State v. DeAngelis, 19252
Decision Date | 08 July 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 19252,19252 |
Citation | 256 S.C. 364,182 S.E.2d 732 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. James V. DeANGELIS, Appellant. |
Jack F. McGuinn, and Patrick E. Treacy, Columbia, for appellant.
Solicitor Phillip K. Wingard, Lexington, for respondent.
At the 1970 May Term of the General Sessions Court for Lexington County, a jury was duly empaneled and sworn to try James V. DeAngelis, the appellant herein, on an indictment charging him with receiving stolen goods. There were two other indictments pending charging him with receiving stolen goods, and a fourth and fifth indictment charging him, along with others, with receiving stolen goods and a conspiracy to commit the crime of receiving stolen goods. A sixth indictment charged the appellant, along with two others, with committing the crimes of housebreaking, safecracking and grand larceny.
Prior to proceeding with the trial, the appellant's retained counsel requested and were granted time to discuss with their client the possibility of entering guilty pleas to the several indictments against him. Thereafter, these attorneys made various offers for a negotiated plea and sentence, exclusive of any plea to the indictment charging the crimes of housebreaking, safecracking and larceny. After further lengthy negotiations, the appellant, through his retained counsel, offered to enter a plea of guilty on each of the six pending indictments and would accept a sentence of sixty years, provided he would not have to serve over three years before being placed on probation, and further that the indictment charging him with housebreaking, safecracking and larceny be amended to charge the crime of accessory after the fact to housebreaking and grand larceny. The State agreed and recommended to the trial judge that the six pleas of guilty be accepted upon the terms above stated.
Prior to the acceptance of the pleas of guilty the trial judge personally conducted an examination of the appellant, with a stenographic record thereof being made by the court reporter, to determine whether the pleas were being made voluntarily and with the understanding of the nature of the charges, the consequences of the pleas and the rights necessarily abandoned by such pleas. We quote the following from the record:
The court sentenced the appellant in the aggregate to a term of twenty years, provided that upon the service of three years the balance of his sentence would be suspended and he would be placed on probation for five years. The appellant was given one hundred and twenty days within which to arrange his business affairs before he commenced the service of his prison term.
In August, 1970, the appellant made a motion for a new trial upon the ground of after-discovered evidence. This motion was denied by the trial judge on the ground that the aforesaid pleas of guilty had been initiated and negotiated by the appellant and that the affidavits offered in support of the motion failed to establish any after-discovered evidence. The appellant prosecutes this appeal from such order.
It appears from the record that the guilty pleas of the appellant and the sentence imposed were the result of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining has been approved by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747. In the cited case it was held that the defendant was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that he misapprehended the quality of the State's case.
The primary question for determination is whether the trial judge committed error in not granting the motion of the appellant for a new trial made on the ground of after-discovered evidence.
The courts do not look with favor upon applications for new trials on the ground of after-discovered evidence, as there must be an end to litigation in any case; however, there are cases that motions of this character should be entertained and granted in order that wrongs done may be remedied. State v. Augustine, 131 S.C. 21, 126 S.E. 759. It is the fixed rule that the credibility of newly-dicovered evidence offered in support of a motion for a new trial is a matter for determination by the circuit judge to whom it is offered. In him, not this court, resides the power to weigh such evidence; and, his judgment thereabout will not be disturbed except for error of law or abuse of discretion. State v. Parker, 249 S.C. 139, 153 S.E.2d 183.
The appellants motion for a new trial was based on three affidavits, one by Donald Edward Crain, Sr., one by Johnny Rogers Ford, and one by his counsel. The appellant did not submit his own affidavit in support of his motion.
The sixth indictment, hereinbefore referred to, initially charged that on or about October 24, 1969, the appellant along with Joseph Scheibler and John Havekost,...
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Jamison v. Cohen, C/A No. 9:15-2859-MBS
...for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge."); State v. DeAngelis , 256 S.C. 364, 369, 182 S.E.2d 732, 734 (1971) (stating absent error of law or abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb the trial court's judgment); Sta......
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...195 (1978). Absent error of law or abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb the trial judge's judgment. State v. De Angelis, 256 S.C. 364, 182 S.E. 2d 732 (1971); State v. Deese, 266 S.C. 534, 225 S.E.2d 175 (1976). A party requesting a new trial based on after-discovered evidence m......
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DeAngelis v. State of South Carolina, Civ. A. No. 71-814.
...This motion was denied by the trial judge. The denial was appealed to the Supreme Court of South Carolina and in an opinion filed July 8, 1971, 182 S.E.2d 732, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and The trial court admitted the Petitioner to bail pending the hearing of......
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Hayden v. State, 21861
...539, 243 S.E.2d 195 (1978). Absent error of law or abuse of discretion, this Court will not disturb his judgment. State v. De Angelis, 256 S.C. 364, 182 S.E.2d 732 (1971); State v. Deese, 266 S.C. 534, 225 S.E.2d 175 (1976). I believe the trial court made its decision without error of law o......