State v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 14 March 1903
• Citation: 31 Wash. 260,71 P. 1030
• Parties: STATE v. CRAWFORD.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

71 P. 1030

31 Wash. 260

STATE v. CRAWFORD.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 14, 1903

Appeal from Superior Court, Kittitas County; Frank H. Rudkin, Judge.

W. R Crawford was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Reversed.

Pruyn & Slemmons, for appellant.

C. V Warner and Austin Mires, for the State.

FULLERTON C.J.

The appellant was charged with the crime of murder in the first degree for the killing of one G. V. Huhn, tried on the charge, and found guilty of manslaughter. He appeals from the judgment and sentence pronounced against him.

A witness on the part of the state was questioned as to a conversation he had with the appellant preceding the homicide, its purpose being to show threats made by the appellant against the deceased. One of the answers was as follows: 'Well, he just simply said he had been down seeing Mr. Hayward--if he had given him the land the fence was on that Mr. Huhn had been cutting down--and he said he would go up, and, if he caught Huhn cutting the fence down he would shoot him.' The appellant moved to strike the answer on the ground that the language testified to did not amount to a threat, and assigns error on the refusal of the court to grant the motion. Conceding the contention of counsel as to the effect of the answer to be well taken, it would not be error on the part of the trial court to refuse to strike the answer out. There is no rule of law which requires a trial court to go through the testimony of each witness, and strike out and withdraw from the jury such of it as does not meet the expectations of the party introducing it. Its competency, relevancy, and materiality are questions for the court, but whether it proves or disproves a particular fact is ordinarily a question within the peculiar province of the jury to determine. In the case before us this character of testimony being relevant to the issue, whether the fact sought to be established by it was or was not proved by the testimony offered, was a question which the jury had the duty of solving from the testimony as a whole. The court was not called on to say whether particulars answers did or did not prove the fact.

The dying declaration of the deceased was allowed to go to the jury, together with the circumstances under which it was made. It is objected that the court erred in permitting these surrounding circumstances to be detailed to the jury. There are cases which seem to support this contention, but the weight of authority and the better reason, it seems to us, are the other way. The circumstances under which a dying declaration is made materially affect its weight and credibility, and, as these are questions for the jury, it is proper that such circumstances should be shown. 10 Enc. of Law, 387 (2d Ed.)

Objections were interposed and sustained to the following questions propounded to the appellant: 'You may state whether or not you had any malicious feelings towards Mr. Huhn in his lifetime?' 'Mr. Crawford, you may state whether or not you were in fear of this man?' 'I will ask you if you knew the general reputation of the deceased, Huhn, in the community where he lived, in reference to his going armed?' The last question was also propounded to several of the appellant's witnesses, and objections thereto sustained. The prevailing rule is that whenever the motive intention, or belief of a person is relevant to the issue, it is competent for such person to testify directly upon that point, whether he is a party to the suit or not. His testimony may be, and often is, entitled to but little weight, but this is no reason for its exclusion. He knows what his feelings, motives, or beliefs were at the particular time, and, when relevant to the issue, has the same right to testify regarding them as he has to any other relevant fact within his knowledge. It was error, therefore, to sustain the objections to the first and second questions quoted. In passing upon the last of the questions quoted, the court held it permissible to show what the fact was with reference to the deceased's going armed. but that it was incompetent to show what his general reputation in the community where he had lived was in that regard. A somewhat similar question was before this court in State v. Ellis, 70 P. 963, where it was held error to refuse to permit the defendant to show what the reputation and habit of the deceased were with reference to using firearms when engaged in quarrels. In that case it was said: 'It is readily perceived that the real issue at the...