State v. Craig

• Decision Date: 03 March 1909
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CRAIG.

100 P. 167

52 Wash. 66

STATE v. CRAIG.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 3, 1909

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; W. A. Huneke, Judge.

Howard Craig appeals from a conviction. Reversed and remanded for new trial.

Geo. A. Latimer and Fred Miller, for appellant.

R. M Barnhart, Fred C. Pugh, and J. Stanley Webster, for the State.

CHADWICK J.

When this case was called for argument on December 15, 1908, no briefs had been filed by the respondent. The prosecuting attorney of Spokane county appeared, and, after oral argument, asked leave of the court to file a printed brief. It was then stipulated that a reply brief might be filed. The record was before counsel at that time. The prosecuting attorney filed a brief and, before entering into an argument on the merits, submits a motion to dismiss the appeal because of imperfections in the record. Without entering into either inquiry or discussion of the points raised, we decide that the motion came too late, and that this case should be decided upon its merits.

Appellant was convicted of a felony in the superior court of Spokane county. He set up the defense of insanity, and offered testimony on the trial to sustain his plea. The court gave the following instruction: 'You will see, therefore, that if you believe from the evidence in this case that the defendant was insane, and that he committed the crime with which he is charged, that he may or may not be legally accountable for such crime. If you should find that the defendant at the time the act was committed was suffering from mental disease so complete that every faculty and power of his mind were affected by it and that in consequence the defendant was incapable of a single healthy mental action then such crime would be the product of an insane mind, and the defendant could not be held accountable therefor. On the other hand, if you should find that at the time the act was committed the defendant was suffering from partial mental disease, so that he was capable of at least some sound, healthy mental action, then he would or would not be accountable, depending upon whether the act was the product of a sound mental action. If you should find that the defendant committed this crime, and that it was the direct product and offspring of diseased mental action, then the defendant could not be held legally accountable therefor. But, on the other hand, if you should find that, even though the defendant was suffering with partial mental disease, yet that he was capable of some sound mental action, and that the crime was the outgrowth, the result, the offspring of such sound mental action, then he would be accountable therefor.' Exceptions were duly reserved by appellant, and it is insisted that the court erred in his conception of the law of insanity when invoked as a defense to crime. It is the privilege of one charged with crime to have the jury instructed upon his theory of defense in plain and concise language. The instruction complained of is contradictory, inconsistent with itself, and misleading to the jury. The objectionable part of the instruction lies in this: The jury is told that, if it finds defendant was suffering from mental disease so complete that every faculty and power of his mind was affected by it, and that in consequence the defendant was not capable of a single, sound, healthy mental action, then defendant could not be held accountable for his crime. The remainder of the instruction may be favorable to appellant, but we are not called upon to deal with the subject as a purely abstract proposition. The court was assuming to instruct the jury upon a defense technical in so far as the layman is concerned, and the fact that the jury may have been misled by the improper part of the instruction is sufficient to warrant a reversal of this cause. The court's instruction is calculated to draw the minds of the jury entirely away from a consideration of the relation of the mental condition of the appellant to the particular thing charged against him. It denies the benefit of the defense of monomania, which may be and usually is the defense set up when insanity is relied upon. A person may be partially insane on all subjects, and yet be criminally responsible if he have sufficient capacity to distinguish right from wrong with reference to the crime committed. On the other hand, he may be mentally sound upon almost all subjects, with power of rational thought and capacity to meet the ordinary affairs of life, and yet upon some one or a particular group of subjects manifest a mental excitement, either of desire or aversion, that makes him wholly irresponsible within the limit of his aberration. Confusion has resulted from the failure of some courts to distinguish between partial insanity in the sense of weakened or disordered intellect generally and partial insanity in the sense of monomania. While the subjects of inquiry suggested by the instruction given afford an inviting field for the talent and theory of the alienist, so far as the law is concerned, the test is a simple one, and is sustained by authority without number. 'Had the accused sufficient capacity at the time of committing the act to distinguish between right and wrong with reference to the act complained of?' is the general rule adopted by the courts. Clevenger on Insanity, p. 165. The authorities on this subject are too numerous for present citation. They are collected and the principles stated in 12 Cyc. 164; 21 Cyc. 663; 22 Cyc. 1212; 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 619-621.

Counsel for the state cite State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 6 Am Rep. 533, and Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193, to sustain the trial court; but do not contend, either in oral argument or in their brief, that the instruction complained of was proper. They say: 'Respondent does not contend that the foregoing is the true measure of criminal responsibility applicable to the defense of insanity. The better rule, we think, is that announced by the English judges in the historic McNaghten Case and approved by a majority of the courts and text-writers of this country today, but we do take issue with appellant upon his claim of prejudice. If the giving of the instruction complained of was error, it was error without prejudice, because the instruction given was more favorable to the appellant than the instructions requested by his counsel.' We cannot subscribe to this test. Without going into the merits of the requested instructions, it is enough to say that, while the court could refuse to give the instructions requested, he was nevertheless bound to instruct the law of the case. The talent of counsel is not an issue here. The instruction given to the jury is. It is not only confusing, but it injects issues and directs inquiries on the part of the jury that should have no place in a criminal trial. This is practically conceded by counsel for the state: 'The point we make is this: The doctrine of the Pike and Parsons Cases embodied in the court's charge to the jury is clearly an extension of the rule stated by Clevenger and maintained by counsel because (1) it included irresistible impulse and authorized the jury to acquit the defendant, even though he knew the act was wrong, if by reason of mental disease he was irresistibly impelled to commit it; (2) it substituted the medical test instead of the legal...