State v. Degroot, A18-0850
| Decision Date | 15 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | A18-0850 |
| Citation | 946 N.W.2d 354 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Darren Heath DEGROOT, Appellant/Cross-Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Following a bench trial, appellant Darren Heath Degroot was convicted of attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct,1 electronically soliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct,2 and electronically distributing any material, language, or communication that relates to or describes sexual conduct to a child.3 On appeal, Degroot argued that the State failed to prove that he committed an act that was "a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for" the commission of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. He also argued that the district court violated Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2018), when it convicted him of both the electronic solicitation offense and the electronic distribution offense. Finally, he argued that the district court violated Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2018), when it sentenced him on both the electronic solicitation conviction and the attempted third-degree sexual assault conviction. The court of appeals agreed that section 609.04 and section 609.035 were violated, but otherwise rejected Degroot's arguments; thus, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. State v. Degroot , No. A18-0850, 2019 WL 1758464 (Minn. App. Apr. 22, 2019). We granted Degroot's petition for review and the State's petition for cross-review.
Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the attempt conviction and because the offense of electronic solicitation necessarily includes the offense of electronic distribution, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision in part. Because the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the electronic solicitation conviction and the attempted third-degree sexual assault conviction were not part of a single behavioral incident, we reverse the court of appeals’ decision in part and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In February 2017, the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force conducted an undercover operation in Worthington to investigate internet crimes against children.
Special Agent John Nordberg operated a decoy profile of a 14-year-old boy named "Johnny" on an online dating application.4
Around 9:30 a.m. on February 7, 2017, appellant Darren Degroot sent an electronic message to Johnny from Degroot's home in Edgerton. Special Agent Nordberg, posing as Johnny, replied.5 Degroot quickly began asking Johnny about his sexual experiences and preferences. Within 10 minutes, Johnny wrote, "I'm 14, is that ok?" Degroot replied "Oh wow u r young." As their electronic communication continued, the sexual nature of their conversation quickly escalated. In the first 30 minutes of their conversation, Degroot sent Johnny multiple unsolicited photographs of an erect penis. Degroot asked Johnny for photographs in return.
Degroot repeatedly expressed his arousal and sexual attraction to the child. Degroot and Johnny talked about when, and how often, they might meet for sex. Degroot suggested they could have multiple sexual encounters over the next 3 days. He also inquired about where Johnny normally lived and offered, more generally, that "any time u need to get away ur always welcome to come here n ill give u some fun." Degroot said he was interested in meeting later that day and Johnny told Degroot that he was alone at his aunt's house in Worthington.
Degroot and Johnny agreed to meet that afternoon. Degroot asked Johnny about preparing for anal sex, specifically asking if Johnny knew how to use an enema and whether he had personal lubrication. Degroot said he could bring "supplies." They made plans to shower together when Degroot arrived. Degroot then described his sexual fantasies for their encounter, including fetishized roleplay. Johnny ended their conversation around noon by stating that he needed to go to a nearby gas station to get something to eat.
Thirty minutes later, Johnny announced that he was back online and confirmed that he was 14 years old. Johnny asked again if that was okay. After 15 minutes, Degroot responded, "Yes that's ok bud." Degroot and Johnny resumed their dialogue. Returning to the topic of that afternoon, Degroot asked whether Johnny had been a good boy and referenced using a belt if Johnny had been naughty.
Degroot left Edgerton around 2 p.m. to drive to Worthington, which is approximately 40 miles away. Johnny told Degroot to text him when Degroot was nearby because he was staying with his aunt and did not know the exact address. During the drive, Degroot continued sending fetishized messages to Johnny with updates about his location. When Degroot arrived in Worthington, Johnny used landmarks to direct Degroot to his aunt's home. Johnny instructed, Degroot texted Johnny "Ok I'm here" at 2:49 p.m. Johnny confirmed the relative location of his house a second time and said that the door was open. Degroot asked, "Ford Taurus in garage?" Johnny said yes.
Meanwhile, the Worthington Police Department dispatched an undercover arrest team to the decoy location. Officers observed Degroot park, get out of his car, and walk toward the house, carrying a plastic shopping bag. They arrested Degroot while he was still in the parking lot. Degroot's bag contained personal lubricant, an enema bottle, a long-handled spoon, and a belt.
The events of that day resulted in three charges that are relevant here: attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct;6 electronically soliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct;7 and electronically distributing any material, language, or communication that relates to or describes sexual conduct to a child.8 After a bench trial, the district court found Degroot guilty as charged. The district court entered judgments of conviction on all three charges, concluding they were not a part of a single behavioral incident because they were committed at different times and places with different criminal objectives. Using the Hernandez method, the district court sentenced Degroot in the order the crimes were committed: a 15-month stayed sentence for electronic distribution; a 20-month stayed sentence for electronic solicitation; and a 30-month executed sentence for attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct.9
On appeal, Degroot argued that the State failed to prove that he committed an act that was "a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for" the commission of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. He also argued that the district court violated Minn. Stat. § 609.04 when it convicted him of both the electronic solicitation offense and the electronic distribution offense. Finally, he argued that the district court violated Minn. Stat. § 609.035 when it sentenced him on both the electronic solicitation conviction and the attempted third-degree sexual assault conviction.
Although the court of appeals rejected Degroot's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, it agreed that the district court violated sections 609.04 and 609.035. Degroot petitioned for review of the sufficiency issue and the State filed a cross-petition for review of the issues arising under sections 609.04 and 609.035. We granted both petitions.
We begin with Degroot's argument that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that the State presented sufficient evidence to support his attempt conviction. Degroot concedes that he "prepared to have a sexual encounter with a decoy fourteen-year-old boy by driving to a parking lot across the street from the house where the planned sexual encounter was to take place and by exiting his vehicle with items in his possession to be used during the sexual encounter." Nevertheless, he argues that his preparatory acts did not rise to an attempt because he "did not commit a substantial step toward committing the intended sexual conduct while on the property where the sexual conduct was to take place."
In support of his argument, Degroot contends that the plain and unambiguous language of the attempt statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.17 (2018), requires the State to prove four elements. First, the defendant intended to commit a crime. Second, the defendant took a step considerable in degree, amount, or extent toward committing the intended crime. Third, the step was not part of the process of getting ready to commit the intended crime. Fourth, the step took place at the location of the intended crime. The State argues that the plain and unambiguous language of the attempt statute does not require the defendant to take a substantial step at the location of the intended crime.
When the meaning of a criminal statute is intertwined with the issue of whether the State proved a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we are presented with a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. Townsend , 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020).
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute's language, on its face, is unambiguous. State v. Jama , 923 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. 2019). When the language of a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, it is unambiguous and we must apply its plain meaning. State v. Culver , 941 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2020). By contrast, language is ambiguous when it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. In determining whether the language of a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, "we consider the canons of interpretation listed in Minn. Stat. § 645.08 [ (2018) ]." State v. Riggs , 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015).
One such canon provides that "words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage." Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1). "In the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Noor, A19-1089
......Degroot , 946 N.W.2d 354, 361 n.10 (Minn. 2020) (citing LaFave). Because Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a) does not require that more than one person be put in ......
-
State v. Miller
...situations." 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2(b) (6th ed. 2020); see State v. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d 354, 361 n.10 (Minn. 2020) (citing LaFave). Under the Model Code, an officer may stop a person if:Page 36 (i) the officer has reasonable cause to ......
-
State v. Miller, A20-0558
...situations." 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2(b) (6th ed. 2020); see State v. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d 354, 361 n.10 (Minn. 2020) (citing LaFave). Under the Model Code, an officer may stop a person if:(i) the officer has reasonable cause to believe ......
-
State v. Galvan-Contreras
...2017). When interpreting a statute, the first step is to determine whether the language of the statute is ambiguous. State v. Degroot , 946 N.W.2d 354, 360 (Minn. 2020). When "the Legislature's intent is clear from the statute's plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute ......