State v. DeCoster

• Decision Date: 23 January 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. AND-94-375,No. 7119,7119
• Citation: 653 A.2d 891
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Austin J. DeCOSTER, d/b/a DeCoster Egg Farms. DecisionLaw
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 891

653 A.2d 891

STATE of Maine v. Austin J. DeCOSTER, d/b/a DeCoster Egg Farms.

Decision No. 7119.

Law Docket No. AND-94-375.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Oct. 4, 1994.

Decided Jan. 23, 1995.

Stephen L. Wessler (orally), Thomas A. Harnett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

George F. Burns, Arnold C. Macdonald, Amerling & Burns, Hugh Calkins, Calkins & Pouravelis, Portland, Janice Morgan, Linda Christ, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., Augusta, Eric Nelson, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., Farmworker Unit, Bangor, for amici curiae.

Michael T. Healy (orally), William C. Knowles, Verrill & Dana, Portland, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN and LIPEZ, JJ.

RUDMAN, Justice.

Austin J. DeCoster, d/b/a DeCoster Egg Farms ("DeCoster") appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Bradford, J.) permanently enjoining conduct that was found to violate the Maine Civil Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4681 (Supp.1991) ("Civil Rights Act") and ordering him to pay the costs and reasonable attorney fees of the plaintiff, the State of Maine. DeCoster contends that the Superior Court erred in finding a violation of the Civil Rights Act and, in the alternative, that the court erred in finding him liable for the civil rights violations committed by his nonparty supervisory employees ("supervisors"). DeCoster further asserts that the injunction issued by the Superior Court is too broad and consequently represents an abuse of discretion.

The State cross-appeals from the Superior Court's determination that DeCoster's actions are not violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 207-214 (1989) ("UTPA"). The State contends that the court erred in finding that the UTPA is not applicable to the relationship between DeCoster and his resident employees. We disagree and hold that the relationship between DeCoster and his resident employees is not "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the UTPA. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court in its entirety.

The court heard five days of testimony from 22 witnesses. The facts as found by the Superior Court may be briefly summarized as follows: DeCoster is the sole proprietor of egg farms employing about 300 workers, 100 of whom are of Hispanic ancestry who speak Spanish as their primary language. DeCoster was charged with engaging in a pattern or practice of conduct that prevented the workers and their families, living in housing furnished by him, from having contact with or access to a variety of service providers, friends, and family members in violation of the UTPA and the Civil Rights Act. Many of the workers live in a mobile home park maintained by DeCoster; they do not pay rent, heat, fuel or electricity. The mobile home park consists of approximately twenty mobile homes, houses only employees and their families, and when employment is terminated the employees must vacate the mobile homes.

DeCoster's employees have experienced difficulty adjusting to their new surroundings, primarily because of their inability to speak English. Since 1987 various organizations and individuals have come to the mobile home park to offer assistance. The Rural Community Action Ministry ("RCAM") workers offer family planning assistance, emergency housing and outreach services to clients who cannot get from their homes to

RCAM's offices. Pine Tree Legal Assistance ("Pine Tree") attorneys assist workers in a variety of legal matters, some of which have resulted in legal claims and actions against DeCoster. DeCoster resented the presence of the RCAM and Pine Tree personnel and, in August 1989, erected a sign stating:

NO ADMITTANCE

AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEES

ONLY

OTHERS REPORT TO OFFICE

A.J. DECOSTER CO.

Testimony of DeCoster's supervisors established that one of the reasons for the sign was to prevent RCAM and Pine Tree workers' access to DeCoster's employees. After the erection of the sign, DeCoster's supervisors threatened, intimidated and harassed RCAM workers. Three supervisors frequently followed the cars of visiting RCAM workers at dangerously close range and, on one occasion, blocked a RCAM worker's exit from the facility, allowing her to leave only after the police arrived and informed the supervisors that they would be arrested if they did not release her. A DeCoster supervisor also threatened a RCAM worker telling her, "[I]f you come back [to the trailer park], we will take you out." Consequently, both RCAM and Pine Tree discontinued their outreach services to DeCoster's employees.

The conduct of DeCoster's supervisors placed the RCAM outreach workers and residents of the mobile home park in fear for their personal safety, and interfered with the residents' access to social and legal services and their quiet use and enjoyment of their homes. The supervisors acted under the direction and control of DeCoster, with his knowledge and consent. The "No Admittance" sign was erected for the purpose of isolating the residents and denying their access to services that might cause financial or legal problems for DeCoster, and the sign discouraged legitimate visitors from entering the mobile home park.

I. The Civil Rights Act

DeCoster first argues that the court erred in finding a violation of the Civil Rights Act. The court held that the employees living in DeCoster's mobile home park are tenants under Maine law and have a right to quiet enjoyment, including a right to receive visitors at their homes. DeCoster asserts that the employees occupy the mobile homes incident to their employment and, consequently, have no right to receive visitors. ¹

The Superior Court's conclusions that the laborers residing in DeCoster's mobile home park have a right to quiet enjoyment, including the right to receive visitors, is a conclusion of law, reviewable for error. See Morin Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Atlantic Design & Constr. Co., 615 A.2d 239, 241 (Me.1992). An employee who occupies housing provided by an employer that is merely incidental to employment has been characterized as a "tenant incident to employment." Moreno v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 693 F.2d 106, 107 (10th Cir.1982). DeCoster relies on numerous cases from other jurisdictions holding that such employees have no right to possession of the property they occupy other than that which emanates from the contract of employment, and urges this Court to read these cases to support his contention that the laborers living in his mobile home park have no right to receive visitors. We decline DeCoster's invitation. The right of a laborer living in housing provided by the employer to receive visitors at home is inherently different from the right at issue in each of the cited cases--namely the right of an employer to evict an employee living in employer provided housing upon termination of employment. The fact that housing is furnished incident to employment has no bearing on whether a tenancy exists and the classification of employees as tenants incident to employment is irrelevant to the determination of whether those employees have a right to receive visitors in their employer provided residences. ²

The question of whether laborers residing in employer provided housing are tenants under Maine law is one of first impression. DeCoster has voluntarily elected to furnish housing to his employees as an aid to his business. While it is true that the employees pay no monetary rent, the offer of free rent helped to induce some of these employees to leave their homes in Texas and Mexico and come to Maine to work for DeCoster. It is commonly understood that a portion of workers' compensation is housing and the same holds true under these facts. DeCoster benefits from this arrangement through the wages he is able to pay his workers and by having the workers on the premises immediately available for work. We conclude that this is sufficient consideration to find that DeCoster's employees are tenants under Maine law and as such have a right to quiet enjoyment, which includes a right to receive visitors in their homes.

Other jurisdictions have held that migrant workers living in employer provided housing have a right to receive visitors under theories of constitutional and property law. ³ Having determined that DeCoster's employees are tenants under Maine law with a right to receive visitors in their homes, we have no reason to go further and consider the constitutional issue of freedom of association or the question whether any property owner has the right to bar access to governmental services available to migrant workers.

DeCoster argues that because his employees receive the same compensation whether or not they live in the employer provided housing, the housing cannot be considered compensation. ⁴ The fact that some employees choose not to live in DeCoster's mobile homes does not negate the fact that the housing serves as an incentive and is part of the employees' compensation.

DeCoster argues that he cannot be found liable under the Civil Rights Act even if those acting under his direction and control intentionally used and threatened force and violence to interfere with the rights of his employees. The Superior Court's finding that the conduct of DeCoster's supervisors was carried out with the knowledge, consent and direction of DeCoster, is a finding of fact that we review for clear error. Findings of fact will be upheld if they are based on a justifiable inference drawn from credible evidence. See Burton v. Merrill, 612 A.2d 862, 865 (Me.1992). The court reasonably inferred from the evidence set forth above that DeCoster had knowledge of, consented to, and directed the actions of his supervisors.

The court's determination that DeCoster is personally liable for violating the Civil Rights Act is a conclusion of law which we review for error. The critical part of the Maine Civil Rights Act reads: "Whenever any person, ... intentionally interferes or attempts to...