State v. Danielski, s. C2-83-1861

• Decision Date: 24 April 1984
• Docket Number: C9-83-1856,Nos. C2-83-1861,s. C2-83-1861
• Citation: 348 N.W.2d 352
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Janice Marie DANIELSKI, Respondent, and STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Dean Anthony DANIELSKI, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 352

348 N.W.2d 352

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Janice Marie DANIELSKI, Respondent, and STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Dean Anthony DANIELSKI, Respondent.

Nos. C2-83-1861, C9-83-1856.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

April 24, 1984.

Review Denied July 26, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

Where the same parental authority that is used to accomplish criminal sexual acts against a child is used to prevent the reporting of that act, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the child is no longer subject to that authority.

Cynthia E. Ostlie, Asst. Polk County Atty., Crookston, for appellant.

James Beuning, Mahnomen, for respondent Janice Marie Danielski.

Paul A. Kief, Bemidji, for respondent Dean Anthony Danielski.

Heard, considered and decided by FOLEY, P.J., and WOZNIAK and SEDGWICK, JJ.

OPINION

SEDGWICK, Judge.

This is an appeal by the state from a Polk County District Court Order dismissing complaints of two counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct against each of two defendants as barred by the three-year statute of limitations. We reverse.

FACTS

Defendants, Dean Anthony Danielski and Janice Marie Danielski, were each charged on August 26, 1983, with two counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct, all arising out of an incident occurring in July 1980.

The victim is the daughter of Janice and stepdaughter of Dean. The child's sworn statements indicate abuse by Dean began in 1976 when she was nine years old and occurred two to three times each week when her mother was at work. The abuse initially involved Dean undressing the child, manipulating and touching her breasts and genitals, and inserting his fingers and tongue in her vagina. When the child was eleven, Dean forced her to suck his penis. At age fourteen he engaged in intercourse with her.

The victim remembers particular occurrences because of the significance of the date. For example, she remembers that certain abuse occurred when Dean lived with her mother prior to their marriage when they moved to a trailer home after their marriage, on her birthday, the beginning of school, upon coming home from the hospital following a tonsillectomy, on a summer trip, on her graduation, etc.

The victim repeatedly told her mother of Dean's sexual abuse. The mother took no action to end the abuse.

In July 1980, the child was forced to perform acts of sexual contact and penetration with both Janice and Dean. While watching television one Saturday, Dean and Janice brought out a box containing sexual devices, including a dildo, a vibrator and massager. Dean and Janice removed all of their clothing. Dean directed the victim to insert the dildo and vibrator in her mother's vagina while forcing his penis into the child's mouth. The mother watched. The abuse continued after this date.

The victim told her boyfriend who told his family. The victim indicated to doctors following attempts at suicide: "I did it because of Dean." No one in whom the victim confided knew what to do, or felt that anything could be done. Dean frequently grounded her and denied her phone privileges after he abused her. After he had sexually abused her following her tonsillectomy, she called her boyfriend and told him. Dean punished her by preventing her use of the phone for a period of time.

In the summer of 1983, when the victim was 16, she went camping with her mother and brothers. Dean came to the campground, entered the trailer when the victim was alone, and began fondling her and asked her to have sexual intercourse with him. She got away and went to the bathroom where she cut her wrists "because I couldn't stand it any longer."

Following this episode, she visited her natural father and his wife and told her stepmother of the abuse. The stepmother told the girl's father, who immediately called the authorities and had the victim file statements with the police. The statements were made on Friday, July 29, 1983; an investigation was conducted and complaints filed against defendants on August 26, 1983, 26 days after the three-year period prescribed in the statute of limitations.

ISSUE

Does the statute of limitations begin to run where adults in a position of authority over children use that authority to both coerce sexual acts and prevent the child from reporting the crime after the acts?

ANALYSIS

The victim's mother and stepfather are charged pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.342(b) (1980). There are four elements to the crime charged:

1) The defendant did feloniously and unlawfully engage in sexual penetration with another person,

2) when the victim was at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and when defendant was more than 48 months older than the victim,

3) defendant was in a position of authority over the victim, and

4) defendant used that authority to coerce the victim to submit.

The trial court dismissed the complaints on the basis that each act of sexual contact or intercourse was complete when the act was done, and therefore the statute of limitations had run on August 1, 1983, three years after the July 1980 sex acts.

The limitations set forth in Minn.Stat. Sec. 628.26 (1980) are:

LIMITATIONS

Indictments for murder may be found at any time after the death of the person killed; indictments for violation of section 609.42, subdivision 1, clauses (1) or (2) [bribery statute] shall be found and filed in the proper court within six years after the commission of the offense; in all other cases, indictments shall be found and filed in the proper court within three years after the commission of the offense; but the time during which the defendant shall not be an inhabitant of, or usually resident within, this state shall not constitute any part of the limitations imposed by this section.

(Emphasis added.)

In Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970), the Supreme Court answered the question of when the statute of limitations begins to run by considering the purposes served by the limitation, the nature of the crime and the legislative intent. The following general principles were discussed:

In deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run in a given case several considerations guide our decision. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity. For these reasons and others we have stated before "the principle that criminal limitations statutes are 'to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.' " We have also said that "[s]tatutes of limitations normally begin to run when the crime is complete." And Congress has declared a policy that the statute of limitations should not be extended "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law." These principles indicate that the doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied in only limited circumstances ....

Id. 397 U.S. at 115-16, 90 S.Ct. at 860 (cites omitted) (emphasis added). The court acknowledged that whether a particular criminal offense is a continuing offense is a question of statutory interpretation. The court applied these principles and concluded that Toussie's failure to register at age 18 was not a continuing offense which would extend the five year statute of limitations. The general rules discussed were:

1) That criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose

2) Where a criminal statute of limitations sets a specific limited period for a particular class of crimes, the particular offense should not be construed as a continuing one "unless the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one." See id. at 116, 90 S.Ct. at 861.

Applying the Toussie court's considerations to Minn.Stat. § 609.342 (1980) it is apparent that each of the four elements is a substantive component of the crime, but that one of the elements, engaging in sexual penetration, is complete when the act is complete. Elements three and four are unique to this particular crime of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and neither the defendant's position of authority over the victim, nor his coercive use of that authority necessarily cease with the sex act.

The criminal sexual conduct statute punishes not only the sexual abuse of the child but also the use of authority to coerce the child to submit to the sexual act. Here the child was abused continuously from the early age of 9 until the age of 16. Although the victim told her mother, this was insufficient to get official...