State v. Daniel

• Citation: 2023 Ohio 4035
• Docket Number: 2022-0603
• Decision Date: 09 November 2023
• Parties: The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Daniel, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

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2023-Ohio-4035

The State of Ohio, Appellee,
v.
Daniel, Appellant.

No. 2022-0603

Supreme Court of Ohio

November 9, 2023

Submitted March 21, 2023

CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-21-1104, 2022-Ohio-1348.

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Kalniz, Iorio & Reardon Co., L.P.A., and Edward J. Stechschulte, for appellant.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and R. Jessica Manungo, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

Steven L. Taylor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

DeWine, J.

{¶ 1} By statute, a person convicted of arson is required to register as an arson offender for life. The sentencing judge may reduce the registration period, but only if the prosecuting attorney and the investigating law-enforcement agency

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recommend a reduction. In this case, we address whether it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine to tie the judge's ability to reduce the registration period to a recommendation from executive-branch officials. We hold that it does not. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion, so we affirm its judgment.

I. The arson-offender-registration scheme

{¶ 2} In 2012, the Ohio General Assembly passed a law establishing a registry of people convicted of arson-related crimes. See 2012 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 70. The law applies to those convicted of arson or aggravated arson as well as those convicted of a related attempt or conspiracy or complicity offense. R.C. 2909.13(A).

{¶ 3} The registration duty is triggered when statutory notice is provided to the offender. R.C. 2909.14 and 2909.15. The person responsible for providing the notice depends on the sentence that is imposed. R.C. 2909.14. For arson offenders who are sentenced to a term of confinement, the official in charge of the correctional institution must provide the notice before the offender is released from confinement. R.C. 2909.14(A)(1). But if the offender is not sentenced to a term of confinement, then the sentencing judge is required to notify the offender of his registration obligations at the sentencing hearing. R.C. 2909.14(A)(2). In either event, the offender must sign a form indicating that he has received and understands the notice, R.C. 2909.14(B), and the official must give a copy of the notification form to the offender, R.C. 2909.14(D).

{¶ 4} Arson offenders who have received notice are required to register annually for life with the sheriff of the county in which they reside. R.C. 2909.15(A), (D)(1), and (D)(2)(a). The law provides one limited exception to the lifetime-registration requirement. If the sentencing judge "receives a request from the prosecutor and the investigating law enforcement agency to consider limiting the arson offender's registration period," then the judge may, at the

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sentencing hearing, limit the offender's duty to reregister to a period of "not less than ten years." R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b). That last provision, which we will call the "reduced-registration provision," is the portion of the law being challenged in this case.

II. Daniel pleads guilty to arson

{¶ 5} Tyree Daniel was among a group of people who set fire to a building in Toledo. He supplied the lighter fluid and a lighter, and he was caught on video dousing the building's door with lighter fluid. For his part in the crime, Daniel was indicted on two counts of aggravated arson, felonies of the first and second degree. He negotiated a deal with the state under which he pleaded guilty to a single count of arson, a felony of the fourth degree, see R.C. 2909.03(B)(1).

{¶ 6} When it came time for sentencing, Daniel challenged the constitutionality of the reduced-registration provision. He relied on a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, State v. Dingus, 2017-Ohio-2619, 81 N.E.3d 513 (4th Dist), which held that by authorizing a trial court to reduce an offender's default lifetime-registration period only upon the request of the prosecutor and the investigating law-enforcement agency, the statute permitted improper executive-branch influence in the judicial realm and thus violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, id. at ¶ 31-33. Daniel asked the trial court to find the provision unconstitutional and to consider reducing his registration period, even if the state did not request a reduction.

{¶ 7} Noting that statutes are afforded a strong presumption of constitutionality, the court overruled Daniel's challenge. The state did not request a reduced registration period, so the trial court notified Daniel of his obligation to register as an arson offender for life. Additionally, Daniel signed a form titled "Notice of Duties to Register as an Arson Offender," which outlined his statutory registration requirements. Finally, the trial court sentenced Daniel to three years of community control and ordered him to serve 60 days in jail.

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{¶ 8} Daniel appealed, arguing that the reduced-registration provision unconstitutionally infringed on the judicial power to impose a criminal sentence. 2022-Ohio-1348, 188 N.E.3d 671, ¶ 7. The court of appeals disagreed. It concluded that "because the arson registration statute is not punitive, its registration requirements do not constitute an aspect of a criminal sentence." Id. at ¶ 19. And even assuming, arguendo, that the registration requirement was part of the sentence, the court found no separation-of-powers problem because "the statute puts into place, rather than infringes upon, the judiciary's authority to sentence a defendant to a reduced arson registration period." Id. at ¶ 22. Recognizing that its decision was in conflict with the Fourth District's decision in Dingus, the Sixth District certified the following conflict question to this court: "Does R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) unconstitutionally violate the doctrine of separation of powers?" 2022-Ohio-1348 at ¶ 30.

{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to answer that question and resolve the conflict. 167 Ohio St.3d 1466, 2022-Ohio-2490, 191 N.E.3d 436.

III. The separation-of-powers doctrine

A. The division of powers

{¶ 10} The Ohio Constitution-like its federal counterpart-allocates power to three distinct branches of government. The General Assembly possesses the "legislative power of the state." Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1. The governor holds the "supreme executive power of this state." Article III, Section 5. And the courts exercise the "judicial power of the state." Article IV, Section 1.

{¶ 11} We have explained that the doctrine of separation of powers is inherent in the constitutional provisions distributing power among the three branches. See State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 55; State v. Sterling, 113 Ohio St.3d 255, 2007-Ohio-1790, 864 N.E.2d 630, ¶ 22. The doctrine ensures that "powers properly belonging to one of the departments [are not] directly and completely administered by either of the

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other departments" and that no department possesses "an overruling influence over the others." State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. for Summit Cty., 120 Ohio St. 464, 473, 166 N.E. 407 (1929).

{¶ 12} Despite the absence of an express "distributive clause in the Constitution of Ohio," this court has long recognized as true "that each of the three grand divisions of the government must be protected from encroachments by the others, so far that its integrity and independence may be preserved," Fairview v. Giffee, 73 Ohio St 183, 187, 76 NE 865 (1905) Importantly, though, "the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence" United States v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974)" 'While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government'" Id., quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J, concurring). As James Madison explained, the division of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches does not mean that the branches" 'ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over, the acts of each other.'" (Emphasis original in The Federalist No. 47.) Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-381, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989), quoting The Federalist No. 47, at 299 (J. Cooke Ed.1961). Instead, the separation-of-powers doctrine provides that" 'where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.'" (Emphasis original in The Federalist No. 47.) Mistretta at 381, quoting The Federalist No. 47, at 299.

B. The judicial power

{¶ 13} The question in this case is whether the statutory scheme impermissibly allows the executive branch to infringe upon an area that our Constitution has placed in the sole province of the judiciary. Thus, it is necessary

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to outline the contours of the judicial power.

{¶ 14} What constitutes the judicial power within the meaning of the Ohio Constitution "is to be determined in the light of the common law and of the history of our institutions as they existed anterior to and at the time of the adoption of the constitution." State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Harmon, 31 Ohio St. 250, 258 (1877). At its core, the judicial power is "to hear and determine a controversy between adverse parties, to ascertain the facts, and, applying the law to the facts, to render a final judgment." Gi...