State v. DeAngelo M.

• Decision Date: 04 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 34,995.,31,413.,34,995.
• Citation: 344 P.3d 1019
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. DeANGELO M., Child–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

344 P.3d 1019

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.DeANGELO M., Child–Appellant.

31,413.

No. 34,995.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Nov. 4, 2014.

Certiorari Granted, Feb. 6, 2015,

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Pranava Upadrashta, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E. Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Chief Judge.

{1} DeAngelo M. (Child) appeals his convictions for second-degree murder, burglary, larceny, and tampering with evidence. Child appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made during an interrogation by three investigating officers and contends that the State did not overcome the rebuttable statutory presumption that his statements were inadmissible against him because he was thirteen years of age. See NMSA 1978, § 32A–2–14(F) (2009).

{2} We evaluate whether the State successfully rebutted the presumption of inadmissibility of statements made by a thirteen-year-old child under Section 32A–2–14(F). We conclude that the evidence presented by the State to the district court did not rebut the presumption of inadmissibility with clear and convincing evidence. State v. Adam J., 2003–NMCA–080, ¶¶ 10–11, 133 N.M. 815, 70 P.3d 805. Therefore, Child's statements were improperly admitted. We reverse the district court on its denial of the motion to suppress Child's statements. We affirm on the issues of denial of his motion to sever, request for a bill of particulars, and demand for a twelve-person jury. Accordingly, we remand this case for a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

{3} Child was eight days past turning age thirteen when he was interrogated by three investigators in connection with the murder of Angel Vale. The officers interviewed neighbors and witnesses, including Child's mother. On July 23, two retired police officers, who were acting as agents of the district attorney, and a uniformed police officer drove Child and his mother to the Roosevelt County Law Enforcement Complex where they questioned him. His mother was present throughout the interrogation. One officer read and explained Child's Miranda rights to him, which, according to the officer's testimony, Child appeared to understand. During the interrogation, Child made inculpatory statements to the officers regarding the burglary of Vale's home. Child was arrested.

{4} Child filed a motion to suppress his statements. Two of the investigators and Child's teacher at the Curry County Juvenile Detention Center testified at the suppression hearing. The district court found that Child had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights and denied his motion to suppress his statements. Child also filed a motion to sever the murder, aggravated burglary, one count of tampering with evidence from larceny, and the second count of tampering, a motion for a bill of particulars, and a motion to compel the State to allow the case to be heard by twelve jurors instead of six. The district court denied each motion. Defendant timely filed this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Child's Motion to Suppress His Statements

{5} Prior to trial, Child filed a motion to suppress his statements that were obtained during the interrogation by the two district attorney investigators and a police officer based on the State's failure to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility for a thirteen-year-old child's statements under Section 32A–2–14(F). The district court denied the motion. The denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo. See State v. Gutierrez, 2011–NMSC–024, ¶ 7, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024 ; State v. Jade G., 2007–NMSC–010, ¶ 15, 141 N.M. 284, 154 P.3d 659.

{6} Child argues that the standard created in Adam J. for the State to rebut the “presumptive inadmissibility” of statements by a child under the age of fifteen years is contrary to legislative intent because it requires comparison of the accused's ability to give a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights to an average of other protected young children, instead of requiring an individualized determination of whether the child has the ability to understand legal consequences and not to be unduly influenced by authority figures. Child further argues that, even if Adam J. was correct, the State did not sufficiently rebut the presumption that his statements to the police were inadmissible. 2003–NMCA–080, ¶ 7, 133 N.M. 815, 70 P.3d 805.

{7} The State argues that the Adam J. standard is appropriate and that the State rebutted the presumption that Child's statements were inadmissible by presenting evidence from the two investigating officers and his teacher regarding his personal traits that supported the district court's finding that he had the ability to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights.¹ For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Adam J., while equating a particular age to a legislative line between children who do or do not have the developmental maturity to make a valid waiver, nevertheless significantly expands the range of inquiry to assess factors “particular to an individual child.” Id. ¶ 8. Viewing this case in light of the expansive evaluation of circumstance and personal characteristics that Adam J. and Subsection (F) require to be conducted by the district court with regard to thirteen-year-old children, we conclude that the State's evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption that Child was incapable of a valid waiver of his right under Section 32A–2–14(F).

1. The Two–Tier Analysis of Ability to Waive Rights and Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver Under Section 32A–2–14 of the Children's Code

{8} The capacity to waive Fifth Amendment rights is assumed for children over fifteen and for adults. See State v. Jonathan M., 1990–NMSC–046, ¶ 8, 109 N.M. 789, 791 P.2d 64 ; see also Gutierrez, 2011–NMSC–024, ¶ 7, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024 (requiring the same assessment for adults and children when determining the legitimacy of a Miranda waiver); State v. Martinez, 1999–NMSC–018, ¶¶ 14–15, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718 (determining that the factors used in evaluating a waiver of constitutional rights for juveniles over the age of fourteen are essentially the same as those used for an adult). This is because Section 32A–2–14 of the Children's Code assumes that children fifteen years old and older are more similar in development and maturity to adults and, therefore, are better able to protect their rights. See Jonathan M., 1990–NMSC–046, ¶ 8, 109 N.M. 789, 791 P.2d 64 (explaining that children over fifteen and adults are unlikely to make involuntary statements after Miranda warnings due to their higher level of sophistication); see also Martinez, 1999–NMSC–018, ¶ 18, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718 (stating that Section 32A–2–14 codifies that the adult rule for a successful waiver of rights applies to children fifteen years old and older). When a defendant fifteen years old and older raises his lack of capacity to waive Fifth Amendment rights, the state must prove that he waived his rights by a preponderance of the evidence. Gutierrez, 2011–NMSC–024, ¶ 7, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024.

{9} However, the Children's Code emphasizes the difficulty a child younger than fifteen experiences due to a lack of maturity and development when waiving Fifth Amendment rights. The Children's Code protects children younger than fifteen years old by creating a rebuttable presumption that statements given by thirteen- or fourteen-year-old children are inadmissible. Section 32A–2–14(F) ; see In re Francesca L., 2000–NMCA–019, ¶ 7, 128 N.M. 673, 997 P.2d 147 (holding that the Children's Code grants heightened protection only for the statements of those under fifteen years old), overruled on other grounds by Adam J., 2003–NMCA–080, ¶ 10, 133 N.M. 815, 70 P.3d 805. The rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility created by Subsection (F) “stresses age in its effort to draw the line between children who are too young to waive their rights and those who are not.” Adam J., 2003–NMCA–080, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 815, 70 P.3d 805. The presumption is based on a legislative recognition that most children under fifteen are less capable of understanding and protecting their legal interests than are older children and adults. E.g., Jonathan M., 1990–NMSC–046, ¶ 8, 109 N.M. 789, 791 P.2d 64 (interpreting previous version of Section 32A–2–14 to reflect that young children do not have the capacity to understand or protect their constitutional rights). Subsection (F) creates a constitutional classification based on age that requires this level of protection. Francesca L., 2000–NMCA–019, ¶ 12, 128 N.M. 673, 997 P.2d 147. It is an age-based presumption that is intended to “draw the line between children who are too young to waive their rights and those who are not.” Adam J., 2003–NMCA–080, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 815, 70 P.3d 805.

{10} The child's “[a]ge is particularly pertinent because Subsection [ (F) ] creates a distinction based upon the age of a child.” Francesca L., 2000–NMCA–019, ¶ 12, 128 N.M. 673, 997 P.2d 147. A child's proximity in age to thirteen is also relevant to this determination and can alone serve as an indication that the state did not rebut the presumption. See Adam J., 2003–NMCA–080, ¶ 5, 133 N.M. 815, 70 P.3d 805 (stating that the district court could have determined that the state did not rebut the presumption based exclusively on the fact that the child had only recently turned thirteen). Without sufficient intellectual and emotional development, not only are young children unable to understand and protect their legal interests, they are also unable to understand the legal consequences of their statements. They may also be affected by the inherent intimidation of questioning by authority figures such as police. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962) (stating that a fourteen-year-old child is unequal to police in knowledge and understanding of consequences of...