State v. Cruz, 67147-8.
Decision Date | 07 October 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 67147-8.,67147-8. |
Citation | 139 Wash.2d 186,985 P.2d 384 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Sabas E. CRUZ, Petitioner. |
Nielsen, Broman & Associates, Eric J. Nielsen, Eric Broman, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Jim Krider, Snohomish County Prosecutor, S. Aaron Fine, Deputy, Everett, for Respondent.
The Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.120(4), mandates life without possibility of parole when the offender is convicted of a third "most serious offense" after two separate prior convictions. RCW 9.94A.030(25). Sabas Cruz appealed such a sentence to the Court of Appeals claiming the offense for which he was sentenced was his second, not his third, and one of the prior convictions had previously "washed out" and thus could not be calculated as part of his offender score. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for resentencing.
In 1994 Cruz was charged by an amended information with one count of rape of a child in the first degree. See RCW 9A.44.073. He waived his right to a trial by jury and was subsequently found guilty by the court. He had two prior convictions, both based on pleas of guilty: a December 1975 conviction of rape and a February 1989 conviction of attempted burglary in the first degree. Cruz was paroled for the 1975 offense on December 23, 1977, and was not convicted of another felony until February 17, 1989. By the time of Cruz's 1989 conviction the 1975 conviction had "washed out" (i.e., it was not counted as a prior offense for purposes of calculating Cruz's offender score) as a matter of law because Cruz had gone 10 years since his release without further felony conviction. In his statement on plea of guilty to the 1988 offense Cruz evidenced his understanding that his sentencing range would be between 11.5 and 15 months "based upon my criminal history which I understand the Prosecuting Attorney says to be none." Statement of Def. on Plea of Guilty (Feb. 10, 1989). However in 1990 the legislature amended the statute by eliminating sex offenses from the washout provision. Laws of 1990, ch. 3, § 706.
Assuming the previously amended washout provisions would not benefit Cruz, the 1994 trial court held Cruz was a persistent felon predicated on the two prior convictions, and sentenced him to life without possibility of parole pursuant to the POAA. Division One affirmed. State v. Cruz, 91 Wash.App. 389, 404, 959 P.2d 670 (1998). We granted his petition for review. 137 Wash.2d 1008, 978 P.2d 1098 (1999).
Are 1990 amendments to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, retroactive?
Cruz's first conviction was in 1975 on an information charging one count of rape in violation of then RCW 9.79.010.2 Thereafter the state adopted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA). By the time of Cruz's 1989 conviction, the SRA provided Class B felonies would not count toward an offender's score for purposes of sentence determination if the offender had spent 10 years in the community since release from confinement without being convicted of any felonies. Former RCW 9.94A.360 (1988 Supp.).3 At that time, removal of a "washed out" conviction from the offender score was automatic and not subject to judicial discretion. David Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 5.6[d] (1985). The trial judge in 1989 correctly determined Cruz's 1975 felony was a Class B conviction which had "washed out"4 and correctly sentenced him as a first offender.
But in 1990 the legislature amended the SRA to except sex offenses from washout provisions of the SRA. Laws of 1990, ch. 3, § 706. It is the application of this change to his prior conviction that forms the gravamen of Cruz's challenge because but for the 1975 conviction Cruz would not be a persistent offender subject to a term of life imprisonment without parole. Such is necessarily the case because a conviction for purposes of implementing the POAA must also be a conviction that forms part of a defendant's offender score. RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii); State v. Morley, 134 Wash.2d 588, 604, 952 P.2d 167 (1998).
The Court of Appeals concluded that Cruz's previously washed out conviction was not only resurrected by the 1990 amendments to the SRA, but this resurrection of his criminal history did not violate the state and federal prohibitions on ex post facto legislation.5 Cruz, 91 Wash.App. at 399, 959 P.2d 670. But as we conclude this legislation is not retroactive, we need not reach the question of whether such a revival would run afoul of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation.
The presumption against retroactive application of a statute Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439, 117 S.Ct. 891, 895, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). See also In re Personal Restraint of Shepard, 127 Wash.2d 185, 193, 898 P.2d 828 (1995) ( ). The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation is but a further manifestation of the repugnance with which such retroactive legislation is viewed. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Nonetheless, an amendment to a statute, such as the 1990 change to the SRA, will be applied retroactively if: (1) the legislature so intended; (2) it is "curative"; or (3) it is remedial, provided, however, such retroactive application does not run afoul of any constitutional prohibition. In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 119 Wash.2d 452, 460, 832 P.2d 1303 (1992).
Legislative intent for retroactivity must be clearly found within the statute's language. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268, 114 S.Ct. 1483; State v. Douty, 92 Wash.2d 930, 935, 603 P.2d 373 (1979).
But the legislature has not stated any intention to apply the 1990 change regarding sex offenses retroactively, either expressly or impliedly. Rather this statute is unequivocally prospective:
Laws of 1990, ch. 3, §§ 706, 1406(2) (emphasis added). Section 706 embodies relevant amendments to the washout provisions of the SRA at issue here. Laws of 1990, ch. 3, § 706. Section 1406 is a legislative command to apply the statute prospectively.
Likewise there is no argument that this change to the washout provision is "curative." A curative amendment is one that "clarifies or technically corrects an ambiguous statute." F.D. Processing, 119 Wash.2d at 461, 832 P.2d 1303 (citation omitted). But here there is no question under the version of the SRA in effect in 1989 that a Class B felony, even for a sex offense, was subject to washout provisions. The 1990 amendment therefore effected a substantive, not curative, change.
Nor is the 1990 amendment remedial. A remedial change is one that relates to practice, procedures, or remedies, and does not affect a substantive or vested right. F.D. Processing, 119 Wash.2d at 462-63, 832 P.2d 1303. This amendment is not remedial but substantive. The amendment imposes an affirmative disability; it promotes the retributive aim of punishment, and there is no rational basis or nonpunitive purpose for the change. See State v. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488, 499, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433-34, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) ( ); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2720, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) ( ); Ward, 123 Wash.2d at 498 n. 5, 869 P.2d 1062 ( ).
The Court of Appeals reasoned a statute is not applied retroactively where the previously washed out offense is used only to calculate the offender score for the crime committed after the amendment. Cruz, 91 Wash.App. at 399, 959 P.2d 670. However the issue here is not the calculation of Cruz's offender score in 1994, but whether or not his washed out 1975 conviction could figure into that calculation. Absent revival it could not.
Under the SRA a defendant's offender score is determined by the "offenses for which the defendant was convicted and by the defendant's ...
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