State v. Deal

• Decision Date: 11 August 1888
• Citation: 24 Fla. 293,4 So. 899
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BOYD et al. v. DEAL, Assessor of Revenue.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

4 So. 899

24 Fla. 293

STATE ex rel. BOYD et al. v. DEAL, Assessor of Revenue.

Florida Supreme Court

August 11, 1888

Original proceeding in Mandamus.

MAXWELL C.J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The governor acts as a part of the law-making power of the state in approving a bill passed by the legislature. The function is not of an executive, but of a legislative, character.

The bill, as presented to the governor for his action, should be the same, in its legal effect, as to the same matter, as it was when it passed the two houses of the legislature. If subsequent to its passage by such houses, and before its approval by the governor, provisions have been inserted in it which change the legal effect of it as to a matter regulated by it before such insertion, the entire approved bill will be void. If, however, the genuine provisions are distinct from and independent of the spurious, it seems that they will not be affected by the latter.

A bill to revoke and abolish the existing municipal government of Palatka, and to reorganize its government, (chapter 3780, Laws 1887,) and containing 31 sections, passed the senate. In the house of representatives it was amended by striking out everything after the enacting clause, and inserting in lieu thereof eight new sections. This amendment was concurred in by the senate. Section 9 to 31, inclusive, of the original bill, were enrolled with the eight amendatory sections, and numbered in the enrollment as they were originally, and the amendatory sections were numbered from 1 to 8, consecutively. In this condition the bill was signed by the officers of the senate and house of representatives, and then presented to the governor, who approved it. The provisions of the spurious sections as to some matters covered by the genuine sections are different in their legal effect from those of the genuine sections. Held, the entire bill is of no effect was a law.

COUNSEL Calhoun & Davis, for relators.

Sumner C. Chandler, for respondent.

OPINION

RANEY, J.

A bill to be entitled 'An act to revoke and abolish the present municipal government of the town or city of Palatka, and to reorganize a city government for the said town or city,' and containing 31 sections, numbered from 1 to 31 consecutively, passed the senate at the last session of the legislature, and in this condition reached the house of representatives, where it was amended by striking out everything after the enacting clause, and inserting, in lieu of the matter so struck out, 8 new sections. This amendment was concurred in by the senate. In enrolling the bill, the amendatory sections were substituted for the first eight original sections of the bill; and such amendatory sections and the 23 sections, numbered from 9 to 31, consecutively, of the original bill, were enrolled; and in this condition the enrolled bill was signed by the officers of the senate and house of representatives, when it was carried to the governor, who approved it on the 3d day of June.

Considering the bill as a whole, though it has the sanction of the governor, and is certified to by the officers of the two houses, yet, as is conclusively shown by the journals, it has never been adopted by the two houses referred to. Cooley, Const. Lim. 163, 164.

The question presented for decision is whether any part of this ostensible statute, as it appears in both the enrolled and the printed laws, is valid.

In Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721, the facts were that a bill providing 'that all existing judgments of courts of record in this state, and all which may hereafter be rendered in said courts of record, be, and the same are, liens upon all of the property of the defendants therein, which is subject to levy and sale,' originated in and was passed by the senate. In the house of representatives the following amendment was adopted: 'Provided, that the lien shall extend only to property in the county where the judgment was rendered, and in the county where it is recorded in the office of the probate court,' and, as thus amended, the bill passed the house, but the senate refused to concur in the amendment, and a committee of conference was appointed by the two houses. This committee reported against the proviso, and recommended that the bill should be passed without it; and this report was concurred in by the house, and the senate was notified of the house having receded from its amendment.

The bill was never enrolled as it passed; but, in making what was intended to be an enrolled copy, to be signed by the presiding officers of the two houses, and to be presented to the governor, the proviso was also enrolled as a part of the bill; and in this shape it was signed by the speaker of the house and president of the senate, and approved by the governor.

It is apparent that the bill, as it was signed by the officers of the two houses and approved by the governor, made all existing and future judgments of courts of record liens on the property of the defendants only in the county in which the judgment was or should be rendered, and in those counties where it should be recorded in the office of the probate court; while such bill, as it actually passed the two houses, made judgments of courts of record liens on all property of the defendants in any county in the state, whether the judgment had been recorded in the county or not.

Nothing could be plainer than that the governor had acted on and approved a bill whose provisions were in legal effect one thing, whereas the bill which had passed the two houses of the legislature was entirely different in its legal effect; or, as stated by the supreme court of Alabama, the bill which was signed by the officers of the two houses and approved by the governor 'was not the bill which had been passed by the two houses.'

The whole bill was held to be of no validity; the court saying they were not to be understood as deciding that an error of this character would vitiate the whole act, where separate and distinct matter from that of the bill was inadvertently inserted, and did not affect the original bill as passed, or change its substance or legal effect.

In Moody v. State, 48 Ala. 115, where certain material amendments had been added to the bill after its introduction, but were omitted in the enrollment, and did not appear in the enrolled bill as signed by the officers of the two houses and the governor, the bill was held to be of no effect as a law.

In Berry v. Railroad Co., 41 Md. 446, the facts were as follows: In 1868 a statute was passed incorporating the railroad company, and the nineteenth section of the act provided that, if the company did not complete the road within four years from the time of commencing its construction, the charter was to be null and void. The commencement was made in 1873, within the time prescribed by the act, and consequently, as the charter stood, the company had till some time in 1877 to complete the road.

In 1874 an amendatory act was passed which in its third section recited, by way of preamble, that it was feared that the time allowed by the charter for the completion of the road was insufficient; and this third section, as enrolled and approved by the governor, and as printed in the volume of laws, provided that if the road was not finished in five years from January, 1870, (thus diminishing instead of increasing the time allowed by the original act,) the charter and all amendments should be void. Upon an examination of the engrossed bill as it was finally acted upon by the two houses of the legislature, with the indorsements thereon by the proper officers as to the action of the houses, and the journals of both houses, it appeared beyond question that the extension of time for the completion of the road, as provided in the third section of the bill, was five years from the 1st day of January 1875. The decision was that as the third section of the amendatory act of 1874, as sealed and approved by the governor, was materially different from the section as it passed the two houses of the legislature, it was void; but that as the other portions of said amendatory act, exclusive of said third section, were regularly passed by the legislature and approved by the governor, and were (as expressed in the head-note) entirely distinct and severable from the third section, they were valid and effective.

The material difference between the third section of the amendatory act, as it passed the two houses, and as it was when approved by the governor, was occasioned by omitting the word 'five' after the word 'seventy,' in copying or enrolling the bill for signature and approval; and on account of this omission and material difference the court declared the particular section null and void, and held that the nineteenth section of the original statute was left unaffected, and prescribed the time for completion of the road, viz., four years from the time of commencement, in 1873.

What the provisions of the other sections of the amendatory act of 1874 were, does not appear in the report of the case. The doctrine, however, upon which they were held good, was that they were 'entirely distinct and severable from that which is void.'

In State v. Platt, 2 S. C. 150, it appears that the nineteenth section of 'An act to revise simplify, and abridge the rules, practice, pleadings, and forms of courts in this state,' as enrolled and signed by the presiding officers of the senate and house of representatives, and approved by the governor, provided, inter alia, that the courts for the county of Barnwell should be held at 'Barnwell;' but the legislative journal showed that the section, as it actually passed the two houses, provided that the courts should be held at 'Blackville.' 'The...