State v. Cravens
Decision Date | 17 February 1988 |
Docket Number | Nos. C-870095,C-870097,s. C-870095 |
Citation | 42 Ohio App.3d 69,536 N.E.2d 686 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. CRAVENS, Appellee. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. KRUSE, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The interpretation of a statute is the determination of what the statute means. The interpretation starts and ends with the words chosen by the legislature, but it is not limited to the words alone, because the whole context of the enactment must be considered.
2. The process of interpretation requires (1) a decision about the purpose to be attributed to the statute and (2) a decision about the meaning of the legislature's words that will carry out that purpose. The words have a double function: They serve as guides to discovery of the purpose, and they serve as limitations on the extent of the statute's applications. The words must be taken in their usual, normal or customary meaning.
3. A court may not suspend or reduce the "mandatory fines" required by R.C. 2925.03(H) except in the case where the court determines that the offender is indigent and unable to pay the fine.
Arthur M. Ney, Jr., Pros. Atty., and Paul R. Markgraf, for appellant.
Jack C. Rubenstein, Cincinnati, for appellees Donald E. Cravens and Brian K. Kruse.
In 1986, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2925.03 by adding divisions (H) through (L), providing for the imposition of mandatory fines for certain drug trafficking offenses. The single question in these two state appeals (filed by leave of court and consolidated for decision) is whether the trial court has the power to suspend a portion of the mandatory fines under R.C. 2929.51(F). 1 We hold that the trial court has no power to suspend any portion of the mandatory fines.
In State v. Kruse, case No. C-870097, the defendant pleaded guilty on December 11, 1986 to one count of aggravated trafficking in cocaine (a violation of R.C. 2925.03[A] and a felony of the third degree), and the other two counts were dismissed. A presentence report was ordered by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing on January 6, 1987, the court imposed a sentence for a definite term of two years, suspended it, and placed the defendant on probation for five years on certain conditions not relevant in this appeal. The court specifically deferred the consideration of a fine under divisions (H) through (L) of R.C. 2925.03, asking for memoranda of counsel on the meaning of these new provisions, which had become effective August 29, 1986. On January 8, 1987, after a hearing at which the court expressed its opinion that the power to suspend a fine as granted in R.C. 2929.51(F)(1) was still "operative" because fines imposed without considering all the circumstances are arbitrary and should not be forced on a court, the trial court "modified" the prior sentencing entry by imposing a fine of $2,500, suspending $1,900 of it "in the interest of justice and the correction and rehabilitation of the offender," and ordering payment of a $600 fine. This is the order from which the prosecution appeals.
In State v. Cravens, case No. C-870095, after acceptance on January 6, 1987 of a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated trafficking in cocaine (in violation of R.C. 2925.03[A] and a felony of the second degree), followed by a presentence report, the trial court imposed a sentence of imprisonment of three to fifteen years, three years to be "actual incarceration" (not suspended), imposed a fine of $5,000, and suspended "execution" of $4,000, leaving $1,000 to be paid.
The statutory language to be interpreted is found in the following parts of R.C. 2925.03(H), (I), (J) and (L), all of which were enacted by Am.S.B. No. 67 (141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 164), effective August 29, 1986:
The statutory language used by the trial court to justify its suspension of a portion of the fines was originally enacted in 1974 (Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 [134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1987] ) and is now found in R.C. 2929.51:
It is clear that in Ohio, trial judges do not have inherent power to suspend the execution of a sentence, the legislature may grant or withhold the power to suspend, and a suspension not authorized by statute shall be set aside. State, ex rel. Gordon, v. Zangerle (1940), 136 Ohio St. 371, 16 O.O. 536, 26 N.E.2d 190. It is also clear that when the legislature specifically provides for mandatory imprisonment ("actual incarceration") for a felony drug offense, the sentencing judge has no discretion to modify the period of mandatory imprisonment (R.C. 2929.51), and a convicted offender must serve the stated period. State v. Oxenrider (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 60, 14 O.O.3d 235, 396 N.E.2d 1034 ( ). See Cleveland v. Scott (1983), 8 Ohio App.3d 358, 8 OBR 470, 457 N.E.2d 351 ( ); State v. Bonello (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 365, 3 OBR 428, 445 N.E.2d 667 ( ). This being the state of the law, our attention turns to the meaning of the statutes under consideration.
The interpretation of a statute is the determination of what the statute means. The interpretation starts and ends with the words chosen by the legislature, but it is not limited to the words alone, because the whole context of the enactment must be considered.
The process of interpretation requires (1) a decision about the purpose to be attributed to the statute and (2) a decision about the meaning of the legislature's words that will carry out that purpose. The words have a double function: They serve as guides to discovery of the purpose, and they serve as limitations on the extent of the statute's applications. The words must be taken in their usual, normal or customary meaning.
We first note that in divisions (H) through (L) of R.C. 2925.03, the General Assembly emphasized what it intended by using the phrase "mandatory fine" a total of twenty-five times. The word "mandatory" has a well-known meaning: Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3 Ed.1969) 771. We find in the use of "mandatory fine" the same restrictions on sentencing discretion as was meant by the use of "actual incarceration." State v. Oxenrider, supra.
The purpose and intent of the 1986 amendment are further revealed by its design and structure. First, mandatory fines are separate from the fines that may be assessed generally for felony convictions. Division (H) begins with the phrase "[n]otwithstanding the fines otherwise...
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