State v. Orange County, 43247

• Decision Date: 31 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 43247,43247
• Citation: 281 So.2d 310
• Parties: STATE of Florida, and the Taxpayers, Property Owners and Citizens of Orange County including non-residents owning property or subject to taxation, et al., Appellants, v. ORANGE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 310

281 So.2d 310

STATE of Florida, and the Taxpayers, Property Owners and Citizens of Orange County including non-residents owning property or subject to taxation, et al., Appellants, v. ORANGE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellees.

No. 43247.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 31, 1973.

J. Robert Eagan, State's Atty., for appellants.

Steven R. Bechtel, Mateer & Harbert, Orlando, and Frank L. Watson, Freeman, Richardson, Watson, Slade, McCarthy & Kelly, Jacksonville, for appellees.

Thomas C. Britton and Lawrence R. Metsch, Shutts & Bowen, Miami, for Naples Civic Association, as amicus curiae.

ERVIN, Justice.

This cause is before us on direct appeal from a decision of the Orange County Circuit Court validating 'not exceeding $3,000,000 Capital Improvement Bonds,' to be issued by Orange County. We have jurisdiction under Florida Constitution Article V, Section 3, and Florida Statute 75.08, F.S.A. Oral argument having been waived by the parties, we proceed to expedite disposition of the cause.

The appellee, Orange County, filed its complaint on October 27, 1972, for validation of the bonds in question. The bonds were to be issued by the County to acquire and construct certain county capital projects pursuant to County Ordinance No. 72--5, enacted September 5, 1972.

On October 27, 1972, an Order to Show Cause why such obligations should not be validated was entered in the Circuit Court for Orange County directing the State of Florida and the several property owners, taxpayers and citizens of Orange County, Florida, including non-residents owning property or subject to taxation therein and all others having or claiming any right, title or interest in property to be affected by the issuance by the County of the obligations, to appear on December 11, 1972, to show cause why the obligations and the proceedings authorizing the same should not be validated and confirmed.

County Ordinance No. 72--5 authorized the County to acquire and construct county capital projects, issue revenue obligations to finance the cost thereof and provided for their payment solely from the proceeds of race track funds and jai alai fronton funds accruing annually to Orange County pursuant to Chapters 550 and 551, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and allocated to the Board of County Commissioners pursuant to law.

After considering the State's answer, the exhibits introduced into evidence and hearing the testimony and argument of counsel, the Court on December 11, 1972, entered its final judgment validating the bonds.

By this appeal we are called upon to decite whether noncharter counties have the power to issue capital improvement bonds repayable solely from the county's share of race track and jai alai funds.

Sections 1(f) and (i) of Article VIII, State Constitution, together with Section 6(b) (Schedule), Article VIII thereof, continue in counties without charters the same status and delegated powers that existed in them pursuant to law prior to the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, with the additional power to adopt ordinances except where inconsistent with enabling statutes.*

There is nothing in the 1968 Constitution that precludes a noncharter county from issuing revenue bonds without an approving referendum to finance the acquisition or construction of authorized county buildings, payable solely from a portion of its annual share of race track and jai alai fronton funds distributed to it pursuant to F.S. Sections 550.13 and 550.14, F.S.A.

There is nothing in the general law or in any special law that precludes Orange County from issuing the revenue bonds here considered. On the contrary, there is delegated authority for implementing by ordinance the issuance of county bonds as hereinafter explained.

Since there is no such preclusion, Section 1(f) of Article VIII authorizes Orange County, a noncharter county, pursuant to enabling statutes to enact a county ordinance (in lieu of securing a special act to that effect) authorizing such a revenue bond issue. F.S. Section 125.01(1), (c), (r), (t), F.S.A., empowers noncharter counties in several self-government respects and clearly authorizes adoption of the bond ordinance herein. Thus there is no preclusion; instead, there is ample authority for the bond ordinance. Since F.S. Section 125.01(1)(r), F.S.A. delegated to Orange County the specific power to issue bonds and revenue certificates, it had the power to adopt its implementing ordinance in this instance.

There is little need for Section 125.01(1)(r) if a county still has to go to the Legislature to get special enabling legislation each time it wishes to issue bonds. The ordinance carefully tracks the enabling authority of the cited statutes. Under these circumstances there was no reason for the county to go to the Legislature for a special act.

The unquestioned object of Section 1(f), Article VIII, is to authorize a 'board of county commissioners of a county not operating under a charter (to) enact, in a manner prescribed by general law, county ordinances Not inconsistent with general or special law . . .' (Emphasis supplied.) For a definition of the meaning of the word, 'inconsistent,' in this context, see State ex rel. Dade County v. Brautigam, Fla., 224 So.2d 688.

Instead of going to the Legislature to get a special bill passed authorizing such building fund revenue bonds, the Orange County Commissioners under the authority of the 1968 Constitution and enabling statutes now may pass an ordinance for such purpose, as they did in this case, because there is nothing inconsistent thereto in general or special law. On the contrary, there is ample Delegated authority for such purpose. The object of Article VIII of the 1968 Constitution was to do away with the local bill evil to this extent.

What Orange County is purporting to do here by ordinance has been done several times by other counties pursuant to authority of special enabling legislation. See, e.g., Tapers v. Pichard, 124 Fla. 549, 169 So. 39; Posey v. Wakulla County, 148 Fla. 115, 3 So.2d 799; Prescott v. Board of Public Instruction of Hardee County, 159 Fla. 663, 32 So.2d 731; State v. Board of Public Instruction, Okaloosa Co. (Fla.), 214 So.2d 723; State v. Gadsden County, (Fla.), 229 So.2d 587, and other cases.

F.S. Sections 130.01 and 130.012, F.S.A., prescribe the general law authority for the issuance of county bonds. If an ad valorem tax is to be levied to service such bonds or its taxing credit is otherwise pledged, an approval thereof by the electors is required. Section F.S. 130.03, F.S.A. and Section 12 of Article VII State Constitution. However, as indicated by the foregoing cases, if revenue bonds serviced by race track funds are involved no election is necessary. The Orange County ordinance, similarly as a special act might have done, pursuant to enabling law ¹ authorized the issuance of the revenue bonds without the necessity of an election. There is nothing inconsistent with any general or special law in the Orange County ordinance pledging the County's portion of the race track funds for the service of such bonds or in not requiring an approving election for the issue.

The case of State v. County of Dade (Fla.1970), 234 So.2d 651, only involved a construction of pertinent provisions of the 1968 State Constitution applying to a pledge of ad valorem taxes or spread of tax millage for the service of bonds and certificates of indebtedness of a local unit pursuant to F.S. Section 135.01, F.S.A.

It did not involve a pledge of excise tax revenues distributed to local units. Several cases succeeding State v. County of Dade have recognized this distinction. Compare State of Florida v. Division of Bond Finance, 246 So.2d 102 (Fla.1971); Nohrr et al. v. Brevard County Educational Facilities Authority, 247 So.2d 304 (Fla.1971); Platts v. Division of Bond Finance, etc., 275 So.2d 231 (Fla.1973); State v. Putnam County Development Authority (Fla.) 249 So.2d 6; and State of Florida v. Inter-American Center Authority (Fla.), 281 So.2d 201, opinion filed July 27, 1973. There is nothing in the 1968 State Constitution that abrogates the rule of earlier cases, e.g., State v. Town of Medley (Fla.1964), 162 So.2d 257, and State v. Board of Public Instruction, Okaloosa County, supra, that 'no election . . . is necessary if the certificates of indebtedness or revenue certificates are payable from excise taxes or sources other than ad valorem taxes.'

Insofar as the holding in State v. Dade County, supra, 234 So.2d text 653, purported to overrule earlier bond cases not involving the pledging of ad valorem taxes, it is clearly obiter dictum. The majority in that case in quoting from Section 12 of Article VII of the 1968 State Constitution on page 653 failed to note that the certificates of indebtedness referred to in Section 12 are those 'payable from ad valorem taxation' not from excise taxes.

The law is well settled that counties have delegated authority under the implementing and applicable provisions of F.S. Chapters 130 and 159, F.S.A., to issue bonds (including those pledging the county's taxing credit and revenue bonds) but that revenue bonds and certificates of indebtedness which do not pledge ad valorem taxes do not require an approving election.

Affirmed.

ROBERTS, ADKINS and McCAIN, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., dissents with Opinion.

DEKLE, J., dissents with Opinion.

CARLTON, C.J., dissents and concurs with DEKLE, J.

BOYD, Justice (dissenting):

The effect of this bond issue would be to require the county to pay the bonds from the funds received from the race track and jai alai taxes, and obviously if the race track and jai alai taxes should be made unavailable to Orange County, or if for any reason the race track and jai alai taxes should not be available to the State, the bond holders would be entitled to be paid from other sources. There is no way in which Orange County can commit the Florida Legislature to continue...