State v. Curtis, s. WD
| Decision Date | 22 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | Nos. WD,s. WD |
| Citation | 931 S.W.2d 493 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Randy CURTIS, Appellant. 50821, WD 52223. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
David Simpson, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., David R. Truman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
The defendant, Randy Curtis, was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance, § 195.202, RSMo 1994, and was sentenced as a prior offender to five years imprisonment. The defendant appeals his conviction and the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion. The dispositive issue is whether the police had reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop. 1 Because we hold that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, the Rule 29.15 issue as to whether trial counsel objected to the seizure of the illegal drugs when offered into evidence, is moot.
A confidential informant called Columbia, Missouri, Detective Ted Anderson on April 27, 1994, and told him that the defendant would be selling crack cocaine from his car later that evening. The informant had provided reliable information to Detective Anderson previously. During one communication with the informant, Detective Anderson had verified the identity of the defendant by showing the informant a picture of him.
On this occasion, the informant told Detective Anderson that the defendant was coming from Mexico, Missouri, and would be in the area of By George's, on the Business Loop in Columbia, selling crack cocaine out of his car. The informant told the detective that the defendant would be driving a 1990s model maroon four-door Buick with temporary tags. He also stated that the defendant would arrive in the area between 8:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. and that crack cocaine would be found in a glass vial.
Relying on this information, Columbia police officers set up a surveillance of the area. At approximately 8:45 p.m., the officers observed the defendant, driving a maroon Buick with temporary tags, pull into the parking lot of Mazzio's Pizza, across the street from By George's. This information was immediately verified by the officers. The officers approached the car and asked the defendant and his passenger to get out of the car. The defendant refused, put the car into reverse gear in an attempt to escape, and slammed into a police car stationed behind him. The defendant yelled to the officers that he could not open his door, and then reached in between the two front seats and put his hand under the back of the front passenger seat.
The defendant and his passenger eventually were removed from the car, and the defendant was arrested. The officers found a crack pipe and a Lifesavers container with approximately 8 rocks on the driver's seat of the car. The substance was later determined to be crack cocaine. When the officers searched under the seat where the defendant had been reaching, they found a razor blade, as well as a leather eyeglass case containing a glass vial, and a small amount of steel wool. The glass vial contained approximately 10 more rocks of crack cocaine.
The defendant contends that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his car based on the information provided by the informant, who, the defendant argues, was not shown to be reliable. He contends, therefore, that the stop and subsequent search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The state argues that the defendant has waived the opportunity to raise this point on appeal because he waived his objection at the time the drugs were introduced into evidence. However, the defendant made a pre-trial motion to suppress and evidence on the motion was heard. The motion was denied. Before opening statement, counsel requested and was granted a continuing objection by the court, which was agreed to by opposing counsel, in order to preserve his motion to suppress. He objected to testimony offered by the first witness in accordance with his prior motion and added that there was no foundation for his testimony. The court overruled the objection to the foundation and noted his continuing objection. Nevertheless, after having made a clear record to preserve the issue, trial counsel stated, "no objection," when the controlled substance was offered into evidence, and thereby, the state argues, affirmatively waived the continuing objection. See State v. Holbert, 416 S.W.2d 129, 131-32 (Mo.1967). It is apparent that counsel had no additional objection to the admissibility of the drugs when he said,...
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State v. Baker
...to review the denial of a motion to suppress on its merits, State v. Stillman, 938 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Mo.App.1997); State v. Curtis, 931 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo.App.1996), noting that "to now rule a waiver of this point and a denial of review would be a hypertechnical application of the requireme......
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State v. Stillman, WD
...a denial of review would be a hypertechnical application of the requirement of renewing the objection at every stage. See State v. Curtis, 931 S.W.2d 493 (Mo.App.1996). Therefore, the court will review the denial of Stillman's motion to suppress the evidence on the The proponent of a motion......
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State v. Williams
...presented at trial. These acts include: • The defendant requested and was granted a continuing objection. Id. at 715;State v. Curtis, 931 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Mo.App.1996) (in addition, prosecutor agreed to continuing objection); see McWhorter, 240 S.W.3d at 764 (“When a defendant requests a co......
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Reeves v. Singleton, WD
...As the State admits, an anonymous tip such as this cannot, without more, provide the basis for reasonable suspicion. State v. Curtis, 931 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo.App.1996), citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). Rather, information obtained from an anonym......