State v. Dawson

• Citation: 983 P.2d 916,1999 MT 171
• Decision Date: 15 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-079.,98-079.
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert DAWSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

983 P.2d 916

1999 MT 171

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert DAWSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 98-079.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs December 30, 1998.

Decided July 15, 1999.

Rehearing Denied August 12, 1999.

Richard J. Carstensen, Billings, Montana, For Appellant.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, John Paulson, Assistant Attorney General; Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney, Melanie B. Logan, Deputy Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, Montana, For Respondent.

Justice JAMES C. NELSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Robert Dawson (Dawson) pleaded guilty to one count of felony possession of methamphetamines and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia after the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, denied Dawson's motions to suppress evidence obtained in a search of his person and a statement Dawson made to law enforcement officers prior to that search. In pleading guilty, Dawson reserved the right to appeal the District Court's adverse rulings on his motions. Hence, Dawson now appeals his conviction and sentence and the denial of his motions to suppress. We affirm.

¶ 2 We address the following issues on appeal:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court properly deny Dawson's motion to suppress which was based on Dawson's claim that law enforcement officers lacked particularized suspicion for an investigative stop and frisk?

¶ 4 2. Did the District Court properly deny Dawson's motion to suppress which was based on Dawson's claim that law enforcement officers failed to give Dawson his Miranda warnings before conducting a custodial interrogation?

Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 5 On December 18, 1996, law enforcement officers from the Billings Police Department were conducting surveillance of a room at the Parkway Motel in Billings. The room had been rented by Jeremy Roehr, a known criminal. The officers suspected that the room was being used for illegal activities, including transactions involving stolen merchandise, bad checks and dangerous drugs. During their surveillance, officers observed several individuals entering and leaving the room throughout the day.

¶ 6 That evening, Officer Jeremy House assisted other law enforcement officers in the execution of a search warrant for the motel room. Officer House provided security for the detectives who were conducting the search and interviewing the occupants of the room. At about 11 p.m., Officer House, who was standing just inside the motel room, heard a knock at the door. Expecting to see one of the detectives returning to the room, Officer House opened the door. As he did so, Dawson walked into the room and asked for Jeremy. When Officer House realized that Dawson was not a detective, he informed Dawson that he was a police officer and that they were conducting a search of the room.

¶ 7 Officer House later testified that he told Dawson that he was going to conduct a pat-down search of Dawson's person for weapons. However, before doing so, Officer House asked Dawson if he had any weapons, drugs, or needles on his person. Dawson responded that he had no guns. Finding this response unsatisfactory, Officer House asked Dawson again if he had any weapons, drugs, or needles. Dawson motioned toward his left coat pocket and said that he had some "smoke" in there. Officer House, who understood the term "smoke" to be a slang or street term for illegal drugs, reached into Dawson's coat pocket and removed a black pouch containing what he believed to be illegal drugs. Officer House then arrested Dawson for criminal possession of dangerous drugs.

¶ 8 On December 23, 1996, Dawson was charged by Information with one count of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation of § 45-9-102, MCA, and one count of criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-10-103, MCA. The Information alleged that on December 18, 1996, Dawson possessed a quantity of the drug methamphetamine as well as several items of drug paraphernalia including plastic vials, baggies, and razor blades.

¶ 9 On March 10, 1997, Dawson filed two motions. In the first motion, Dawson sought to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of his person. Dawson contended that the search was illegal as Officer House did not have an articulable, reasonable suspicion that Dawson had engaged in criminal activity. In the second motion, Dawson sought to suppress his statement regarding the "smoke." He contended that Officer House failed to advise him of his Miranda rights prior to conducting a custodial interrogation from which the statement regarding "smoke" was elicited.

¶ 10 A hearing on Dawson's motions was conducted on April 11, 1997. At that time, testimony was received from both Dawson and Officer House. Dawson testified that he went to the motel room to ask Roehr about a set of keys to his sister's car. Dawson claimed that, contrary to Officer House's testimony, when Officer House opened the door and saw him standing there, Officer House grabbed him, pulled him into the room and tossed him up against a wall. Dawson also testified that he used the term "smoke" to refer to his cigarettes.

¶ 11 The District Court entered an order on June 25, 1997, denying both of Dawson's motions to suppress. On July 10, 1997, Dawson pleaded guilty to the charges and reserved his right to appeal the District Court's adverse ruling on his motions. The court sentenced Dawson to three years with the Department of Corrections on the felony possession charge and six months on the misdemeanor drug paraphernalia charge. The court ordered that the sentences were to run concurrently. ¶ 12 Dawson appeals his conviction and sentence and the denial of his motions to suppress. The District Court released Dawson on his own recognizance, subject to conditions, pending his appeal.

Standard of Review

¶ 13 The standard of review of a district court's denial of a motion to suppress is whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, and whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Parker, 1998 MT 6, ¶ 17, 287 Mont. 151, ¶ 17, 953 P.2d 692, ¶ 17 (citing State v. Roberts (1997), 284 Mont. 54, 56, 943 P.2d 1249, 1250).

Issue 1.

¶ 14 Did the District Court properly deny Dawson's motion to suppress which was based on Dawson's claim that law enforcement officers lacked particularized suspicion for an investigative stop and frisk?

¶ 15 The District Court concluded that pursuant to §§ 46-5-401, 402 and 403, MCA, and this Court's decision in State v. Broken Rope (1996), 278 Mont. 427, 925 P.2d 1157, regarding investigative stops, Officer House possessed the requisite objective data and resulting suspicion to lawfully stop and frisk Dawson. Thus, the court denied Dawson's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the investigative stop and frisk.

¶ 16 Dawson contends that the court erred in determining that Officer House had sufficient cause to temporarily detain and frisk him. Dawson argues that merely knocking on a motel room door at 11:00 p.m. cannot create a particularized suspicion of illegal activity.

¶ 17 When a law enforcement officer seizes a person, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies. Broken Rope, 278 Mont. at 430, 925 P.2d at 1159 (citing Bauer v. State (1996), 275 Mont. 119, 125, 910 P.2d 886, 889). In Broken Rope, this Court reiterated the two-part test set forth in State v. Gopher (1981), 193 Mont. 189, 631 P.2d 293, to determine whether a law enforcement officer has sufficient cause to stop an individual. Under this test, the State must first establish objective data from which an experienced officer can make certain inferences. The State must then show a resulting suspicion that the person is, or has been, engaged in wrongdoing. Broken Rope, 278 Mont. at 430-31, 925 P.2d at 1159 (citing Anderson v. State Dept. of Justice (1996), 275 Mont. 259, 263, 912 P.2d 212, 214).

¶ 18 Section 46-5-401, MCA, was amended in 1991 to reflect our decision in Gopher. This statute now provides:

Investigative stop. In order to obtain or verify an account of the person's presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.

Section 46-5-401, MCA (emphasis added). The question of whether a particularized suspicion exists is a question of fact which is dependent on the totality of the circumstances. Broken Rope, 278 Mont. at 431, 925 P.2d at 1159 (citing Anderson, 275 Mont. at 263, 912 P.2d at 214; State v. Reynolds (1995), 272 Mont. 46, 50, 899 P.2d 540, 542-43). Moreover, a particularized suspicion does not require certainty on the part of the law enforcement officer. State v. Olmsted, 1998 MT 301, ¶ 34, ___ Mont. ___, ¶ 34, 968 P.2d 1154, ¶ 34, 55 St.Rep. 1235, ¶ 34 (citing State v. Morsette (1982), 201 Mont. 233, 241, 654 P.2d 503, 507).

¶ 19 In the case sub judice, there was sufficient evidence presented at the suppression hearing to show the existence of objective data from which Officer House, an officer with seven years of law enforcement experience, could make certain inferences. Broken Rope, 278 Mont. at 431,925 P.2d at 1159. Law enforcement officers were in the process of executing a search warrant at the motel room of Jeremy Roehr, a known criminal. The officers had the room under surveillance for several hours prior to obtaining the search warrant and, in that surveillance, they observed several people entering and leaving the room. The officers had probable cause to believe that Roehr was conducting transactions involving dangerous drugs and stolen property in his motel room. Thus, when Dawson appeared...