State v. Arata

• Decision Date: 03 December 1909
• Parties: STATE v. ARATA.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

105 P. 227

56 Wash. 185

STATE v. ARATA.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 3, 1909

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Kitsap County; John B. Yakey Judge.

Jama Arata was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed.

George Friend and Milo A. Root, for appellant.

Thomas Stevenson, W. F. Magill, and C. D. Sutton, for the State.

MOUNT J.

The appellant was tried and convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree. He appeals from the death sentence.

His counsel argues, first, that the information is insufficient. The information states: 'That the said Jama Arata in the county of Kitsap, state of Washington, on the 21st day of November, A. D. 1908, then and there being, purposely feloniously, and of his deliberate and premeditated malice did kill one Herbert Richards, by then and there purposely feloniously, and of his deliberate and premeditated malice stabbing, cutting, and mortally wounding said Herbert Richards with a knife which he, the said Jama Arata, then and there held in his hands, contrary,' etc. It is contended that, because the verb 'did' follows the words 'purposely, feloniously, and of his deliberate and premeditated malice,' there is no allegation that the killing was done purposely, etc. There is no merit in this contention. To say that a person purposely and feloniously did an act is to say that he did it purposely and feloniously. There is no difference in the two expressions. Substantially this form of information has been sustained by this court in many cases as charging murder in the first degree. State v. Cronin, 20 Wash. 512, 56 P. 26, and cases there cited; State v. Crawford, 31 Wash. 260, 71 P. 1030. The jury returned a verdict of 'Guilty of murder in the first degree, and further recommend the defendant to the mercy of the court.' It is contended that this shows a compromise verdict, and that the jury were not convinced of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, because there is but one penalty provided for the offense, which penalty is death where no mercy can be shown. Many reasonable inferences might be drawn from this recommendation, but the fact remains that the jury unanimously found the defendant guilty of the greater crime charged. That finding was the ultimate finding upon the issues tried. The jury were not concerned about the penalty. It was the duty of the court to pronounce the judgment which the law imposed. Such a recommendation was merely advisory, and, if the penalty were such that the judge might exercise a discretion in pronouncing sentence, he would not be bound thereby. He might heed the recommendation or not as he saw fit. The recommendation was therefore mere surplusage. It did not invalidate the verdict regularly and solemnly rendered. Nor did it necessarily show that there was a doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the guilt of the accused. State v. Bennett, 40 S.C. 308, 18 S.E. 886; State v. Potter, 15 Kan. 302; State v. Bradley, 6 La. Ann. 554; State v. Newman, 49 W.Va. 724, 39 S.E. 655; People v. Lee, 17 Cal. 76.

It is contended that the court erred in instructing the jury upon the question of time necessary for deliberation. Upon this question the court, after defining the different degrees of murder and after defining the meaning of the words 'purposely,' 'deliberately,' 'premeditation,' and 'malice,' said to the jury: 'I further instruct you that the law knows no specific time within which any intent to kill must be formed so as to make it murder. If the will accompanies the act a moment antecedent to the act itself which caused death, it is as sufficient to make the offense murder as if it were a day or any other time. I further instruct you that the time of deliberation and premeditation need not be long. If it furnishes room for an opportunity for reflection and the facts show that such reflection existed, and that the mind was busy with the design and made the choice with full chance to choose otherwise, there is sufficient deliberation. I further instruct you that, to warrant the jury in finding a verdict of murder in the first degree, you must find and so indicate in your verdict that the killing was with deliberation and premeditation; that is, that the prisoner conceived intent to kill, that he meditated upon it, and that he formed and afterwards executed the deliberate determination to take life. If the deliberate intent to kill be thus formed and acted upon, it is immaterial how soon after such evil design is formed that it is executed. There need be no appreciable space of time between the formation of the intention to kill and the killing.' This was the whole instruction upon this...