State v. Davis
Decision Date | 30 March 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 13239,13239 |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Francis H. Hicks, Mountain Home, for defendant-appellant.
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., and Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen. (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
Charged with a felony, the defendant waived his right to a jury and submitted the question of his guilt to the district court. The district court did so try the issue but only after inquiry of the prosecuting attorney--who said the state would defer to the views of the judge. 1 The court found the defendant guilty and imposed sentence.
The sole issue presented on appeal is the defendant's contention that the district court was without jurisdiction to allow the defendant to waive a jury trial. Defendant relies primarily on article 1, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution and In re Dawson, 20 Idaho 178, 117 P. 696 (1911). The State, in its brief, correctly points out the inapplicability of the Dawson case--where there was no trial, but a plea of guilty to the felony there charged. Although the Court did in Dawson make the statement:
such was pure dictum. 2
The State argues that in State v. Hightower, 101 Idaho 749, 620 P.2d 783 (1980), we changed the rule set forth in State v. Scheminisky, 31 Idaho 504, 174 P. 611 (1918), that a jury may not be waived in felony cases and that Hightower "necessarily stands for the proposition that a trial by jury may be waived in felony cases." We are unable to find any discussion of art. 1, § 7 in Scheminisky and put it aside. We also do not read Hightower for the proposition that "a trial by jury may be waived in felony cases," nor do we find it necessary to determine at this late date, in this case, the meaning of the language in art. 1, § 7. 3
As acknowledged in State's brief here, in Hightower we said:
101 Idaho at 756-57, 620 P.2d at 790-91.
As is readily seen, we did not reach the issue of waiver by a defendant of his constitutional right to a trial by jury, but held, as to the State's contention that it too had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of guilt, that the State having, on two occasions on two separate charges, not raised the issue in the district court, it could not be heard to raise it later in a collateral attack on a judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court pursuant to former I.C. § 18-213. The Hightower defendant on the basis of a district court finding of mental defect had been acquitted by reason thereof in accordance with the statutory provisions--but the issue of his guilt or innocence...
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