State v. Cushman

• Citation: 451 S.W.2d 17
• Decision Date: 09 March 1970
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 54660,54660,1
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. William Bradford CUSHMAN, Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Page 17

451 S.W.2d 17

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. William Bradford CUSHMAN, Appellant.

No. 54660.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

March 9, 1970.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Walter W. Nowotny, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Jack E. Gant, John J. Hager, Gant, Moran & Hager, Kansas City, for appellant.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

This is an appeal by William Bradford Cushman from the judgment of the circuit court affirming a judgment of conviction in the magistrate court and a sentence to pay a $5 fine for violation of § 302.020, subd. 3, V.A.M.S., which requires that every person operating or riding as a passenger on any motorcycle upon any highway of this state wear protective headgear at all times and provides that 'The protective headgear shall meet reasonable standards and specifications established by the director' of revenue. The constitutionality of paragraph 3 of § 302.020 was challenged in the magistrate court. The question was preserved in the circuit court and is now before this court for final determination.

Paragraph 3 is said to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, § 10 of the Constitution of Missouri 1945, V.A.M.S., by denying this defendant due process of law. It is contended that in its very nature it is an excessive use of and is not fairly referable to the police power; that the police power must be exercised with scrupulous regard for private rights and only for the furtherance of the public good and welfare and if otherwise exercised the exercise will be stricken down. Conceding that the test is reasonableness appellant argues that the compulsory helmet statute violates the foregoing principles; that the regulation is imposed on the cyclist solely for the protection of the cyclist's personal safety and not for the safety, well-being or benefit of other members of the public at large: that it requires the cyclist to purchase at his own expense and article of personal wearing apparel to qualify for use of his own personal property; that in attempting to protect the motorcyclist from cranial injury the section draws an unreasonable distinction between operators of or passengers on motorcycles and operators of and passengers in automobiles. Appellant urges that the operator of a motorcycle has a constitutional right to determine what apparel he wears and what means he will employ to protect himself from bodily harm incidental to the operation of a motorcycle, and that he has the fundamental right as an attribute of individual liberty to make this decision free from state compulsion.

In State v. Darrah, Mo.Sup., 446 S.W.2d 745, this court upheld the constitutionality of § 302.020, subd. 3 against a challenge that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, § 10 of the Constitution of Missouri. All questions raised here on this issue were raised in that case and determined adversely to the contentions of appellant. Without tiresome repetition we reaffirm the ruling that § 302.020, subd. 3 is not vulnerable to attack on this ground.

Next, paragraph 3 of § 302.020 is said to violate Article III, § 40(30), Constitution of Missouri 1945, prohibiting the General Assembly from passing any local or special law 'where a general law can be made applicable, * * *.' Appellant asserts that paragraph 3 makes an unreasonable classification in that the drivers of all vehicles except motorcycles are excluded from the operation of the section. Appellant suggests that the requirement of a helmet to protect a driver from flying objects would afford the same protection to the driver of a convertible automobile or a bicyclist, but that these drivers are not required to wear helmets and therefore the paragraph is an unconstitutional 'special' law. In support of his position appellant cites McKaig v. Kansas City, 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S.W.2d 815, holding unconstitutional a city ordinance prohibiting automobile dealers from keeping their places of business open on Sunday and six national holidays, and City of Springfield v. Smith, 322 Mo. 1129, 19 S.W.2d 1, holding unconstitutional as a special law a city ordinance requiring movie theatres to close on Sundays because it did not include other places of amusement.

In our judgment § 302.020, subd. 3 is not a special law within the constitutional inhibition against special laws. Clearly the General Assembly may make reasonable classifications of subjects notwithstanding some kind of a general law might be passed. State ex rel. Daily Record Co. v. Hartmann, 299 Mo. 410, 253 S.W. 991, 994, 995. A law which includes less than all who are similarly situated is special 'because it omits a part of those which in the nature of things the reason of the law includes.' State ex inf. Barrett ex rel. Bradshaw v. Hedrick, 294 Mo. 21, 74, 241 S.W. 402, 420. A law is not special if it applies to all of a given class alike and the classification is made upon a reasonable basis. City of Springfield v. Smith, supra, 19 S.W.2d l.c. 3(2); Marshall v. Kansas City, Mo.Sup., 355 S.W.2d 877, 93 A.L.R.2d 1012. The question is 'whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no distinctive circumstances appertaining to the class with respect to which it has legislated which reasonably justify its action in restricting the operation of the law to the persons * * * to which the law is made applicable.' State ex inf. Barrett ex rel. Bradshaw v. Hedrick, supra, 241 S.W. l.c. 420.

Motorcyclists are not similarly situated with automobilists or bicyclists. There are distinctive differences which justify the General Assembly in placing motorcyclists in a separate class an restricting the operation of the helmet law to them. The reasonableness of classifying them separately from operators of other vehicles has been recognized by courts of last resort in several states. People v. Fries, 42 Ill.2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149, 150; State v. Anderson, 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49, 53; Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 253 La. 285, 217 So.2d 400, 403. Motorcycles are different from bicycles in their mobility, power, speed, their use generally on main highways rather than on byways and sidepaths, in the exposure of their operators to the risks and hazards of the road, and in the danger they represent to the operation of other vehicles. Motorcyclists are subjected to greater danger of bodily injury than bicyclists, and are more likely to cause injury to others than are bicyclists. Likewise, motorcyclists are in a different situation from automobilists in that they are out in the open...