledge of or participation in the robbery, or that he gave a pistol to Brown, or took any lunch to Brown and Nicholson while they were in concealment.

The information, omitting purely formal matters and the names of the defendants, charges that Thomas J. Craft, on a day named, in Butler county, Mo., "in and upon one Irvin Wailer, assistant cashier and in charge of the Bank of Qulin, a banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Missouri, unlawfully and feloniously did make an assault, and $3,500 lawful money of the United States of the value of $3,500, the property of the said Bank of Qulin, in the presence and against the will of the said Irvin Waller, then and there by violence to the said Irvin Waller and then and there by putting the said Irvin Waller in fear of some immediate injury to his person feloniously did rob, steal, take, and carry away; against the peace and dignity of the state."

I. It is not necessary, in charging robbery in the first degree, that the person alleged to have been in the lawful possession of the property taken be limited to those named in the statute.

The gravamen of the offense consists in the taking by violence, or by putting in fear, the money or property of another from one who was at the time in the lawful possession of the same. Whether that one was the owner or the legal custodian is immaterial so far as the charging of the offense is concerned. The words of the statute, therefore, defining those from whom the unlawful taking of property shall constitute robbery, may be disregarded as words of description rather than of limitation. This we have held by Implication in recognizing the validity of indictments or informations which did not allege the custody of the property taken to have been in possession of one of those designated in the statute. State v. Wilson (Mo. Sup.) 237 S. W. 776; State v. Carroll, 214 Mo. 392, 113 S. W. 1051, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 311. In fact, so far as the sufficiency of the charge is concerned, the ownership of the property taken may be laid in the one in possession of same at the time of the robbery. State v. Montgomery, 181 Mo. 19, 79 S. W. 693, 67 L R. A. 343, 2 Ann. Cas. 261; State v. Lamb, 141 Mo. 301, 42 S. W. 827; State v. Reich (Mo. Sup.) 239 S. W. 835; State v. Flynn, 258 Mo. 211, 167 S. W. 516. It is immaterial whether the one in possession of the property holds it, at the time of the robbery, as owner or bailee. State v. Huffman (Mo. Sup.) 238 S. W. 430.

It Is further contended that the information is insufficient in that it does not charge that the assistant cashier was the owner of the money taken, or that he had any interest therein. This contention omits from consideration the nature of the offense denounced by the statute which we have before discussed. The information does allege that appellant made the assault upon the assistant cashier, who was at the time in the lawful custody of the money belonging to the bank, and, by putting him in fear of some immediate injury to his person, feloniously did rob, steal, etc. These allegations are ample to bring the offense within the purview of the statute. In addition, it is not necessary to the validity of the information that the money be alleged to have been taken "from the person" of the assistant cashier. It is charged that the taking was in his presence and against his will. This with the other allegations employed constitutes a sufficient compliance with tie statute. The essential allegations necessary to charge robbery in the first degree are the same in the statute as at common law. Under the latter the words "in his presence" are by judicial construction held to be substitutionally or tantamount in meaning to the words "from his person." East, P....