State v. Dade County, 38981

• Decision Date: 25 February 1970
• Docket Number: No. 38981,38981
• Citation: 234 So.2d 651
• Parties: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DADE, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 651

234 So.2d 651

The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DADE, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 38981.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 25, 1970.

Rehearing Denied April 22, 1970.

Richard E. Gerstein, State's Atty., and Jack R. Blumenfeld, Asst. State's Atty., for appellant.

Thomas C. Britton, County Atty., and Thomas P. Abbott, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

BOYD, Justice.

This cause is before us on appeal from the Order of the Circuit Court of Dade County, validating special county building certificates of indebtedness in the amount of $7,600,000.00 for the purchase and improvement of facilities to be used as a youth hall and juvenile court complex. Appellant and Appellee agree that the questions before us are:

1. Will the issuance of the youth hall and juvenile court complex certificates of indebtedness, without approval at a freeholders' election, violate Article VII, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution?

2. Is the levy of the special building tax for the payment of the youth hall and juvenile court complex certificates of indebtedness excluded from, and not subject to, the millage limitations contained in Article VII, Section 9, subsection (b), of the Florida Constitution of 1968?

On June 18, 1969, the Board of Commissioners of Dade County, Florida, enacted Ordinance 69--34 entitled:

'An Ordinance authorizing the construction of a new youth hall and juvenile court complex, the issuance at one time or from time to time of not exceeding $7,600,000 special county building certificates of indebtedness for payment of the cost thereof, and the levy of a building tax not exceeding one-fourth of a mill annually for ten consecutive years for the payment of such Certificates of indebtedness and the interest thereon.' (e.s.)

Florida Statute § 135.01, F.S.A., relied on as authority for the issuance of the certificates of indebtedness, provides:

'Whenever any board of county commissioners shall deem it necessary to erect or repair any courthouse, jail, or other county building, erect an addition or additions to any courthouse, jail or other county building, they shall give notice for thirty days in some newspaper published in said county, or in some newspaper published in the judicial circuit, if there be none published in the county, that at the next regular meeting of the board after the publication of the said notice, such question or questions, will be acted upon by said board. If, at said meeting, a majority of said board shall determine that it is necessary to erect, repair, or build addition or additions to, such building or buildings, they may levy a Building tax not exceeding five mills per annum, for not more than thirty consecutive years in lieu of all other county building tax. The tax levied shall be assessed and collected at the same time and in the same manner as other state and county taxes are levied and collected.'

Prior to January 7, 1969, the effective date of the new Constitution, this Court, in a number of cases, upheld the financing of essential government requirements under Florida Statute § 135.01, and its predecessors, without freeholder vote. These cases ¹ are relied on by appellee.

The question is whether Section 12 of Article VII of the new Constitution, F.S.A., has superseded our prior decisions and rendered Florida Statute § 135.01, F.S.A. invalid.

Section 12 of Article VII, of the Constitution provides as follows:

'Local bonds.--Counties, school districts, municipalities, special districts and local governmental bodies with taxing powers may issue bonds, Certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation certificates, payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than twelve months after issuance only:

'(a) to finance or refinance capital projects authorized by law and only when approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation; or

'(b) to refund outstanding bonds and interest and redemption premium thereon at a lower net average interest cost rate.'

(e.s.)

Appellee contends that Section 12 of Article VII, of the new Constitution does not differ in any material way from former Section 6 of Article IX of the Constitution of 1885 and should be construed as was the prior provision to allow the certificates of indebtedness under consideration.

The prior constitutional provision effective from 1930 until January 7, 1969 provided:

'The Legislature shall have power to provide for issuing State bonds only for the purpose of repelling invasion or suppressing insurrection, and the Counties, Districts, or Municipalities of the State of Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after the same shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which a majority of the freeholders who are qualified electors residing in such Counties, Districts, or Municipalities shall participate, to be held in the manner to be prescribed by law; but the provisions of this act shall not apply to the refunding of bonds issued exclusively for the purpose of refunding of the bonds or the interest thereon of such Counties, Districts, or Municipalities.'

We are unable to agree with appellee's contention that 'except for refinements of language' the old and new sections do not differ as related to the instant case. The new Constitution expressly provides for the issuance of Certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation certificates 'only to finance capital projects authorized by law and Only when approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation. * * *' The prior Constitution did not mention certificates of indebtedness or tax anticipation certificates, but referred only to bonds requiring approval of freeholders.

The present Constitution is clearly more restrictive and expresses the will of the people that financial arrangements of the type formerly upheld in the Tapers v. Pichard line of cases be no longer permitted. ² The language of Section 12, Article VII is plain. In Ervin v. Collins ³ we held:

'We are called on to construe the terms of the Constitution, an instrument from the people, and we are to effectuate their purpose from the words employed in the document. We are not permitted to color it by the addition of words or the engrafting of our views as to how it should have been written. * * * As pointed out by the chancellor, it must be presumed that those who drafted the Constitution had a clear conception of the principles they intended to express, that they knew the English language and that they knew how to use it, that they gave careful consideration to the practical application of the Constitution and arranged its provisions in the order that would most accurately express their intention.'

We hold, therefore, that Florida Statute § 135.01 is invalid and the certificates of indebtedness proposed to be issued thereunder cannot be issued without approval of freeholders as provided by Section 12 of Article VII, Florida Constitution of 1968.

Appellant contends that the levy of the special building tax to pay the certificates of indebtedness is subject to the millage limitations of Section 9(b), Article VII of the new Constitution. ⁴ This Court has recently had occasion to consider the provision in question in State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson. ⁵ Since the certificates of indebtedness here under consideration can only be issued upon approval of the freeholders, the tax levied to pay the certificates is in addition to, and not included within, the 10 mills allowed for county purposes under Section 9(b), of Article VII.

This Court is mindful of the urgent need for expanded juvenile court and youth hall facilities in Dade County. This need is clearly established in the record. We are not, however, permitted the luxury of an elastic interpretation of a clear constitutional provision.

Accordingly, the final decree validating the bonds is reversed.

It is so ordered.

DREW, THORNAL, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, C.J., dissents with opinion.

ROBERTS, J., dissents with opinion.

ERVIN, Chief Justice (dissenting):

I think we should affirm the Circuit Court's validation of the special Dade County building certificates of indebtedness in the amount of $7,600,000 for the acquisition of necessary land and improvements thereon of facilities to be used as a Youth Hall and Juvenile Complex Center.

The designation, 'Youth Hall and Juvenile Complex Center,' is in reality a more sophisticated name for the buildings to house the Dade County Juvenile Court and to detain and imprison the County's juvenile offenders for their discipline, detention and rehabilitation separate from the County's adult offenders.

These buildings come squarely within the genre of courthouse buildings and jails as contemplated by F.S. Section 135.01, F.S.A. Compare State v. County of Palm Beach, Fla.1956, 89 So.2d 607.

The County has levied for the financing of these facilities, through the issuance of said certificates of indebtedness, a special ad valorem millage tax not exceeding one fourth of one mill on the dollar for a period of ten consecutive years beginning in the fiscal year 1970--71, pursuant to F.S. Section 135.01, F.S.A.

Appellant contends that for the said certificates to be valid they must be approved at a freeholders' election pursuant to Section 12 of Article VII of the revised 1968 Florida Constitution, which approval it also contends is necessary to satisfy millage restrictions of Section 9 of Article VII of the Constitution which would otherwise apply.

Appellee contends the certificates are of a class of obligations which do not fall within the restrictions of said Sections 9 and 12 of Article VII, since such restrictions are amenable to the judicial constructions given similar provisions in the 1885 Constitution. See e.g., Tapers v. Pichard, 1939, 124 Fla. 549, 169 So. 39. Compare Hayek v....