State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 05 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1162.,14–1162.
• Citation: 782 S.E.2d 423
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Respondent Below, Petitioner, v. Megan DAVIS, Petitioner Below, Respondent.

782 S.E.2d 423

STATE of West Virginia, Respondent Below, Petitioner,

v.Megan DAVIS, Petitioner Below, Respondent.

No. 14–1162.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 23, 2015.

Decided Nov. 5, 2015.

Joe M. Fincham II, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Huntington, WV, Attorney for Petitioner.

A. Courtenay Craig, Esq., Huntington, WV, Attorney for Respondent.

LOUGHRY

, Justice:

The State of West Virginia appeals from the October 23, 2014, order of the Circuit Court of Cabell County granting a petition for writ of mandamus filed by the respondent herein, Megan Davis. At issue in this mandamus case is a separate, criminal case against the respondent that was dismissed by Cabell County Magistrate Ron Baumgardner upon the State's motion prior to holding a preliminary hearing.¹ Because the State indicated that it might seek an indictment for the alleged criminal conduct, the circuit court ruled that the respondent is entitled to a preliminary hearing. After a careful review of this matter, we conclude that the respondent is not entitled to a preliminary hearing. Accordingly, we reverse.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On August 4, 2014, a City of Huntington police officer filed a criminal complaint in magistrate court charging the respondent with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, which is a felony. The complaint alleged that she arranged for a person who was cooperating with law enforcement to sell sixteen grams of marijuana to a third party. The respondent was arrested and arraigned on August 5, 2014. Thereafter, her bail was reduced and, on August 15, 2014, she was released on a personal recognizance bond. On August 21, 2014, the respondent's defense counsel suggested to the assistant prosecutor that the criminal charge was unsupportable because the respondent had been entrapped. Acting on this information, the assistant prosecutor directed the police to investigate the entrapment claim.

The following day, August 22, 2014, the parties appeared in magistrate court for a preliminary hearing on the criminal charge. Before the preliminary hearing commenced, the assistant prosecutor filed a motion with the magistrate court seeking to dismiss the criminal complaint without prejudice. The prosecutor indicated that the case was to be dismissed "for direct," which signaled that the State might, in the future, present the matter to the grand jury for possible indictment. The prosecutor asked for the dismissal because he did not believe he was in a position to proceed with the preliminary hearing, in part because the State had not yet completed its investigation concerning the respondent's allegation of entrapment. Opposing the motion, the respondent offered to waive the preliminary hearing in exchange for an "open file policy," allowing her access to the State's file on the criminal charge. The State declined this offer. Over the respondent's objection, the magistrate court granted the motion to dismiss the criminal complaint. As a result, no preliminary hearing was held.

Later that same day, although the criminal complaint had been dismissed, the respondent filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking the circuit court to require the magistrate "to hold a pre-indictment preliminary hearing for the [respondent] so that [s]he may be able to protect [her] rights[.]" The mandamus petition also sought a standing order requiring every magistrate in the county to ensure that the right to a preliminary hearing is observed in every criminal case.

After briefing and oral argument on the mandamus petition, the circuit court ruled that the respondent was entitled to a preliminary hearing provided the hearing could be held prior to the return of an indictment against her. The circuit court reasoned that the State may move to dismiss a criminal charge "altogether," but it has no right to seek the dismissal of a felony charge in order to directly present the matter to a grand jury, gain a tactical advantage over a defendant, or merely circumvent a defendant's right to a preliminary hearing.² A written Final Order reflecting the circuit court's mandamus ruling was entered on October 23, 2014. By separate order entered that same day, the circuit court stayed the execution of its Final Order pending the outcome of this appeal.

II. Standard of Review

This appeal is from a circuit court's order in a mandamus case. "A de novo standard of review applies to a circuit court's decision to grant or deny a writ of mandamus." Syl. Pt. 1, Harrison Cty. Comm'n v. Harrison Cty. Assessor, 222 W.Va. 25, 658 S.E.2d 555 (2008)

; accord Syl. Pt. 1, Staten v. Dean,

195 W.Va. 57, 464 S.E.2d 576 (1995) ( "The standard of appellate review of a circuit court's order granting relief through the extraordinary writ of mandamus is de novo."). Similarly, our review is plenary on the issues before us pertaining to the interpretation of state statutes and court rules. "Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review." Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). "Court rules are interpreted using the same principles and canons of construction that govern the interpretation of statutes." Syl. Pt. 2, Casaccio v. Curtiss, 228 W.Va. 156, 718 S.E.2d 506 (2011). With this in mind, we consider the parties' arguments.

III. Discussion

The State argues that the respondent is not entitled to a preliminary hearing because her criminal complaint was dismissed, and that it was error for the circuit court to conclude that a magistrate may not dismiss a felony charge before holding a preliminary hearing. The respondent contends that she is entitled to a pre-indictment preliminary hearing as a matter of right under the plain language of statutory and judicial rule. This case requires us to examine two issues of criminal procedure: an accused's right to a preliminary hearing, and the State's authority to seek the dismissal of a criminal complaint. We begin our analysis with a brief overview of the law of preliminary hearings in West Virginia.

"[T]his Court has consistently recognized that a preliminary hearing is not a federal constitutional mandate, and that there is nothing in our State Constitution which would give an independent state constitutional right to a preliminary hearing." Peyatt v. Kopp, 189 W.Va. 114, 116, 428 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1993)

(footnote and citations omitted); accord Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Rowe v. Ferguson, 165 W.Va. 183, 268 S.E.2d 45 (1980) ("A preliminary hearing in a criminal case is not constitutionally required."). Accordingly, the parties focus upon statutory and judicial rules to support their arguments.

In article one, chapter sixty-two of the West Virginia Code, the Legislature established a preliminary procedure to "deal with arrest[s] ... and the attendant steps to bring the arrested person before a magistrate to be informed of the nature of the charge, his right to counsel and the arrangement for bail." Rowe, 165 W.Va. at 189, 268 S.E.2d at 48

. Section one of this article provides for the filing of a written complaint stating the essential facts of the crime charged,³ while sections two⁴ through five pertain to the issuance and execution of an arrest warrant based upon the filing of that criminal complaint. Section six requires that a magistrate court inform the defendant of the nature of the criminal complaint, his or her rights, and the possibility of bail. This statute provides, inter alia, that "[t]he [magistrate] shall in plain terms inform the defendant of the nature of the complaint against him, of his right to counsel and, if the offense is to be presented for indictment, of his right to have a preliminary examination." W.Va.Code § 62–1–6 (2014). Section eight pertains to a preliminary examination, commonly referred to as a preliminary hearing:

If the offense is to be presented for indictment, the preliminary examination shall be conducted by a [magistrate] of the county in which the offense was committed within a reasonable time after the defendant is arrested, unless the defendant waives examination. The defendant shall not be called upon to plead. Witnesses shall be examined and evidence introduced for the State under the rules of evidence prevailing in criminal trials generally. The defendant or his attorney may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf. On motion of either the State or the defendant, witnesses shall be separated and not permitted in the hearing room except when called to testify. If the defendant waives preliminary examination or if, after hearing, it appears from the evidence that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the [magistrate] shall forthwith hold him to answer in the court having jurisdiction to try criminal cases. If the evidence does not establish probable cause, the defendant shall be discharged. After concluding the proceeding the [magistrate] shall transmit forthwith to the clerk of the court to which the defendant is held to answer all papers in the proceeding and any bail taken by him.

W.Va.Code § 62–1–8 (2014)

. Similar language is found in procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Rule 5(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the offense is to be presented for indictment, a defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination, unless waived[,]" while Rule 5(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for Magistrate Courts states, "[i]f the offense is to be presented for indictment, a defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination unless waived."

The well-settled purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to hold a defendant to answer for the alleged offenses set forth in the criminal complaint. This purpose is made clear in West...