State v. Darryl Reed
| Decision Date | 06 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | C-940315 C-940322,96-LW-4434 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL REED, Defendant-Appellant. APPEAL |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Joseph T. Deters, Prosecuting Attorney, No. 0012084, and L. Susan Laker, Esq., No. 0000431, 914 Main Street, Suite 500 Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, No. 0016590, and John Fenlon, Esq., No. 0042395, 8 East Long Street, 11th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43266-0587, for Defendant-Appellant.
This appeal is before us pursuant to an order from the Ohio Supreme Court directing this court to allow appellant's application to reopen his appeal under App.R. 26(B)(5). State v. Reed (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 534, 660 N.E.2d 456.
Appellant was convicted of drug abuse in April 1994. The facts of the underlying conviction are not germane to this appeal, as the sole assignment of error on reopening is that the trial court erred in denying him the right to represent himself. Because we conclude that this sole assignment of error is not well taken, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Appellant was indicted in December 1993. On January 20, 1994, appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw counsel. On January 26, 1994, appellant appeared before the trial court and requested that attorney Douglas Mansfield represent him. The trial court appointed Mansfield to appellant's case. On February 28, 1994, the trial court denied appellant's pro se motion to act as co-counsel. The trial court then asked appellant if he desired to represent himself or to proceed with Mansfield. Appellant responded: "That's what he's here for, yeah."
On March 28, 1994, the trial court denied appellant's motion to withdraw Mansfield and again asked if appellant wanted to represent himself or to be represented by Mansfield. Appellant did not reply, and the trial court stated the following:
On April 20, 1994, the trial court again denied appellant's motion to withdraw Mansfield. The trial commenced that same day. A jury was seated, and the state made its opening statement. After a recess, outside the jury's presence, the judge discussed a motion to suppress that Mansfield had filed. It appears from the transcript that Mansfield had indicated to the court that he wished to withdraw the motion to suppress. Mansfield formally withdrew the motion, but appellant did not wish to withdraw his pro se motion to suppress. After a heated exchange between the judge and appellant, appellant stated the following:
The trial judge would not allow appellant to represent himself, as it would prejudice appellant for the jury to see that Mansfield was no longer representing appellant. Appellant then stated that he would waive his right to a jury and represent himself in a trial to the court. The trial judge refused, stating:
At this point it's too late. It's too late to waive it. I'm going to bring the jury in. If he interrupts again, I'm going to have him removed. I'm going to protect him from himself.
The jury was brought back into the courtroom, and the trial proceeded.
A defendant's right to self-representation has long been recognized. Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525. However, the United States Supreme Court did not state at what point a defendant must assert his right to self-representation.
From a review of this issue in federal and state courts, several principles emerge. First, the right to self-representation is unqualified if asserted before empaneling the jury. Jackson v. Ylst (C.A.9, 1990), 921 F.2d 882, 888; Robards v. Rees (C.A.6, 1986), 789 F.2d 379, 383; United States v. Matsushita (C.A.2, 1986), 794 F.2d 46, 51; McDonald v. State (C.P.1991), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 262, 266, 598 N.E.2d 219, 222; State v. Bowens (Aug. 9, 1991), Ashtabula App. No. 89-A-1463, unreported. The defendant's desire to represent himself must be clear and unequivocal. See United States v. McKinley (C.A. 10, 1995), 58 F.3d 1475; Bowens, supra; McDonald v. State (C.P. 1991), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 262, 266, 598 N.E.2d 219, 222. After a trial has commenced, the decision about whether to grant a defendant's request to represent himself is within the discretion of the trial court. Robards, supra, at 384; State v. Kendrick (Nov. 21, 1991), Cuya-hoga App. No. 59381, unreported; McDonald, supra, at 266, 598 N.E.2d at 222. During trial, the trial court has a greater duty to maintain the integrity of the proceedings. Bowens, supra. "The appropriate criteria for a trial judge to consider are the defendant's reasons for the self-representation request, the quality of the counsel representing the party, and the [defendant's] prior proclivity to substitute counsel. United States v. Matsushita (C.A.2, 1986), 794 F.2d 46, 51.
In applying the above principles to the case at bar, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request to represent himself. Appellant's request was made after the trial commenced. Even though no testimony had been adduced, the jury had been seated and had heard the state's opening statement. The absence of Mansfield after the recess would have been disruptive and likely prejudicial to appellant. When asked prior to the day of trial if he would prefer to represent himself, appellant did not make a clear and unequivo-cal request. Rather, he stood mute. When appellant eventually did request to represent himself, the request came after a heated exchange with the trial judge. The episode raised the question about the reasoning behind appellant's request, which seemed to be motivated at least in part by anger or frustration. Given the history of the case, the trial judge was in a better position to evaluate appellant's motivation. Further, the record did not raise any question about the quality of Mansfield's representation of appellant. Finally, the proclivity of appellant to change counsel was demonstrated by his multiple requests to change attorneys.
In conclusion, we have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request to represent himself after the jury trial commenced. The sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
While it seems quite clear to me that the trial court was convinced that appellant's counsel was highly competent and that appellant would hurt his case by representing himself, I would nevertheless hold that the trial court committed reversible error in denying appellant his right to self-representation. The supreme court's opinion granting appellant's application to reopen his appeal emphasized the importance of the right to self-representation:
In Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, the United States Supreme Court held, without equivocation, that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. In McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984), 465 U.S. 168, 177, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950, 79 L.Ed.2d 122, 133, at fn. 8, the court further held that the denial of the right to self-representation is reversible error per se and therefore that it may not be subjected to the harmless-error analysis.
State v. Reed (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 534, 535, 660 N.E.2d 456, 458.
In the present case, appellant had for some time been expressing dissatisfaction with his counsel and had been filing his own motions. The trial court correctly told him he was not entitled to hybrid representation, i.e. he could not represent himself and be represented by counsel. See State v Overholt (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 111, 120, 601 N.E.2d 116, 121. Nevertheless, appellant did not trust counsel's judgment and sought to bring issues to the attention of the court himself. The matter did not come to a head until counsel withdrew appellant's motions to suppress and to view the premises during trial. At that point, a complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship occurred of such magnitude as to constitute a "Sixth Amendment problem." The level of trust and cooperation between appellant and counsel had deteriorated to such a degree that there was an absence of any attorney-client relationship. See State v. Pruitt (1984), 18 Ohio App.3d 50, 57, 480 N.E.2d 499, 507; State v. Bowens (Aug. 9, 1991), Ashtabula App. No. 89-A-1463, unreported; State v. Scott (Sept. 29, 1988), Franklin App. No. 88AP-346, unreported. However, this breakdown did not occur before trial because the trial court did not even discuss the motions at issue until after the prosecutor's opening statement. Appellant unequivocally sought to exercise his right to self-representation rather than be...
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