State v. Dana
| Court | Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US) |
| Writing for the Court | Before McKUSICK; GLASSMAN |
| Citation | 517 A.2d 719 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Ricky A. DANA, Sr. |
| Decision Date | 12 November 1986 |
Page 719
v.
Ricky A. DANA, Sr.
Decided Nov. 12, 1986.
Michael E. Povich, Dist. Atty., Jane M. Eaton, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Machias, for plaintiff.
Libhart & Ferm, William N. Ferm (orally), Ellsworth, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, SCOLNIK and CLIFFORD, JJ.
GLASSMAN, Justice.
Ricky A. Dana, Sr., appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, Washington County, entered on a jury verdict of guilty of Count I, passing or attempting to pass a roadblock, 29 M.R.S.A. § 2501-A(4) (Supp.1985), and Count II, attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, 29 M.R.S.A. § 2501-A(3) (Supp.1985). He contends it was obvious error for the trial court to fail to instruct that intent is an essential element of both offenses, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. For reasons hereinafter set forth we vacate the judgment as to Count I and affirm the judgment as to Count II.
Officer Phillip Stanley of the Pleasant Point Police Department testified that he twice tried to stop Dana's car by blocking its path with a marked police car and activating flashing blue lights. Each time, Dana drove around the police car and away
Page 720
at a high speed. By radio, Officer Stanley contacted State Trooper Dale Earle, who took up the chase using the blue lights of the police vehicle. Trooper Earle encountered Dana twice, but both times Dana accelerated away at speeds that Earle could not match, despite driving over 100 miles an hour at one point. A few minutes after losing sight of Dana, Officer Stanley and Trooper Earle found Dana's car in a carport on Pleasant Point.Dana first contends it was obvious error for the trial court to instruct the jury in the language of the statute without instructing that intent was a required element of both counts. Because no objection to the instructions was raised at trial, we review on the obvious error standard of M.R.Crim.P. 52(b). See also M.R.Crim.P. 30(b).
The first question is whether intent is an element of the crimes charged. Some culpable mental state is an essential requirement for any crime, unless a contrary legislative intent plainly appears. State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me.1979). We have described this requirement as a "fundamental principle of our Criminal Code." State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 540 (Me.1980). Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(1) (1983) provides that "[a] person is not guilty of a crime unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law defining the crime specifies, with respect to each other element of the crime, except as provided in subsection 5...." Subsection 5 provides:
If a statute defining a crime does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state with respect to some or all of the elements of the crime, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required, pursuant to subsections 1, 2 and 3, unless:
A. The statute expressly provides that a person may be guilty of a crime without a culpable state of mind as to those elements; or
B. A legislative intent to impose liability without a culpable state of mind as to those elements otherwise appears.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(5)...
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State v. Roy, No. 87-536
...plain error warranting reversal. A number of states have adopted a position close to that advocated here. See, e.g., State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719, 721 (Me.1986); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 401 Mass. 109, 117-18, 514 N.E.2d 1309, 1315 (1987). Many of the federal circuit courts of appeal have ado......
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State v. Westgate, Docket: Yor-15-91
...determine whether the State had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact necessary to support his conviction. See State v. Dana , 517 A.2d 719, 721 (Me. 1986). The court's instructions to the jury supply the only insight that we can have into the jury's essential fact-finding. The inco......
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State v. Day
...acts done "for proper medical purposes or other valid reasons." 3 State v. Keaten, 390 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Me.1978). See also State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719, 721 (Me.1986) (statute must be construed as a whole in order to give effect to legislative intent). Omission of those words did not affect ......
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Rippett v. Bemis, No. 7556
...facilitate her husband's continued possession of a firearm. Criminal intent is a question of fact for the factfinder. See State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719, 720-21 (Me.1986). The evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to Lola Rippett, is sufficient to sustain a finding that she......
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State v. Roy, No. 87-536
...plain error warranting reversal. A number of states have adopted a position close to that advocated here. See, e.g., State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719, 721 (Me.1986); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 401 Mass. 109, 117-18, 514 N.E.2d 1309, 1315 (1987). Many of the federal circuit courts of appeal have ado......
-
State v. Westgate, Docket: Yor-15-91
...determine whether the State had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact necessary to support his conviction. See State v. Dana , 517 A.2d 719, 721 (Me. 1986). The court's instructions to the jury supply the only insight that we can have into the jury's essential fact-finding. The inco......
-
State v. Day
...acts done "for proper medical purposes or other valid reasons." 3 State v. Keaten, 390 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Me.1978). See also State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719, 721 (Me.1986) (statute must be construed as a whole in order to give effect to legislative intent). Omission of those words did not affect ......
-
Rippett v. Bemis, No. 7556
...facilitate her husband's continued possession of a firearm. Criminal intent is a question of fact for the factfinder. See State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719, 720-21 (Me.1986). The evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to Lola Rippett, is sufficient to sustain a finding that she......