State v. Riggs, A13–1189.

• Decision Date: 01 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. A13–1189.,A13–1189.
• Citation: 865 N.W.2d 679
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Brandon Wayne RIGGS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

865 N.W.2d 679

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent

v.Brandon Wayne RIGGS, Appellant.

No. A13–1189.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 1, 2015.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Karin Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Christina M. Davenport, Assistant Winona County Attorney, Winona, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie Willett, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

WRIGHT, Justice.

In this case, we consider whether Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1 (2014), provides an exclusive list of factors for a district court to consider when determining the amount of restitution to award to a crime victim. Concluding that the language of section 611A.045, subdivision 1, does not prohibit consideration of the victim's fault, the district court awarded the victim only half of the employment-related expenses that he sought because the victim was the initial aggressor. The court of appeals reversed, and we granted review. Because section 611A.045, subdivision 1, provides an exclusive list of factors for determining the amount of restitution to award, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

I.

Brandon Wayne Riggs was at a gas station in Minnesota City when he was approached by the victim, D.S. The victim confronted Riggs about the quality of the marijuana that Riggs had sold him several months earlier. Riggs left the gas station, but the victim followed Riggs and then attacked him. Riggs drew a knife and stabbed the victim twice, inflicting serious injuries.

The State charged Riggs with second-degree assault, Minn.Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2014), and terroristic threats, Minn.Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2014). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Riggs pleaded guilty to the terroristic threats offense, and the State dismissed the assault charge. The victim filed a request for restitution, including the cost of hiring an employee to help the victim perform his job while his injuries healed.

At the restitution hearing, the State sought $2,973.07 for the victim's employment-related expenses.¹ Riggs urged the district court to order half of the amount of restitution requested for employment-related expenses because the victim was the initial aggressor.² The State objected on the ground that the victim's fault is not included in the exclusive list of factors for determining the amount of restitution to award in Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1. After considering Riggs's “lack of income and inability to pay, the gravity of the injuries suffered by [the victim], and [the victim's] role as the aggressor in the conflict,” the district court ordered Riggs to pay half of the victim's employment-related expenses. The district court reasoned that it was not an abuse of its “broad discretion to reduce the amount of restitution requested by apportioning some of the fault for the victim's injuries to the victim if the victim was the aggressor in the conflict.”

The State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. State v. Riggs, 845 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn.App.2014). Citing Northland Country Club v. Comm'r of Taxation, 308 Minn. 265, 271, 241 N.W.2d 806, 809 (1976), the court of appeals explained that the omission of a phrase from a statute is presumed to be deliberate. Riggs, 845 N.W.2d at 238–39. The court of appeals reasoned that section 611A.045, subdivision 1, directs the district court to consider the victim's economic loss from the offense and the defendant's income, resources, and obligations. Id. at 238. Because the statute does not identify any other factors or provide that other factors may be considered, the court of appeals reversed the district court's restitution award and remanded with instructions to the district court to consider only the factors identified in section 611A.045, subdivision 1, when determining the amount of restitution. Id. at 239. We granted Riggs's petition for review.

II.

Riggs argues that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of section 611A.045, subdivision 1, because the court of appeals construed the phrase “shall consider” as “shall only consider.” In doing so, Riggs argues, the court of appeals added a word that was omitted by the Legislature.

Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn.2014). Our objective in statutory interpretation is to “effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Id.; Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2014). If the Legislature's intent is discernible from the statute's plain and unambiguous language, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Citizens State Bank Norwood Young Am. v. Brown, 849 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn.2014). A statute is ambiguous when its language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn.2007). The first question in our statutory interpretation analysis, therefore, is whether the statute's language is ambiguous. State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn.2009).

When determining whether the language of a statute is ambiguous, we consider the canons of interpretation listed in Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2014).³ One such canon provides that “words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) ; State v. Irby, 848 N.W.2d 515, 525 (Minn.2014). Other factors exist, however, that are appropriate to consider when determining whether a statute is ambiguous. Notably, we construe a statute as a whole and interpret its language to give effect to all of its provisions. Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn.2013) (stating that “[m]ultiple parts of a statute may be read together so as to ascertain whether the statute is ambiguous”); State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.2011) (“[W]e do not examine different provisions [of a statute] in isolation.”). Put differently,

[w]e apply the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be read and construed as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts. Moreover, various provisions of the same statute must be interpreted in the light of each other, and the legislature must be presumed to have understood the effect of its words and intended the entire statute to be effective and certain.

Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 73–74, 93 N.W.2d 690, 698 (1958). Thus, “[i]f the Legislature's intent is clear from the statute's plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.”⁴State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn.2013) ; Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn.2009).

With the canons of interpretation as our guide, we consider the statutory language in question. Section 611A.045, subdivision 1, provides in pertinent part:

The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of the restitution, shall consider the following factors:

(1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense; and

(2) the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant.

Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a). In our past consideration of section 611A.045, subdivision 1, we have focused primarily on the issues of the economic loss sustained by the victim and the ability of the defendant to pay. See State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 64–65 (Minn.2014) (concluding that the State did not meet its burden of establishing the amount of damage the defendant caused to the victim's car); State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 663–64 (Minn.2001) (concluding that the restitution amount imposed by the district court was not an abuse of discretion in light of the defendant's ability to pay); State v. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 672 (Minn.1999) (concluding that the district court was within its discretion by ordering restitution for the cost of a healing ceremony); State v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285–86 (Minn.1995) (concluding that district courts have flexibility to structure restitution orders that consider a defendant's ability to pay). We also have considered whether a district court may impose a restitution amount greater than the monetary parameters of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280, 281–83 (Minn.1996). But we have not determined whether the two express factors in section 611A.045, subdivision 1, comprise an exclusive list of the factors that a district court may consider when imposing restitution.

Riggs argues that the plain meaning of the statute allows the district court to consider the victim's fault for two reasons. First, the statute lacks language that expressly limits consideration to the two factors provided. And second, the phrase “as a result of the offense” allows the district court to consider the circumstances surrounding the offense, such as the victim's role in the offense.⁵ Riggs's argument, however, leads to a conclusion that is contrary to the plain meaning of section 611A.045, subdivision 1.

The plain and ordinary meaning of section 611A.045, subdivision 1, leads to the conclusion that, when ordering restitution, the district court erred by considering factors other than those set forth in the statute. The Legislature expressly provided two factors for the district court to consider, using the language “shall consider the following factors.” Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1. The statute does not include language that would support Riggs's argument, such as “the district court shall consider at least the following factors,” “among the factors that the district court shall consider are,” or any other combination of words that would give the district court discretion to consider additional factors. Moreover, by using a definite article in the phrase, “the following factors,” id. (emphasis added), the statute limits the district court to consideration of the express...