State v. Darrah

• Citation: 446 S.W.2d 745
• Decision Date: 10 November 1969
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 54389,54389,2
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. William Thomas DARRAH, Respondent
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Page 745

446 S.W.2d 745

STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. William Thomas DARRAH, Respondent.

No. 54389.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Nov. 10, 1969.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Walter W. Nowotny, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for appellant.

James T. Buckley, Sedalia, for respondent.

BARRETT, Commissioner.

This appeal involves the constitutionality of that part of the motor vehicle registration and licensing law relating to the operation of motor vehicles, particularly subdivision 3 of Section 302.020 making it unlawful to operate a motorcycle without wearing protective headgear:

'Every person operating or riding as a passenger on any motorcycle, as defined in Section 301.010, RSMo, upon any highway of this state shall wear protective headgear at all times the vehicle is in motion.' (RSMo Supp. Sec. 302.020, subd. 3.)

The question arose and is presented in these circumstances: The prosecuting attorney filed an information charging that the respondent, Darrah, 'did wilfully and unlawfully operate a 1966 Triumph motorcycle upon a public highway at or near the intersection of Main Street and Grand Avenue in Sedalia, Pettis County, Missouri, without wearing approved protective headgear.' Challenging the constitutionality of the act as an infringement of his rights under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and the due process clause of the state constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 10, V.A.M.S., Darrah filed a motion to dismiss the information. The circuit court in a rather full memorandum judgment found the act unconstitutional and therefore discharged the respondent. In so doing the court relied upon and quoted at length from two opinions, American Motorcycle Association v. Davids, Mich.App., 158 N.W.2d 72, and Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, La.App., 208 So.2d 423. The court's judgment was entered eight days before the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Everhardt v. New Orleans, 217 So.2d 400, overruled or reversed its Court of Appeals. And further in fairness to the courts, it should be noted that except for Rhode Island and two New York decisions the court did not have the benefit of a large number of decisions involving motorcycle headgear statutes. As to any relevant facts, the court observed that while neither party offered any evidence 'It is admitted that the defendant violated the statute in question.' Pertinent also the court noted that 'There is no evidence in the record to show any evil against which the statute is directed or how it will promote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community.' In conclusion, in declaring the statute void, the court observed that 'There is no evidence in this record that there is any situation existing which would be helped by the statute or that the safety of the general public would be favorably affected by the wearing of helmets by motorcycle drivers.' Upon entry of the judgment of unconstitutionality and discharge and therefore a judgment that the information failed to charge Darrah with an offense the state has appealed. RSMo 1959, §§ 547.200, 547.210, V.A.M.S.; Cr.Rule 28.04, V.A.M.R.; State v. Terrell, Mo., 303 S.W.2d 26.

As the court observed, there is no evidence and hence no proven fact or established statistical data directly relating to the precise evil to be remedied by the headgear law, neither is there any similar data in this record as to precisely how the 'general public would be favorably affected.' The same suggestion has been made in law school notes to cases, particularly in connection with the Michigan Court of Appeals decision (67 Mich.L.R. 360, an apology and defense of the opinion). And so it is urged that there is no sound or factual basis for the observations of several courts upholding the statutes that motorcycle operators are exposed to the hazard of being stunned by flying stones or pebbles cast by other high-speed vehicles thereby being temporarily distracted and losing control as in Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis.2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, and People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc.2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290. In this connection it has been suggested that there has been no 'identification of precisely what constitutes the public evil to be remedied' (30 Ohio S.L.J. 355, 359) and therefore it is argued that the statutes are designed solely for the protection of the motorcycle operator without relationship to the safety of the general public and for that reason are unconstitutional. In this posture it is asserted that the views of those upholding the statute are based upon an unwarranted 'presumption of constitutionality' of legislation (30 Ohio S.L.J. l.c. 356) or a sort of 'judicial notice of what 'one hears or reads about" and thus the additional question is raised whether and upon whom, the state or the challenger, there is a burden of proof as to the factual foundation of constitutionality. 67 Mich.L.R. 359, 369--371. Also the 'analogical' approach, suicide laws, automobile seat-belt legislation, Sunday laws etc., has been attacked. 30 Ohio S.L.J. l.c. 372. There are two excellent critical notes on the Michigan opinion in 82 Har.L.R. 469 and 13 St.L.J. 339. Contrary to the other notes both the 'public safety' and 'public burden' theories are approved. The Harvard note points out that the court 'virtually ignored the harms to society generally which follow the loss or injury of an individual.'

In many respects these critical views are contrary even to the opinions of the courts declaring headgear legislation unconstitutional. The leading case of this view is now People v. Fries, Ill., 250 N.E.2d 149--150, but even there the court said, 'The classification of motorcyclists separately from operators of other vehicles has a reasonable basis. The differences are evident and need no elucidation at this point.' While the court found that the 'manifest function' of the headgear requirement was solely to safeguard the person wearing it the court said, 'Such a laudable purpose, however, cannot justify the regulation of what is essentially a matter of personal safety.' (250 N.E.2d l.c. 151.) Citing in a footnote statistics of a mortality rate of 11.5 for 10,000 registrations of motorcycles as compared with 5.2 fatalities per 10,000 for all other vehicles the Michigan court nevertheless rejected the reasoning in favor of the legislation as 'obviously a strained effort to justify what is admittedly wholesome legislation.' (158 N.W.2d l.c. 75.) And as to judicial knowledge and incontrovertible, significant facts concerning motorcycles and their operators, no one has challenged the accuracy of this statement by the Supreme Court of North Carolina: 'Motorcycle operators occupy positions of extreme exposure which are not shared by automobile and truck drivers. The latter operate in closed vehicles protected by steel and shatterproof glass.' State v. Anderson, 275 N.C. 168, 174, 166 S.E.2d 49, 51--53. Critics of the legislation say that the argument of danger to the operator from flying objects supports their contention for if this is the legislative evil windshields afford greater protection than crash helmets.

In support of its contention that the headgear statute was designed solely for the protection of the operators and was an attempt to regulate what clothes or articles of adornment they might wear, the American Motorcycle Association relied on a dictum of John Stuart Mill to demonstrate an infringement of individual rights: 'the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, insofar as these concern the interests of no person but himself.' The Michigan court tacitly approved the maxim as a basis for striking down the legislation. (158 N.W.2d l.c. 73.) But as to the vehicle itself, as an object apart, it has been pointed out that there is an inherent danger in the motorcycle's basic design, 'particularly the fact that it must be balanced on two wheels' which 'accounts for its peculiar susceptibility to loss of control' and so requires the utmost vigilance of its operator. 13 St.L.J. l.c. 339. 'Physicists do not yet know the exact principle which keeps a cycle erect and moving. The successful and enjoyable operation of a motorcycle can only be had when there is a true 'man-machine team.' The 'two' are more truly 'one' than with any other means of conveyance.' People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc.2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800. One court has put these matters aside on the ground that they concerned the efficaciousness of helmets and did not affect the constitutionality of the statutes. State v. Mele, 103 N.J.Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176. In any event 'Motor vehicles have become of such general use and form so large a part of the daily lives and experiences of the people that judicial knowledge may be taken of those prominent facts with respect to them or their operation which are a part of the common knowledge of every person of ordinary understanding and observation.' 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 81, p. 101.

But as indicated, these matters relate to the motorcycle as a thing apart or to its operator individually while there are certain other incontrovertible factors bearing directly on motor vehicle legislation in general: '1966 was a year of considerable agitation over the rising slaughter on public highways.' 30 Ohio S.L.J. l.c. 357. In explanation of the Highway Safety Act of 1966, the first sentence of C.C.H. Reports, p. 9 (Products Liability) reads 'In 1965, 49,000 persons lost their lives in highway accidents; 1,500,000 people suffered disabling injuries; another 1,500,000 individuals suffered nondisabling injuries; and * * * the economc costs of highway accidents during the year (1965) aggregated $8.5 billion.' These and similar statistics have been noted in several of the cases, and a New York court said, 'In fact, motorcycle accidents increased by 105% in 1965 as compared to 1964, while the total registration of these vehicles increased by 83%. Fatalities increased by 63.6% and...