State v. Cranney

• Citation: 30 Wash. 594,71 P. 50
• Parties: STATE ex rel. RACE et al. v. CRANNEY, County Treasurer, et al. [*]
• Decision Date: 31 December 1902
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

71 P. 50

30 Wash. 594

STATE ex rel. RACE et al. v. CRANNEY, County Treasurer, et al. ^[*]

Supreme Court of Washington

December 31, 1902

Appeal from superior court, Island county; George C. Hatch, Judge.

Mandamus by the state, on the relation of F. P. Race and another against Thomas Cranney, as treasurer of Island county, and others. From a judgment awarding a peremptory writ, defendant Cranney appeals. Reversed.

Lester Still and S.D. King, for appellant.

A. W Buddress, for respondents.

DUNBAR J.

The respondents move to dismiss the appeal herein for the reason that the appellant has no appealable interest in said cause. There seems to be nothing in this motion. If a party has sufficient interest to make him a party to an action, he has sufficient interest to appeal should the judgment be against him. The motion is denied.

This is a proceeding in mandamus. The alternative writ was not asked for, but a petition or complaint was filed alleging, in substance, that the petitioners had bought at tax sale the lands described in the petition; that the money to pay for the same had been delivered to the treasurer of Island county, who neglected and refused to execute a deed as by law provided; that the defendants Graham and Keene claim some interest in and to the land, which the petition alleged to be inferior and subordinate to the claim of petitioners. The petition prayed for a peremptory writ of mandate against defendant Cranney, as treasurer of said county of Island, commanding him to forthwith make, execute, and deliver to said relators, as provided by law, a good and sufficient deed of conveyance of and to the premises described; that relators have judgment against said Cranney as treasurer, for the sum of $1,500 damages; that they have judgment against all of said defendants forever debarring and foreclosing them from claiming or asserting any right to said premises, and for their costs and disbursements. Notice of application for mandate was duly served. The defendants moved to dismiss the petition for the reason that several distinct separate, and independent matters and several parties defendant were improperly united; that the claim and title of defendants Graham and Keene, or either of them, cannot be inquired into on proceedings in mandamus; and that defendant Cranney had no interest or concern therein. This motion was denied, and a demurrer was interposed by defendant Cranney, to the effect that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and for the other grounds mentioned in the motion to dismiss. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant Cranney answered. The essential part of the answer is that the defendant Rebecca Graham was the owner of the lands and premises in the petition mentioned; that on the 7th day of March, 1902, the relators delivered to the treasurer the private and personal check of John Seymore, drawn upon and payable by a bank situate and doing business in the city of Everett, Snohomish county, Wash., for the sum of $123.40, and then demanded a deed of conveyance to relators of said lands as upon said tax sale; that afterwards, on the 7th day of March, 1902, and before any deed whatever had been either drawn, signed, or executed, the said defendant Rebecca Graham, as owner of said lands, paid to the defendant Cranney, as county treasurer, the sum of $120.40, in full payment of all taxes, interest, costs, and penalties upon all said lands and premises, and for which the same was so sold, and in full redemption of said lands, and the whole thereof, from said sale thereof mentioned in said petition; whereupon said defendant, as treasurer, made, signed, and sealed a due and lawful certificate of redemption of said lands, and the whole thereof, from said sale, to said Rebecca Graham; and for said reason refused to make and deliver to relators the tax deed demanded. The treasurer, in his affirmative answer, states that upon receiving a check from the relators for the payment of the taxes he transmitted the same to Dexter Horton & Co., bankers, of Seattle, for collection, and credit to his account; but before he was notified by the bank that the check was paid and the amount credited to him the money had been received for the redemption of said land. Upon this state of pleadings the case went to trial, and the court found the state of facts upon which it based its conclusion that the relators were entitled to the deed demanded, and the mandate was issued to the defendant Cranney, treasurer aforesaid, commanding him forthwith to make, execute, and deliver said deed to the relators aforesaid to the land described in the petition. It was further decreed that neither of said defendants Rebecca Graham or A. I. Keene had any right, title, or interest in or to the said premises; that the said relators Race and Seymore were the owners in fee simple, and entitled to the possession of the premises described in the petition, and were entitled to costs and disbursements against all the defendants. No damages were awarded. From this judgment the appeal is taken.

We will first notice the petition and demurrer, which may be considered together, as they involve the same question, viz that the court erred in investigating the validity or invalidity of the asserted claims of defendants Graham and Keene in a mandamus proceeding, and that the complaint was bad for the reason that defendants Graham and Keene were joined with the treasurer in the petition. It is insisted that the office of the writ is limited to the control of official action, and the inclusion of foreign matter bears the whole to the ground. This might be true if any foreign matter had been included in the petition; at least the petition in such case would have been subject to a motion of some kind. But, as we view the petition in this case, the incorporation of the defendants Graham and Keene was not the incorporation of foreign matter, but was an attempt to have interests adjudicated which were vitally connected with the subject-matter of the proceeding. Mandamus originally issued only out of the court of king's bench. It was a prerogative writ, and its scope was exceedingly limited. There is no such thing as a prerogative writ in our judicial system, nor can there be under our form of government; but mandamus is a procedure under our Code. It is a judicial investigation, the object of which is the determination of civil rights, the same as in any ordinary proceeding; not only the determination of rights, but their determination in such a way as to culminate in an effective judgment. Therefore all rights of all parties, which are necessary to the conclusiveness of the judgment, should be determined in the proceeding; otherwise a multiplicity of suits would become necessary, the prevention of which is the evident and express object of the statute. As distinguished from the old common-law writ, and the restrictions which were thrown around not only its execution, but the courts from which it could issue, our statute (section 5755, 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St.) provides that: 'It may be issued by any court, except a justice's or a police court, to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled, and from which he is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person.' In this case the writ is invoked to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. The law provides, in section 5760, 2...