State v. Sheffield

• Decision Date: 14 June 2022
• Docket Number: 21-0114
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent, v. Quenton A. SHEFFIELD, Defendant Below, Petitioner.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

875 S.E.2d 321

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent,

v.Quenton A. SHEFFIELD, Defendant Below, Petitioner.

No. 21-0114

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: May 3, 2022

Filed: June 14, 2022

Robert F. Evans, Esq., Public Defender Services, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Scott E. Johnson, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Respondent

HUTCHISON, Chief Justice:

The petitioner, Quentin A. Sheffield, appeals the January 5, 2021, order of the Circuit Court of Cabell County sentencing him to life in prison without mercy for his conviction of first-degree murder, two to ten years of imprisonment for his conviction of malicious wounding, and five years of imprisonment for his conviction of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm.¹ In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the circuit court committed reversible error during his trial when it dismissed a member of the jury after deliberations began and replaced that juror with an alternate who had been discharged from the case. Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, the submitted appendix record, and the relevant authorities, we find merit to the petitioner's argument. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we reverse the petitioner's conviction and sentencing orders and remand this case for a new trial.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

In April 2019, the petitioner was indicted by a Cabell County grand jury on charges of murder, malicious wounding, and possessing a firearm while being a person prohibited from possessing a firearm. The events giving rise to the charges are not relevant to the issue on appeal. Instead, the facts that are important concern what occurred at trial after the jury retired to begin its deliberations.

The record reflects that the petitioner's trial commenced on September 29, 2020, and it lasted a total of six days. On the fifth day of trial, the jury retired to begin its deliberations, and the trial court discharged the alternate juror from the case. After the jury had been deliberating for slightly more than an hour, the trial court called a recess because it had been informed that one of the jurors might have had a conversation with a witness while on a lunch break during the middle of the trial. After stopping the deliberations, the trial court proceeded to question each juror individually, and every juror denied speaking to a witness. At that point, the petitioner moved for a mistrial, arguing that because one of the jurors was not being truthful, there was no other remedy. The State opposed the motion and suggested that the trial court review the surveillance footage from the courthouse cameras to determine which juror had talked to the witness. The trial court agreed to look at the surveillance footage, so it ordered the jury to recess for the day. The trial court also instructed the court clerk to contact the alternate juror and ask her to return the following day. The petitioner objected to recalling the alternate juror.

The next day, through the review of the courthouse video surveillance footage, the trial court determined that Juror B.² had in fact spoken with one of the trial witnesses.³ The court then questioned Juror B. again, and the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: My Baliff was able to get a copy of the courthouse security video, and it shows you talking with [the witness], the owner of Metro Cab, at lunch on Thursday, and that was what I was asking about when you said you did not do it.

I would like to play that for you at this point.

JUROR B.: Oh, okay.⁴

JUROR B.: Okay, I did, yeah, I didn't know that-

THE COURT: You didn't know what?

JUROR B.: That I wasn't allowed to speak to him.

THE COURT: No, but I was asking you yesterday whether you spoke with any witness who had testified and you said no.

JUROR B.: I am sorry. I did not understand that.

THE COURT: I think because of that I have no choice [sic] to excuse you from this jury.

After Juror B. was excused, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion for a mistrial and asked the petitioner whether he would prefer to proceed with just eleven jurors or whether he wanted the alternate juror to return to service. Emphasizing that he was not waiving his request for a mistrial, the petitioner stated that he preferred to have twelve jurors.

Thereafter, the trial court informed Juror S., the alternate juror who had returned as requested, that one of the jurors had to be excused due to the juror's conversation with a witness, and that this necessitated Juror S.’s return to service. Juror S. was then asked by the trial court whether she was "okay serving as a juror in this case." She answered affirmatively. The petitioner's counsel asked Juror S. whether she had spoken to anyone about the case after she had been dismissed and left the courthouse the previous day, and she said, "no." The trial court then informed Juror S. that her written notes about the case had been destroyed when she was discharged and asked whether she was still able to be a fair and impartial juror and whether she was able to discuss the case with the other jurors and deliberate without the benefit of her notes. She replied, "yes," and returned to the jury, but the juror's oath was not re-administered to her.

The trial court told the other jurors that Juror B. had been excused because of her conversation with a witness and that Juror S. would be returning for the deliberations. The trial court asked each juror individually if he or she was still able to sit as a fair and impartial juror in the case and render a decision in light of what had happened. Each juror responded affirmatively. The jury was also instructed as follows:

THE COURT: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Again, I thank you for being here today.

As you know, from what I have said to each of you on the record in chambers, one of your fellow jurors has been excused and an alternate juror is replacing that excused juror.

Do not consider this substitution for any purposes. Under the law, the alternate juror must participate fully in the deliberations that lead to any verdict.

The Prosecution and the Defendant has [sic] the right to a verdict reached only after full participation of the jurors whose votes determine that verdict. This right will only be assured if you begin your deliberations again from the beginning.

Therefore, you must set aside and disregard all past deliberations and begin your deliberations all over again. Each of you must disregard the earlier deliberations and decide this case as if those earlier deliberations have not taken place.

The reconstituted jury then began its deliberations and reached a verdict in less than an hour. During that time, deliberations were paused twice while the jury received additional instructions from the trial court. On one occasion, the trial court informed the jury that the court clerk would be bringing them the "[jury] charge, the instructions, everything." The second time, the jury asked the court who two phone numbers belonged to, and the court informed the jury it could not answer that question as the parties and court agreed they were uncertain as to whether the referenced numbers had been admitted as evidence in the case.

As indicated above, the jury convicted the petitioner of all charges. The mercy phase of the trial was bifurcated, so after reaching its verdict, the jury reconvened to decide whether to afford the petitioner mercy on his first-degree murder conviction. After the jury denied the petitioner a finding of mercy, he filed a post-trial motion asserting error based on the trial court's decision to impanel the discharged alternate juror and not declare a mistrial. The motion was denied, and the petitioner was sentenced by an order entered on January 5, 2021. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

The petitioner argues that the trial court committed reversible error by not granting a mistrial when it became necessary to dismiss a member of the jury after deliberations had begun. "The decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Lowery , 222 W. Va. 284, 288, 664 S.E.2d 169, 173 (2008). In this case, our determination of whether the trial court committed reversible error by not granting a mistrial requires us to interpret the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. "[O]ur review is plenary on the issues before us pertaining to the interpretation of state statutes and court rules." State v. Davis , 236 W. Va. 550, 554, 782 S.E.2d 423, 427 (2015) ; see also Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L. , 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) ("Where the issue on an appeal from the trial court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review."). With these standards in mind, we consider the parties’ arguments.

III. Discussion

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error when it replaced a member of the jury during deliberations with the alternate juror who had been discharged from service. The petitioner argues that the mid-deliberation juror substitution was a violation of Rule 24(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule provides, in pertinent part:

Alternate jurors. - The court may direct that more jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities

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