State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 06 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 36476.,36476.
• Citation: 160 Conn.App. 251,124 A.3d 966
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Edward Victor DAVIS.

160 Conn.App. 251

124 A.3d 966

STATE of Connecticut

v.Edward Victor DAVIS.

No. 36476.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 26, 2015.

Decided Oct. 6, 2015.

Peter G. Billings, with whom, on the brief, was Sean P. Barrett, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).

Rocco A. Chiarenza, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Adam B. Scott, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

GRUENDEL, J.

The defendant, Edward Victor Davis, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of operating a motor vehicle with an elevated blood alcohol content in violation of General Statutes § 14–227a (a)(2), one count of bribery of a witness in violation of General Statutes § 53a–149 (a), one count of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–181 (a)(3)and one count of interfering with a police officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a–167a. He also appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a trial to the court, on a part B information, of being a third time offender in violation of § 14–227a (g)(3). On appeal, the defendant claims that § 53a–149is unconstitutionally vague as applied and that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the bribery of a witness and the third time offender counts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts reasonably could have been found at trial. On November 20, 2010, the defendant and his stepson, Jonathan Oakes, were boating on the Connecticut River. While on the boat, the defendant consumed eight or nine beers. In the late afternoon, the two returned the boat to a boat launch in East Hartford, loaded it onto a trailer attached to the defendant's truck, and drove away. At approximately 4:50 p.m., the defendant and Oakes stopped at a liquor store and purchased a bottle of Peppermint Schnapps. The defendant later admitted to a police officer that he had personally consumed almost a liter of Peppermint Schnapps.

At approximately 5:30 p.m., while driving his truck on Route 83 in Manchester, the defendant collided with a vehicle that had been stopped at a traffic signal. The driver of the other vehicle, Paul Jarmoszko, testified that he initially heard tires screech and then felt “a jolt and the car got pushed forward ... a few feet.” After the accident, Jarmoszko and the defendant exited their respective vehicles.¹Jarmoszko immediately went to inspect the damage on the rear of his vehicle, while the defendant inspected his boat. Shortly after inspecting his boat, the defendant met Jarmoszko between the two vehicles.

After observing the damage to Jarmoszko's vehicle, the defendant offered to pay him a “couple of hundred bucks....” Jarmoszko rejected the offer, at which point the defendant “got agitated and said something [to the effect of] this is how it's going to be? Why don't we pull over to the side and settle it like men?” Jarmoszko, believing the defendant wanted to fight him, told the defendant he was going to contact the police and got back into his vehicle to place the phone call. While speaking to the police, Jarmoszko observed the defendant bang on his car's window several times, yell and then walk away. Jarmoszko later heard the engine of the defendant's truck start.

Shortly afterward, Michael Magrey, a Manchester police officer, was dispatched to the scene of the accident. Magrey parked his police cruiser behind the truck and approached the vehicle's driver's side. He observed a single occupant in the driver's seat of the truck who was revving the vehicle's engine and “appeared to be out of it, under the influence of something.” This individual was later identified as Oakes. Magrey asked Oakes to turn the truck's engine off, hand over the keys and step out of the vehicle. Oakes followed the officer's instructions and sat on the curb.

Magrey then went to make sure that Jarmoszko was not injured. During his interaction with Jarmoszko, Magrey was informed that Oakes was not the person Jarmoszko had observed exiting the driver's side door after the accident. On the basis of this information, Magrey asked Oakes where his companion was located, to which Oakes responded that he was “in the back.” The officer eventually located the defendant lying down inside the boat. His skin appeared blue or purple, was cold to the touch, and his clothing was wet. Although initially unresponsive to questioning, the defendant's demeanor changed drastically. He became hostile and belligerent toward Magrey, yelling and cursing at him. Magrey testified that the defendant kept “coming at me” and he had to “put [the defendant] in an arm bar [to] keep him down.” Eventually, another officer got into the boat and was able to assist Magrey in placing handcuffs on the defendant. The defendant remained in this state of belligerence, attempting to spit on Magrey and ambulance personnel who were attempting to treat him. He was placed on a hospital gurney, while in restraints, and taken to Manchester Hospital for treatment. The defendant was treated and later released from the hospital.

Medical records from the defendant's treatment at the hospital revealed that he had a blood alcohol content of 0.165. The defendant was subsequently arrested by officers of the Manchester Police Department. While in police custody, the defendant admitted to Magrey that he had spoken to Jarmoszko after the accident and had offered him money in order to avoid police involvement.²During this discussion, the defendant further admitted to having consumed almost a liter of Peppermint Schnapps prior to the accident.

The state charged the defendant with the following counts in the part A information: (1) driving under the influence, (2) bribery of a witness, (3) threatening in the second degree, (4) breach of the peace in the second degree and (5) interfering with an officer. The state also charged the defendant, under the part B information, with being a third time offender. The part A counts were tried to a jury and, at the conclusion of trial, a verdict of guilty was returned on all counts with the exception of the threatening count. Afterward, the state proceeded on the part B information and the case was tried to the court. At the conclusion of trial, the court found the defendant guilty on the count of being a third time offender. The defendant now appeals.

I

The defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on the charge of bribery of a witness. Specifically, he argues that the state failed to prove that Jarmoszko was a witness under the statute and that the defendant had the specific intent to influence Jarmoszko in relation to an official proceeding. We are not persuaded.

The standard of review for claims of evidentiary insufficiency is well established. “In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Allan,311 Conn. 1, 25, 83 A.3d 326 (2014). “[W]e do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury's verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stephen J.R.,309 Conn. 586, 594, 72 A.3d 379 (2013).

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. At the conclusion of the state's case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the bribery count. The defendant argued that the state had failed to meet its burden of establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he made the offer of money to Jarmoszko with the intent of influencing his conduct or testimony in relation to an official proceeding. He argued that the statute required the existence of an official proceeding at the time of the offer and that the state had not established the existence of an ongoing official proceeding, noting that the defendant was not arrested until months after the accident. The court then denied the motion for acquittal. On appeal, the defendant challenges the propriety of this determination.

We begin our analysis with the language of the statute at issue. Section 53a–149 (a)provides: “A person is guilty of bribery of a witness if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a witness any benefit to influence the testimony or conduct of such witness in, or in relation to, an official proceeding.” The state, therefore, was required to establish the following: (1) that the defendant offered, conferred or agreed to confer a benefit, (2) to a witness, (3) with the intent of influencing the witness' testimony or conduct in relation to an official proceeding.

General Statutes § 53a–146provides statutory definitions for the terms “official proceeding” and “witness.” Subdivision (1) of the statute defines an official proceeding as “any proceeding held or which may be heldbefore any legislative, judicial, administrative or other agency or official authorized to take evidence under oath,” and subdivision (6) defines a witness as “any person summoned, or who may be summoned,to give testimony in an official proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the statute defines an official proceeding as broadly covering presently instituted proceedings, as well as future proceedings that “may be held.” Accordingly, the definition of a witness includes those who have already been summoned to...