State v. Declerck
| Decision Date | 20 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 109,759.,109,759. |
| Citation | 317 P.3d 794,49 Kan.App.2d 908 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Aryanna Philatina DECLERCK, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Held Unconstitutional
Syllabus by the Court
1. The extraction of a blood sample is both a search of the person and a seizure of an effect. The extraction implicates constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
2. Under the United States and Kansas Constitutions, a search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless a specifically established exception applies. Those exceptions include consent, search incident to a lawful arrest, stop and frisk, probable cause plus exigent circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or feel, and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.
3. Probable cause to arrest is the reasonable belief, drawn from the totality of information and reasonable inferences available to the arresting officer, that the defendant has committed or is committing a specific crime.
4. There is a three-part test to determine when a warrantless blood draw can be taken: (1) There must be exigent circumstances in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant would threaten the destruction of the evidence; (2) the officer must have probable cause to believe that the suspect has been driving under the influence of alcohol; and (3) the procedures used to extract the blood must be reasonable.
5. Despite statutory language authorizing the taking of a blood sample, any such bodily invasion must still be constitutionally sound.
6. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8–1001(b)(2) is unconstitutional to the extent it requires a search and seizure absent probable cause that the person was operating or attempting to operate a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol. A traffic infraction, plus an injury or fatality, without more, does not constitute probable cause that drugs or alcohol were involved in the accident.
7. A driver's consent under Kansas' implied consent statute, without more, does not constitute valid consent under the Fourth Amendment.
Jodi Litfin and Jose V. Guerra, assistant district attorneys, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.
Reid T. Nelson, of Capital and Conflicts Appeals Office, for appellee.
Before POWELL, P.J., ATCHESON, J., and ERNEST L. JOHNSON, District Judge Retired, assigned.
In this appeal, we confront the question of whether drivers on our state's highways relinquish their Fourth Amendment rights under Kansas' implied consent statute. Following a single-vehicle fatality accident and as allowed by statute, an officer directed medical personnel to withdraw blood without a warrant from the driver of the vehicle, Aryanna Declerck, despite her refusal. After receiving the blood test results, the Shawnee County District Attorney charged Declerck with involuntary manslaughter-DUI, a severity level 4 person felony. Declerck filed two motions to suppress, alleging the blood test results were obtained without a warrant and without probable cause. After a hearing, the district court granted Declerck's motions.
The State subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal concerning the suppression of evidence, arguing (1) K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8–1001 clearly authorized the blood draw, (2) the consent exception to the warrant requirement was met because Declerck had impliedly consented to the blood draw under Kansas' implied consent statute, and (3) even if the search was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, the good faith exception should apply to allow admission of the blood test results because law enforcement reasonably relied on the statute when obtaining Declerck's blood.
We hold that the warrantless blood draw, though done in accordance with K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8–1001, violated Declerck's Fourth Amendment rights because it was not done pursuant to probable cause that Declerck had been operating her motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol and because Declerck's implied consent to such a blood draw under Kansas' implied consent statute did not constitute consent for the purposes of a valid exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. We decline to address the State's good faith exception argument, asserted for the first time on appeal, because the State did not establish an adequate record below plus there are disputed facts which prevent us from properly addressing this question. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
On November 5, 2011, at approximately 2 p.m., Declerck was involved in a single vehicle fatality accident in which she was the driver. The passenger, Shaylee Oxy, who was not wearing her seatbelt, was ejected from the vehicle and ultimately died from her injuries. The State subsequently charged Declerck with involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21–5405(a)(3), a severity level 4, person felony.
At the preliminary hearing, two witnesses of the accident, Tom Parish and Gregory Roy; phlebotomist Dave Cunningham, Jr.; Larry Mann from the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) Forensic Laboratory; Officer DominicYancy; and lead investigator Trooper Marcus Seirer testified.
Parish testified he was heading eastbound on I–470 on November 5, 2011, when he noticed a black pickup truck coming off the right shoulder in front of him. He described Declerck's driving as “very reckless.”
Next, Roy testified he was behind Declerck's truck in the left turn lane on 21st street waiting to turn onto I–470. He followed Declerck as she merged onto the highway and stayed in the right lane. There was a small sedan to the left and a vehicle in front of Declerck. Her truck slowly started to drift over to the left, so Roy slowed down because he thought Declerck's truck was going to make contact with the sedan. The truck all of a sudden swerved over to the right and out of the lane slightly onto the right shoulder. The truck then quickly whipped back to the left and crossed into the left lane. Declerck started to lose control and whipped back to the right. Declerck appeared to overcorrect; the truck's left rear tire caught the turf or median, and the vehicle began to barrel roll. Clothes and other debris flew out of the truck and littered the road. As Roy drove past the accident, he noticed an individual lying on the ground. The sedan pulled over to the right side of the road; Roy parked in front of the sedan and exited his vehicle. Roy headed towards the accident scene and noticed the driver of the sedan was still in his vehicle. Roy made a mental note of the sedan's tag. The sedan drove off. Roy immediately approached an officer and told him that a vehicle involved in the accident drove off. The officer handed him a clipboard and asked him to record what he had seen. Roy said there was nothing irregular or reckless about Declerck's driving.
Declerck was transported to Stormont–Vail Hospital as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident. Seirer requested an officer obtain a blood draw from Declerck pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8–1001—a traffic fatality occurred and Declerck could have been cited for a traffic offense. Yancy went to Stormont–Vail to obtain a blood draw. He read and provided a copy of the Implied Consent Advisory to Declerck, but she declined to provide a blood sample.
Yancy contacted his supervising officer, who was at the scene of the accident, regarding Declerck's declination. The officer directed Yancy to proceed with a custodial blood draw.
Cunningham drew Declerck's blood pursuant to Yancy's request. Cunningham gave the blood sample to Yancy who later submitted it to the KBI for testing. Mann reviewed the lab results and testified there were marijuana chemicals in Declerck's blood. He indicated based on the levels of THC—a psychoactive substance found in marijuana—in Declerck's blood, there was some level of impairment.
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the district court bound Declerck over for trial.
Shortly thereafter, Declerck filed two motions to suppress evidence. The first motion dealt with law enforcement's failure to seek a search warrant prior to drawing her blood. The motion alleged, inter alia, there were no exigent circumstances present to excuse the warrant requirement. The second motion alleged law enforcement did not have probable cause to believe Declerck was under the influence of drugs.
The district court held a suppression hearing on the two motions. The State conceded the officers did not have probable cause to support a request for a warrant. Nonetheless,the State argued the blood draw was legal pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8–1001(b)(2), which provides an officer shall request a test in the event of a vehicle accident that results in serious injury or death and the driver could be cited for any traffic infraction. Yancy and Seirer testified similar to their preliminary hearing testimony.
Yancy testified he read Declerck her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), after the blood draw, and she declined to speak to him. Yancy testified he was with Declerck for an hour and did not notice any signs of impairment.
Seirer testified that he arrived on the accident scene after Oxy and Declerck had been transported to Stormont–Vail. At approximately 3:17 p.m., while at the scene of the accident, Seirer learned that Oxy had passed away. At 4:21 p.m. he drove to Stormont–Vail to take a statement from Declerck. Before he met with Declerck, he talked to Yancy who was on his way out of the hospital. Yancy told Seirer that a blood draw had been taken and Declerck invoked Miranda. Seirer proceeded to Declerck's hospital room and told her that...
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...in an accident or collision resulting in serious injury or death. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8–1001(b)(2), (d) ; but see State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908, 317 P.3d 794, rev. denied, 299 Kan. 1271 (2014) (holding 8–1001[b][2], [d] unconstitutional to the extent it allows a search after a traffic ......
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State v. Meitler, 111,697.
...he filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood draw based on a recent Kansas Court of Appeals decision in State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908, 317 P.3d 794, rev. denied 299 Kan. –––– (June 20, 2014), which found that K.S.A.2011 Supp. 8–1001(b)(2) is unconstitutional. The district c......
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Appellate Decisions
...that the statute permitting the blood draw, K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1001(b)(2), was unconstitutional as decided in State v. Declerck, 49 Kan. App. 2d 908 (2014), rev. denied 299 Kan.__(June 20, 2014). District court granted the motion, ruling that Declerck applied, and goodfaith exception to th......