State v. Danforth
| Decision Date | 22 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 47651-9,47651-9 |
| Citation | 643 P.2d 882,97 Wn.2d 255 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James Charles DANFORTH, Jackie Duane Legere, Petitioners. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
University Legal Assistance, Jeffrey H. Hartje, George A. Critchlow, Spokane, for petitioners.
Donald C. Brockett, Spokane County Prosecutor, Paul Smith, Deputy Pros. Atty., Spokane, for respondent.
This case as appealed presented the issue of whether or not intoxication is a defense to the crime of escape, RCW 9A.76.110. Because we hold that petitioners were improperly charged under the escape statute, we find it unnecessary to resolve this issue. We remand for action in accordance with this opinion.
Petitioners, James Charles Danforth and Jackie Duane Legere, were imprisoned for property related crimes. Admittedly, they are alcoholics. In July 1980, both petitioners were on work release status, residing at the Geiger work release center in Spokane. Seeking employment in conjunction with that program, the petitioners met each other, became intoxicated, and failed to return to the center.
Petitioners are unable to recall their actions between the time they became intoxicated and their waking up the next day in Montana. Two weeks later, petitioners were caught in Kansas and returned to Spokane. Petitioners claim they cannot account for the 2-week period or their actions between the time they left Montana and were caught in Kansas.
The petitioners were returned to Washington and charged with escape in the first degree, pursuant to RCW 9A.76.110. Prior to trial the petitioners, being indigent, sought funds for psychiatric evaluations pursuant to CrR 3.1(f). Petitioners argued that the psychiatric evaluation was necessary to establish their intoxication defense. The trial judge denied the request and subsequently granted the state's motion to exclude all evidence of intoxication. Voluntary intoxication, the judge held, was not a defense to escape.
Petitioners were granted a continuance pending their interlocutory appeal. Division III of the Court of Appeals then certified the intoxication issue to this court.
Essentially two statutes proscribe petitioners' conduct. RCW 9A.76.110 is the general escape statute. It provides:
(1) A person is guilty of escape in the first degree if, being detained pursuant to a conviction of a felony, he escapes from custody or a detention facility.
(2) Escape in the first degree is a class B felony.
In addition, RCW 72.65.070 makes it a crime to willfully fail to return to a work release program. That statute states:
Any prisoner approved for placement under a work release plan who wilfully fails to return to the designated place of confinement at the time specified shall be deemed an escapee and fugitive from justice, and upon conviction shall be guilty of a felony and sentenced in accordance with the terms of * chapter 9.31 RCW. The provisions of this section shall be incorporated in every work release plan adopted by the department.
In briefs and oral argument petitioners did not raise the issue of whether they had been properly charged, but the issue was raised by the court after oral argument. In accordance with the terms of Rules of Appellate Procedure, RAP 12.1(b), we requested additional briefing.
On the basis of the supplemental briefs, we hold, prospectively, that work release inmates may not be prosecuted under the general escape statute, RCW 9A.76.110. 1
General principles of statutory construction dictate this result. First, we have consistently applied the rule that when two statutes are concurrent, the specific statute prevails over the general.
In State v. Cann, 92 Wash.2d 193, 197, 595 P.2d 912 (1979), we stated The rule is that where general and special laws are concurrent, the special law applies to the subject matter contemplated by it to the exclusion of the general. State v. Walls, 81 Wn.2d 618, 503 P.2d 1068 (1972); State v. Davis, 48 Wn.2d 513, 294 P.2d 934 (1956); State v. Becker, 39 Wn.2d 94, 234 P.2d 897 (1951). 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction § 51.05 (1973).
As these cases hold, where a special statute punishes the same conduct which is punished under a general statute, the special statute applies and the accused can be charged only under that statute.
This rule is consistent with general principles of statutory construction. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction § 51.05. (4th ed. 1973).
In the case before us, both statutes are clearly applicable. The general statute, RCW 9A.76.110, forbids escape from work release programs as well as prisons, since the definition of a detention includes a work release facility. RCW 9A.76.010. State v. Yallup, 25 Wash.App. 603, 606, 608 P.2d 651 (1980). RCW 72.65.070, on the other hand, deals specifically with escape from work release. RCW 72.65.070, as the more specific statute, thus preempts prosecutions under RCW 9A.76.110 of those defendants whose crime is failure to return to a work release facility.
Second, we are of the opinion that the specific requirement that the defendant's conduct be willful under RCW 72.65.070 recognizes a valid legislative distinction between going over a prison wall and not returning to a specified place of custody. The first situation requires a purposeful act, the second may occur without intent to escape. It is easy to visualize situations where a work release inmate failed to return because of a sudden illness, breakdown of a vehicle, etc. This explains the requirement of willful action.
Finally, this interpretation of the two statutes is necessary to give effect to RCW 72.65.070. RCW 72.65.070 differs significantly from the general escape statute in that the prosecutor must prove the failure to return was willful. Under RCW 9A.76.110, however, a conviction will be sustained if the state demonstrates that the defendant "knew that his actions would result in leaving confinement without permission." State v. Descoteaux, 94 Wash.2d 31, 35, 614 P.2d 179 (1980).
Given the choice, a prosecutor will presumably elect to prosecute under the general escape sta...
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