State v. Daniel
| Decision Date | 18 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 61165.,WD 61165. |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. David E. DANIEL, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Edward F. Ford, III, Kansas City, MO, for Appellant.
Evan J. Buchheim, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Before THOMAS H. NEWTON, P.J., ROBERT G. ULRICH and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.
After Mr. David E. Daniel attacked his girlfriend, the State charged him with one count of forcible rape, one count of forcible sodomy, one count of first-degree domestic assault, and one count of felonious restraint. A jury convicted Mr. Daniel of forcible rape, first-degree domestic assault, and felonious restraint, but acquitted him of forcible sodomy. On appeal, Mr. Daniel challenges only his conviction for first-degree domestic assault under section 565.072.1 For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, these are the facts of the case. On August 4, 2001, Mr. Daniel and his girlfriend, Angela Ottolini, went together to the Oceans of Fun theme park in Kansas City. While there, they saw two of Mr. Daniel's friends and decided to gather at Mr. Daniel's Liberty, Missouri, home for a barbecue later in the day. After the group arrived at Mr. Daniel's home, Mr. Daniel and Ms. Ottolini left their guests, went into a bedroom, and had consensual sexual intercourse. Not wishing to be rude to their guests, Ms. Ottolini told Mr. Daniel that she needed to stop and return to the living room. Ms. Ottolini returned to the living room and Mr. Daniel remained in the bedroom.
Upon Ms. Ottolini's return to the living room, the remaining guest told Ms. Ottolini that she was leaving because Mr. Daniel had touched her earlier in a manner that made her feel uncomfortable. Upset, Ms. Ottolini began looking around the house for her car keys so that she too could leave. Mr. Daniel came out of the bedroom and asked her why she was leaving. When she told him the reason, he became angry, accused her of cheating on him, and began choking and punching her. Mr. Daniel then sexually assaulted and raped her. After Mr. Daniel stopped, Ms. Ottolini escaped and ran to a neighbor's home. An ambulance transported Ms. Ottolini to the hospital, where doctors documented multiple injuries to her head, face, and extremities, the most notable of which was a jaw broken in two places.
Following Mr. Daniel's conviction, the trial court sentenced him to five-years in prison on the forcible rape count, twelveyears in prison on the domestic assault count, and four-years in prison on the felonious restraint count, each sentence to run consecutively.
Mr. Daniel raises two points on appeal. In his first point, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for first-degree domestic assault under section 565.072 because he did not "reside" with Ms. Ottolini and because he did not have a "continuing" social relationship with her, as those terms are used in the statute.2 In his second point, Mr. Daniel contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for firstdegree domestic assault under section 565.072 because Ms. Ottolini did not suffer a "serious physical injury" in the attack.
"When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence we `accept as true all evidence and its inferences in a light most favorable to the verdict, and we reject all contrary evidence and inferences.'" State v. Washington, 92 S.W.3d 205, 207 (Mo.App. W.D.2002) (quoting State v. Goddard, 34 S.W.3d 436, 438 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000)). "`We only determine whether sufficient evidence was presented from which a reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.'" Id. at 207-08 (quoting Goddard, 34 S.W.3d at 438).
In 2000, the General Assembly enacted the first-degree domestic assault law, § 565.072. A person commits the crime of first-degree domestic assault if he "knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury to a family or household member or an adult who is or has been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the actor, as defined in section 455.010, RSMo." As defined in section 455.010, the terms "family" or "household member" include the following people:
[S]pouses, former spouses, adults related by blood or marriage, adults who are presently residing together or have resided together in the past, an adult who is or has been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim, and adults who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have resided together at any time.
§ 455.010(5) (emphasis added).
Mr. Daniel's first point addresses the relationship element of section 565.072. To establish the relationship element, the State ordinarily can satisfy its burden by proving any basis for the relationship designated in the statute. See § 565.072.1 (). In this case, the State's domestic assault verdict director submitted more than one basis for the relationship: first, that Ms. Ottolini and Mr. Daniel "were adults who had resided together in the past"; and second, that they had been in a "continuing social relationship of romantic or intimate nature." Patterned after MAI-CR 3d 319.72, the verdict director reads in pertinent part:
As to Count III, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that on or about August 4, 2001, in the County of Clay, State of Missouri, the defendant knowingly caused serious physical injury to Angela Ottolini by striking her with his fists, and
Second, that Angela Ottolini and defendant were adults who had resided together in the past and had been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature, and
Third, that defendant knew of the relationship submitted in paragraph Second, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count III of domestic assault in the first degree under this instruction.
(emphasis added).
Because the verdict director submitted more than one basis for the relationship between Mr. Daniel and Ms. Ottolini, it appropriately used the conjunction "and" to join them.3
The Notes on Use corresponding to this verdict director recognize that such a submission is proper:
For domestic assault offenses, the victim and the defendant must be "family" or "household members" as defined by Section 455.010, RSMo 2000. Paragraph Second submits the basis for that relationship. If more than one basis is submitted, they should be joined by "and."
MAI-CR 3d, § 319.72, Notes on Use # 2 (emphasis added).
But Mr. Daniel contends that his conviction cannot stand unless the State actually presented evidence sufficient to prove both that he and Ms. Ottolini resided together and that they had been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic nature. We disagree.
By submitting more than one basis for the relationship in the conjunctive, the State sought to prove both that Mr. Daniel and Ms. Ottolini had been in a continuing social relationship and that the two of them had resided together in the past. By convicting Mr. Daniel, the jury necessarily found both of these things. But because proof of either one of these things was sufficient to satisfy the relationship element of section 565.072, we can affirm Mr. Daniel's conviction if there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding as to either basis for the relationship. See State v. Neal, 416 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Mo.1967) () (quoting State v. Reeder, 394 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Mo.1965)).
Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to establish that Mr Daniel and Ms. Ottolini had been in a continuing social relationship, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that they had resided together in the past.
Mr. Daniel contends that the State presented insufficient evidence that he had been in a "continuing" social relationship with Ms. Ottolini because the two of them had a relationship characterized by frequent break-ups. Mr. Daniel's argument turns upon the meaning of the word "continuing" as used in the phrase "continuing social relationship," contained in both section 455.010(5) and section 565.072.
When analyzing the meaning of a criminal statute, we gauge the General Assembly's intent "`from the words used in the statute and give effect to that intent'" State v. Goddard, 34 S.W.3d 436, 438 (Mo.App. W.D.2000) (quoting Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights v. Red Dragon Rest., Inc., 991 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Mo.App. 1999)). In so doing, we examine the language used, according that language its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 115 (Mo.App. W.D.2000).
In particular, we "look[] to whether the language is plain and clear to a person of ordinary intelligence." Goddard, 34 S.W.3d at 438 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When the General Assembly has not defined a word, we "may consult other legislative or judicial meanings" attached to the word. Id. We also may glean a word's plain and ordinary...
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