State v. Davila

Decision Date27 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 90839–7.,90839–7.
Citation184 Wash.2d 55,357 P.3d 636
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Julio J. DAVILA, Petitioner.

Nancy P. Collins, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Brian Clayton O'Brien, Spokane Co. Pros. Atty., Larry D. Steinmetz, Cnty. Prosc. Atty. Ofc., Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

Opinion

GORDON McCLOUD, J.

¶ 1 Julio Davila challenges the Court of Appeals' decision affirming his conviction for second degree murder. At issue is whether the State violated its disclosure obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), when it failed to disclose the fact that a forensic scientist who analyzed certain DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) evidence used in Davila's case had been fired for incompetence. While we conclude that this evidence was both favorable to the defendant and suppressed by the State in violation of its Brady obligations, we also conclude that the evidence was not material to the outcome of Davila's trial, given the specific facts presented in this case. We therefore affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 In 2007, Jeramie Davis called 911 to report an assault at an adult bookstore in Spokane. At the store, police found the owner, John Allen, lying unconscious on top of a baseball bat and bleeding from his head. Allen later died of his injuries.

¶ 3 While police were processing the crime scene, some of Allen's relatives arrived and told them that Allen's car was missing from its usual parking place outside the store. Police found the car a short time later, less than a block from the store, with its passenger side door slightly ajar.

¶ 4 In 2008, Davis was convicted of Allen's murder based on evidence that he had robbed Allen's store on the night that Allen was killed. Julio Davila had not yet become a suspect.

¶ 5 Davila would, however, become a suspect later. In the investigation leading to Davis' trial, detectives swabbed four areas of the baseball bat found at the scene and several areas of Allen's car in order to test them for DNA evidence. These swabs were later tested by former Washington State Patrol Crime Lab (Crime Lab) forensic scientist Denise Olson.

¶ 6 At issue in this case are a swab taken from the handle of the baseball bat (Swab D) and a swab from the steering wheel of the car (Item 24). Olson created a profile for Swab D that revealed a mixture of at least two different people's DNA. Olson found that the “major [DNA] contributor” was “Unknown Individual A.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 275 (emphasis omitted). She found that the other contributor might be Allen but was definitely not Davis. Olson also created a profile for Item 24. She found that Allen was included as a DNA contributor, “Unknown Individual A” could not be excluded as a contributor, and Davis was excluded. CP at 279 (emphasis added and omitted). In other words, Olson's analysis of Item 24 was inconclusive as to whether that item contained DNA from “Unknown Individual A.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

¶ 7 The DNA profile of “Unknown Individual A” (from Swab D) was entered into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database. 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 434–35 (July 12, 2012). In 2011, three years after Davis' conviction, the Crime Lab received a “hit, or a match in that database” between the DNA from “Unknown Individual A” and DNA from the defendant in this case, Julio Davila. Id. at 435.

¶ 8 Lorraine Heath, the supervising forensic scientist at the Crime Lab, retested and analyzed Swab D (the baseball bat swab) and compared it against a new reference swab obtained from Davila. Her testing confirmed that the DNA from Swab D matched the DNA from the reference swab. Heath also retested Item 24 (the steering wheel swab) and confirmed that Davila could be neither included nor excluded as a contributor of DNA on that sample. In other words, Heath's retesting confirmed Olson's results: Swab D contained DNA from “Unknown Individual A,” later identified as Davila's DNA, and Item 24 was inconclusive for this DNA.

¶ 9 The State charged Davila with Allen's murder under two different theories: (1) first degree felony murder for working with Davis to commit a robbery and thereby causing Allen's death and (2) second degree felony murder for causing Allen's death in the course of an assault or attempted assault in the second degree. The first degree felony murder charge was predicated on the theory that Davila worked with Davis to rob Allen's store, but the court dismissed that charge before the jury deliberated, finding that there was insufficient evidence that Davila and Davis knew one another.

¶ 10 At trial, the State presented the following evidence: (1) fingerprints taken from a glass counter close to where Allen was found matched Davila's, (2) Davila's DNA was found on the handle of the baseball bat used to murder Allen, (3) Davila claimed never to have been in Allen's store or to have had any contact with Allen, and (4) Davila lived behind Allen's store at the time of the murder.

¶ 11 The jury convicted Davila of second degree murder. It also found that Davila was armed with a deadly weapon at the time. On October 25, 2012, the court sentenced Davila to 199 months in total confinement, including 24 months for the deadly weapon enhancement.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 12 On July 25, 2012, after Davila's conviction but before his sentencing, the defense filed a motion for a new trial. CP at 162–65. It alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument and rebuttal, and it also asserted that the State withheld Brady material: the fact that “a forensic expert closely linked to the case was incapable of doing her job” and that she had been fired for incompetence. CP at 162.

¶ 13 The expert in question was Olson, the scientist who first tested Swab D—the baseball bat swab that eventually registered the “hit” in the CODIS database—and Item 24—the steering wheel swab that was inconclusive for Davila's DNA. After filing a public disclosure request, the defense learned, after the guilty verdict but prior to sentencing, that Olson had been fired in 2011 after receiving poor evaluations for roughly five years. It also learned that the Crime Lab had performed an audit of Olson's work in 2007, the year that she tested Swab D and Item 24 for Davis' case, and that this audit had revealed errors in the vast majority of Olson's cases and had “resulted in ‘Brady letters' being sent to eleven prosecuting attorneys notifying them of [Olson's] problems and her faulty results.” CP at 256.

¶ 14 In response to the motion for a new trial, the State argued that Olson had not performed any of the DNA testing crucial to the case against Davila. Specifically, it asserted that Heath had conducted the DNA tests in Davila's case and had also “reviewed all of Ms. Olson's tests from the Davis case and agreed with all of Ms. Olson's findings and conclusions.” CP at 261. The State also asserted that when Heath matched Davila's DNA to the DNA found on the handle of the murder weapon, she did not rely on any of the testing done by Olson. CP at 267.

¶ 15 Finally, the State did not dispute the fact that it never disclosed this information—Olson's substandard work performance and the pretrial audits during which the State documented it—to the defense. Instead, the State argued that defense counsel knew at the time of jury selection that Olson no longer worked in the Crime Lab, so he could have discovered the reason with due diligence. CP at 268.

¶ 16 The trial court ultimately held three separate hearings on Davila's motion for a new trial, granting the defense two extensions of time to obtain evidence relevant to the Brady claim.

The First Hearing on the Motion for a New Trial

¶ 17 The trial court first addressed the defense's motion for a new trial on August 1, 2012, the date set for Davila's sentencing. The State acknowledged that Olson's performance record “standing alone ... would cause a great deal of concern.” 4 VRP at 583 (Aug. 1, 2012). But it argued that in light of the fact that Heath retested Swab D and Item 24 and confirmed Olson's results, there was no reasonable probability that the disclosure of Olson's performance record and termination would have changed the outcome of Davila's trial. In making this argument, the prosecutor cited Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), the key United States Supreme Court cases defining Brady materiality.

¶ 18 The court also stated that it had “no evidence to find that [the prosecutor] withheld the ... report [on Olson's incompetence] and that the prosecutor “had no obligation to find out about the extent of the report.” 4 VRP at 596 (Aug. 1, 2012). Nevertheless, it concluded that Heath's retesting would be grounds for a new trial if it were shown that Olson could have contaminated the samples that Heath later retested. Citing In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 174 Wash.2d 474, 276 P.3d 286 (2012), a Brady case involving mishandled forensic evidence, the trial court ruled that the defense was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on whether any of Olson's initial testing could have compromised the DNA evidence in Davila's case. Specifically, the trial court ruled that “the issue is contamination [,] ... mean[ing] the material was compromised, and no matter how many times you test it, it will not make any difference. That is what the defense has to show for the court to make any changes.” 4 VRP at 598–99 (Aug. 1, 2012); CP at 295–96.

¶ 19 The defense suggested that it would need an expert to determine whether the DNA evidence used against Davila might have been compromised,1 but the trial court did not limit the subject of the evidentiary hearing it was granting to expert testimony. It made clear that there was a factual issue as to whether the DNA evidence used to convict Davila might have been mishandled and that defense cou...

To continue reading

Request your trial
66 cases
  • In re Mulamba
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • April 28, 2022
    ...1555. In addition to the police, government agencies covered by this duty have been held to include crime labs ( State v. Davila , 184 Wash.2d 55, 71, 357 P.3d 636 (2015) ) and others within the prosecutor's office ( Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 1......
  • City of Seattle v. Lange
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • July 6, 2021
    ...527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 ).19 State v. Davila, 184 Wash.2d 55, 79 n.9, 357 P.3d 636 (2015).20 141 Wash.2d 910, 919-20, 10 P.3d 390 (2000).21 Id. 22 120 Wash.2d 822, 826, 845 P.2d 1017 (1993).23 44 Wash. App. 8......
  • In re Lui
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • June 22, 2017
    ...to information held by others acting on the government's behalf, not just those facts within the prosecutor's file. State v. Davila , 184 Wash.2d 55, 71, 357 P.3d 636 (2015). This includes the disclosure of personnel records. Id.¶79 As previously discussed, before trial, the State moved to ......
  • In re Pers. Restraint of Mulamba
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • December 8, 2020
    ...of elements. We analyze each anyway. This court's review of Brady claims involves a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Davila, 184 Wn.2d 55, 74, 357 P.3d 636 (2015). The first two Brady factors of favorable and suppressed evidence are factual questions. In re Personal Restraint of Ste......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT