State v. Cureton

• Decision Date: 20 November 1940
• Docket Number: 509.
• Parties: STATE v. CURETON.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

11 S.E.2d 469

218 N.C. 491

STATE v. CURETON.

No. 509.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 20, 1940

Criminal prosecution upon bill of indictment charging the defendant with the murder of one John William Henniken, alias John Williams.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. From judgment of death by asphyxiation pronounced thereon, the defendant appealed.

B S. Whiting, of Charlotte, for appellant.

Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., and T. W. Bruton and George B. Patton Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

BARNHILL Justice.

The defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court to dismiss, on his motion of nonsuit, the first degree of murder charge. The record does not sustain this assignment. Only a general motion of nonsuit was entered. However, as this is a capital case, we have considered defendant's assignment as if supported by the record.

Briefly stated, the evidence favorable to the State tends to show that on June 23, 1940, the defendant, the deceased and others, had been engaged in a game of skin. The deceased took a card out of the deck which, as we understand, is a serious breach of the ethics of that game. The defendant objected. In a few minutes the defendant left and went home. In a short while he came back and the deceased apologized. The game broke up and in about an hour the parties again gathered at another place to continue the game. When the defendant came up to the place of the second game he stated, "I have been mistreated". At that time he had a gun that he shot twice on the street. The deceased walked away and a witness tried to hold the defendant. When the deceased was about 125 feet away the defendant broke away from the witness, followed the deceased, caught up with him and slapped him down. He then pulled him up and said to him "You done me wrong" and shot him. Deceased said, "Oh, Lordy Noah, you done shot me, what you shoot me for? Don't shoot me no more. I ain't done nothing to you." To this the defendant replied, "You done me wrong." He then turned the deceased around and shot him through the head, returned to the shoe shine stand and said, "Who don't like it cause he lay-up there?". He then returned to his home, came back out, walked up to the deceased as he lay in the street and struck the deceased, after which he threw up his hands and said to the others, "Bottle up and go, everybody got to bottle up and go". This evidence is amply sufficient to be submitted to a jury on the charge of murder in the first degree.

Defendant's second assignment of error is directed to the alleged failure of the court to comply with the provisions of C.S. § 564 in that: (1) In giving the charge the court laid undue emphasis on the contentions of the State, thereby expressing an opinion that facts favorable to the State were fully and sufficiently proven and, (2) that in giving his charge the court failed to state in a plain and correct manner the evidence in the case and declare and explain the law arising thereon.

First. The court reviewed in detail the evidence of the several witnesses for the State and that of the defendant in his own behalf. It then outlined, in behalf of the State and of the defendant, the pertinent contentions arising thereon. As there were a number of witnesses for the State and only the defendant testified in his behalf the court naturally consumed more time in outlining the evidence for the State than it gave to the evidence of the defendant. But we find nothing in the charge to support the contention that the court acted otherwise than in a fair and impartial manner, giving the defendant the consideration to which he was entitled.

Second. This feature of defendant's assignment of error is a broadside exception and for that reason might well be ignored. But the defendant in his brief undertakes to point out wherein the charge is defective in this respect. He contends that the court failed to explain and apply the principle of law that when one commits a murder when so drunk as to be incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated design to kill, he would not be guilty of murder in the first degree, but only of murder in the second degree or a lesser degree of homicide.

Every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary is proven to the satisfaction of the jury. State v. Bracy, 215 N.C. 248, 1 S.E.2d 891. No inference of the absence of deliberation and premeditation arises as a matter of law from intoxication; and mere intoxication cannot serve as an excuse for the offender. The influence of intoxication upon the question of existence of premeditation depends upon its degree and its effect upon the mind and passion. For it to constitute a defense it must appear that defendant was not able, by reason of drunkenness, to think out before hand what he intended to do and to weigh it and understand the nature and consequence of his act.

"All the authorities agree that to make such defense available the evidence must show that at the time of the killing the prisoner's mind and reason were so completely intoxicated and overthrown as to render him utterly incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill. As the doctrine is one that is dangerous in its application, it is allowed only in very clear cases." State v Shelton, 164 N.C. 513, 79 S.E. 883, 885; State v. Murphy, 157 N.C. 614, 72 S.E. 1075; State v. English, 164 N.C. 497, 80 S.E. 72; State v....