State v. Crews, 71515
| Citation | 968 S.W.2d 763 |
| Decision Date | 12 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 71515,71515 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Richard CREWS, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Susan McGraugh, St. Louis, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. Nixon, Cristi A. Ingalsbe, Jefferson City, for respondent.
Defendant, Richard Crews, appeals from the judgment of the trial court entered on the jury's conviction of one count of burglary in the first degree, section 569.160 RSMo. (1994) and one count of felonious stealing, section 570.030.3(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to ten years imprisonment on the first-degree burglary count and seven years imprisonment on the stealing count. We affirm.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts, the following evidence was adduced at trial. On the evening of October 13,1994 Gregory and Deborah Koehler returned to their house in the Windsong Court Subdivision in O'Fallon, Mo. The Koehlers noticed that their 1985 GMC Sierra Classic was missing when they opened their garage door. As Mrs. Koehler called the police, Mr. Koehler went inside the house and noticed that someone had broken into the house through a sliding glass door. Mr. Koehler then began to examine the house and noticed several items missing, including a loaded .22 caliber rifle.
The day following the burglary, Courtney Hammonds and Diondrey Hardwick were arrested for driving the Koehlers' stolen Sierra Classic. Hammonds and Hardwick stated that they received the Sierra Classic from a man nicknamed "Cowboy" and his wife in exchange for a piece of cocaine. Both Hammonds and Hardwick identified defendant in a photo line-up as the man who gave them the Sierra Classic in exchange for the cocaine. The O'Fallon Police then searched defendant's residence and found several items that were taken from the Koehlers' home during the burglary. Defendant's brother-in-law later found the .22 caliber rifle that was stolen from the Koehlers' home in defendant's residence and turned the rifle over to the O'Fallon Police.
Defendant was charged with one count of burglary in the first degree and one count of felonious stealing. The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The trial court entered judgment against defendant based on the jury's verdicts and sentenced defendant to ten years on the first-degree burglary count and seven years on the stealing count. This appeal follows.
In his first point on appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree burglary count. Defendant contends that the state failed to produce sufficient evidence that he was armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the burglary. We disagree.
In reviewing an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, we will affirm the trial court's judgment if there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror may have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo. banc), cert. denied 510 U.S. 997, 114 S.Ct. 562, 126 L.Ed.2d 462 (1993). Also, we will review the record in the light most favorable to the state, accepting as true all evidence and inferences that support the jury's verdict and ignoring all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Id.
Section 569.160 states in relevant part:
A person commits the crime of burglary in the first degree...when in effecting entry or while in a building or inhabitable structure or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
(1) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon...
Defendant concedes that the state produced sufficient evidence that he stole a .22 caliber rifle from the Koehlers' home. However, defendant argues that the state failed to produce sufficient evidence that he was armed with a deadly weapon under section 569.160(1) because it failed to produce evidence that he either loaded the rifle or knew that it was loaded. The legislature has defined a deadly weapon as any firearm, loaded or unloaded. Section 556.061(10). (emphasis added). Thus, whether defendant loaded the rifle or knew that it was loaded is immaterial to whether he was armed with a deadly weapon.
Defendant also contends in his first point that the legislature intended the term "armed" in section 569.160(1) to mean more than stealing a firearm during a burglary. Defendant premises this argument on the fact that the legislature used the term "armed" instead of the word "steals" in the statute. We find this argument unpersuasive.
When construing a criminal statute, we must effectuate the legislature's intent by examining the plain language of the statute. See State ex rel. Bulloch v. Seier, 771 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Mo. banc 1989). Here, the legislature has not defined the term "armed". When the legislature has not defined a term, we glean its plain and ordinary meaning from its dictionary definition. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Mo. banc 1993).
Webster's defines the term "armed" as equipped with a weapon. (Webster's Ninth New College Dictionary, 1991). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, a person is "armed" when he equips himself with a weapon for the purpose of stealing it. Accordingly, once defendant took possession of the Koehlers' .22 caliber rifle while burglarizing their home, he was "armed" for purposes of section 569.160(1). Therefore, the state produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. Defendant's first point is denied.
Defendant asserts in his second point that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach him by producing evidence of a prior arrest. We disagree with defendant's contention.
Defendant testified on direct examination that he had never been in the Windsong Subdivision, the subdivision where the Koehlers resided. On cross-examination, the...
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