State v. Krikorian, No. A06-1530 (Minn. App. 1/8/2008), A06-1530.
| Decision Date | 08 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. A06-1530.,A06-1530. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Katherine A. Krikorian, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Stevens County, File No. K1-05-103.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Peter R. Marker, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles C. Glasrud, Stevens County Attorney, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Jessica Godes, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Minge, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges her conviction of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual abuse of her son and daughter. She contends that the district court made ten errors before, during, and after her trial that warrant relief. These claims include the contentions that the district court incorrectly ruled that the statute of limitations allowed her prosecution and that she was sentenced using incorrect sentencing guidelines. Because we conclude that the statute of limitations bars appellant's prosecution for the sexual abuse of her son, we reverse in part. But because we conclude that the statute of limitations does not preclude appellant's prosecution for the sexual abuse of her daughter and we reject her remaining claims of error, we affirm her conviction on that count. We remand for resentencing.
Appellant is the biological mother of a son, C.F., and a daughter, D.F. Appellant began to sexually abuse both children no later than August 1994 while the family was living in Stevens County. At the time the abuse began, C.F. was seven years old, and D.F. was three years old. Appellant forced C.F. to have sexual intercourse with her, often several times a week. Appellant sexually abused D.F. by using a vibrator to stimulate her and her fingers to penetrate her. Appellant also forced C.F. to have sexual intercourse with D.F. on multiple occasions.
During the time period that appellant was abusing C.F. and D.F., they were not constantly in her care. Starting in October 1993, C.F. and D.F. were periodically placed in the temporary foster care of K.F. and her husband. Eventually, C.F. and D.F. were placed in the permanent foster care of the couple. D.F. was permanently placed with K.F. and her husband on August 1, 1995, and C.F. several months later on January 29, 1996. These respective dates were the last times that either child had any contact with appellant. In February 1998, K.F. and her husband adopted both children, after appellant's parental rights were terminated.
Appellant's abuse of C.F. and D.F. did not come to light for many years. In January 2004, appellant was in custody on unrelated charges. During an in-custody assessment to determine whether she should be committed to the Minnesota Security Hospital in St. Peter, she disclosed to the psychiatrist who was performing the assessment that she had abused C.F. many years earlier, while the family was living in California. This information was relayed to Stevens County authorities, who launched an investigation into possible abuse of C.F. by appellant. A Stevens County sheriff's deputy interviewed C.F. on March 17, 2004, and he disclosed to the deputy that appellant had abused both himself and D.F. while the family had resided in Stevens County in the mid1-990s. It does not appear from the record that authorities ever interviewed D.F. regarding appellant's abuse.
Based on C.F.'s statements, authorities charged appellant with two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree for violating Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (1994), for sexual abuse of C.F. and D.F. Although authorities learned about the abuse in March 2004, the complaint charging appellant was not filed until June 17, 2005 to allow C.F. to finish high school before the trial began. The state's first attempt to try appellant ended in a mistrial, which the district court declared after appellant's counsel made improper comments during his opening statement.1 After a second trial, in which C.F. testified but D.F. did not, the jury found appellant guilty on both counts. The district court sentenced appellant to consecutive sentences of 132 months for the first count and 102 months for the second count. This appeal follows.
Appellant's first contention of error is that the district court incorrectly interpreted Minn. Stat. § 628.26(c) (Supp. 1995)—the relevant statute of limitations—to allow appellant's prosecution.2 The parties dispute the date on which the statute of limitations began to run for appellant's offenses. When the offense is a continuing one, such as here, the statute of limitations begins to run when the offense ends. See State v. Burns, 524 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Minn. App. 1994) (), review denied (Minn. Jan. 13, 1995); see also State v. Danielski, 348 N.W.2d 352, 355-57 (Minn. App. 1984) (), review denied (Minn. July 26, 1984). When the complaint was filed, it asserted that multiple acts of sexual abuse of C.F. and D.F. occurred between August 1, 1994, and December 31, 1997. At trial, the jury was instructed to determine whether "the acts took place between . . . August 1, 1994 until . . . December 31, 1997." The state argues that testimony at trial established that the sexual abuse of C.F. and D.F. continued until late 1997. If this is correct, the complaint was undeniably filed within the limitations period.
The evidence that the state relies on in arguing that the abuse occurred into late 1997 is C.F.'s testimony at trial. Questioned about the timing of the abuse, C.F. stated that "there were multiple incidents that occurred during that time frame" and that the acts of sexual abuse were "scattered throughout" the stated time frame. But this testimony establishes nothing more than that multiple acts of abuse occurred sometime within the dates specified in the complaint and incorporated into the jury instructions. When directly asked on cross-examination, C.F. understandably was unable to provide any specific dates on which the abuse occurred. But multiple witnesses testified that D.F. was placed in permanent foster custody on August 1, 1995, and C.F. on January 29, 1996, and that neither child had any further contact with appellant after these dates. In other words, these respective dates are the last potential dates of appellant's abuse of either child. Thus, these dates must be treated as determinative in applying the statute of limitations.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. State v. Al-Naseer, 734 N.W.2d 679, 683-84 (Minn. 2007). The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2006). "[W]hen the legislature's intent is clear from plain and unambiguous statutory language, this court does not engage in any further construction and instead looks to the plain meaning of the statutory language." State v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (). Only when a statute is ambiguous should courts use other canons of construction or extrinsic evidence to discern the legislature's intent. Reiter v. Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 2006). A statute is ambiguous only if it is subject to more than one plausible interpretation. Harrison ex rel. Harrison v. Harrison, 733 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Minn. 2007). When construing a statute, this court presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2006).
Appellant argues that the plain and unambiguous language of the statute of limitations precludes prosecution of her for the abuse of both C.F. and D.F. The state urges us to adopt an interpretation of the statute that allows both of appellant's convictions to stand. The statutory text of Minn. Stat. § 628.26(c) provides:
Indictments or complaints for [first-degree criminal sexual conduct] if the victim was under the age of 18 years at the time the offense was committed, shall be found or made and filed in the proper court within nine years after the commission of the offense or, if the victim failed to report the offense within this limitation period, within three years after the offense was reported to law enforcement authorities.
Both August 1, 1995 and January 29, 1996 are more than nine years before June 17, 2005, the date the complaint against appellant was filed. Accordingly, the plain language of the first part of Minn. Stat. § 628.26(c) does not allow the prosecution of appellant because the complaint was not found or made within the requisite nine years. But the statute also creates an exception to this general limitations period, allowing complaints to be filed more than nine years after the offense ended under certain circumstances.
The exception to the statute's general nine-year limitations period has two parts, each of which is an independent inquiry. Regarding the first part, the plain language of the statute states that the "victim" of the sexual abuse must not have reported the abuse to authorities within nine years of the end of abuse for the exception to be applicable. But once it is determined the exception is applicable, the plain language of the last clause of the statute states that a report of abuse to law enforcement originating from any source triggers the three-year limitations period. In contrast to the clause immediately preceding it, the...
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