State v. David M. Seymour
| Decision Date | 11 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | 01-LW-4857,01CA6 |
| Citation | 2001 Ohio 2561 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. DAVID M. SEYMOUR, Defendant-Appellant Case |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: James R. Kingsley, 157 West Main Street Circleville, Ohio 43113
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: David A. Sams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 88 South Market Street, Logan, Ohio 43138
This is an appeal from a Hocking County Municipal Court judgment of conviction and sentence. The jury found David M. Seymour defendant below and appellant herein, guilty of driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), and of failure to control a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.202. The following errors are assigned for our review:
Our review of the record reveals the following facts pertinent to this appeal. On the evening of October 19, 2000, Fred Carpenter and his wife were watching television in their home adjacent to State Route 664, near South Bloomingville, when they heard a loud noise in the front yard. Carpenter rushed to the front door and observed a Ford truck that had left the highway and crashed through several trees and a fence. He called 911 to report the accident and then walked to the scene to see if the driver had been injured. Carpenter approached the vehicle and recognized appellant as the driver.[1]
Although initially unconscious and slumped over the steering wheel, appellant eventually regained consciousness and asked Carpenter to drive him home. Carpenter refused and advised appellant to sit still until the ambulance arrived. Shortly thereafter, Richard Huffman appeared at the scene.[2] Appellant then asked Huffman to drive him home. Huffman agreed, and appellant and Huffman left the scene before law enforcement officers or other rescue personnel arrived.
Apparently, the closest law enforcement official to the accident scene was Paul Baker, a Park Officer at the Hocking Hills State Park. The Hocking County Sheriff radioed Officer Baker and asked him to investigate. Officer Baker arrived at the scene and observed a truck leaving the area. Carpenter then informed Baker that the suspect had left the scene in the truck. Officer Baker relayed the information to the Hocking County Sheriff's Department which, in turn, requested that he pursue to detain the two men for leaving the scene of the accident. Officer Baker soon located the Huffman vehicle, turned on his pursuit lights and detained Huffman and appellant for eight or nine minutes until Sheriff's Deputy Eric Matheny and State Patrol Trooper Jason Allison arrived.
Officer Matheny and Trooper Allison transported appellant to the accident scene where they began an investigation and had emergency vehicle personnel evaluate appellant. During that time, both officers noted appellant's odor of alcohol, slurred speech and his "robotic" like gait. The officers concluded that appellant was under the influence. Trooper Allison then arrested appellant and transported him to a "park station." Appellant subsequently refused to perform various physical coordination tests or to provide a urine sample. Appellant was eventually charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence and with failing to control his motor vehicle.
On December 7, 2000, appellant filed a three-part motion to suppress evidence. Appellant argued that Officer Baker (1) acted outside his territorial jurisdiction by detaining Huffman's vehicle, and; (2) did not have probable cause to make an arrest. The matter came on for hearing on December 13, 2000, at which time Officer Baker testified that he stopped the vehicle at the Hocking County Sheriff's Department's request because appellant had left the scene of an accident. On January 3, 2001, the trial court denied appellant's motion.
At trial, Officers Baker, Matheny and Allison recounted the events and all opined that appellant was under the influence of alcohol. Appellant testified in his own defense and explained that he lost control of his vehicle when he tried to avoid hitting a dog that had run into the road. He admitted having had a drink that day, but denied that he was under the influence. Several of appellant's employees and acquaintances corroborated this account. They testified that they had either not seen appellant drink at all, or that he did not appear to be under the influence.
The jury found appellant guilty of driving while under the influence and the trial court found him guilty of failure to control a motor vehicle. The court ordered that appellant serve a partially suspended jail sentence, pay a mandatory fine, receive a five year suspension of driving privileges, and serve three years of probation. This appeal followed.
In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress evidence. We disagree with appellant.
Appellate review of trial court rulings on requests to suppress evidence present mixed questions of law and fact. See State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710, 707 N.E.2d 539, 541; State v. Brite (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 517, 519; 698 N.E.2d 478, 479; also see United States v. Martinez (C.A. 11 1992), 949 F.2d 1117, 1119; United States v. Wilson (C.A.11 1990), 894 F.2d 1245, 1254. During proceedings on motions to suppress, a trial court assumes the role of trier of fact. State v. Payne (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 364, 367, 662 N.E.2d 60, 61-62; State v. Robinson (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 560, 570, 649 N.E.2d 18, 25; State v. Rossiter (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 162, 166, 623 N.E.2d 645, 648. Thus, the evaluation of evidence and credibility of witnesses are issues to be determined by the trial court. State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 105, 684 N.E.2d 668, 685; State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1036-1037; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584-585. Factual findings should be accepted unless those findings are "clearly erroneous." State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1, 3; State v. Kennedy (Sep. 30, 1999), Ross App. No. 99CA2472, unreported; State v. Babcock (Feb. 13, 1997), Washington App. No. 95CA40, unreported; also see United States v. Lewis (C.A.1 1994), 40 F.3d 1325, 1332. In other words, a reviewing court is bound to accept a trial court's factual determinations when those findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Harris (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 543, 546, 649 N.E.2d 7, 9; State v. Claytor (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627, 620 N.E.2d 906, 908; also see State v. DePalma (Jan. 18, 1991), Ross App. No. 1633, unreported. The application of the law to those facts is then subject to de novo review by a reviewing court. Harris, supra at 546, 649 N.E.2d at 9; State v. Anderson (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 688, 691, 654 N.E.2d 1034, 1036; also see Lewis, supra 1332; Wilson, supra at 1254. With this in mind, we turn our attention to the particular facts and circumstances of the case sub judice.
Initially, we note that the trial court's judgment does not state precisely why it denied appellant's motion. From our review of the record, however, we agree with that disposition.[3] Our analysis begins with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution which guarantees the rights of people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. This protection is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, see generally Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081. Similar safeguards are further provided under Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. See State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 82, 88, 661 N.E.2d 728, 733; State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d 1271, 1273. These protections ensure that searches and seizures, conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable, subject only to specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. See Thompson v. Louisiana (1984), 469 U.S. 17, 19-20, 93 L.Ed.2d 246, 250, 105 S.Ct. 409, 410; Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514; also see State v. Veit (May 26, 1998), Athens 97CA34, unreported.
One exception to the warrant requirement is the "Terry type" stop. This exception permits a stop and a brief detention when police can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio (1967), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880; also see Andrews, supra at 87, 565 N.E.2d 1271, 1273, at fn. 1; State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 71, 641 N.E.2d 1082. This is what happened when Officer Baker stopped Huffman's car in order to detain appellant.
It is undisputed that appellant was involved in a property damage accident. Under R.C. 4549.03, appellant was required to provide his name, address and vehicle registration number. When appellant left the accident scene without complying with the statute, Officer Baker had sufficient justification to stop Huffman's vehicle and to...
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