State v. Deleon

• Decision Date: 26 July 1994
• Citation: 230 Conn. 351,645 A.2d 518
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Eriberto DELEON. No. (14876).

Page 518

645 A.2d 518

230 Conn. 351

STATE of Connecticut v. Eriberto DELEON.

No. (14876).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 12, 1994.

Decided July 26, 1994.

Lori Welch-Rubin, Sp. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Carolyn K. Longstreth, Asst. State's Atty., with whom was James E. Thomas, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

This appeal arises from the criminal trial of the defendant, Eriberto Deleon, that resulted in the judgment of conviction of felony murder. In a five count substitute information, the state charged the defendant with felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, ¹ burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-101(a)(2) and 53a-8(a), ² robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134(a)(2) and 53a-8, ³ conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48(a) and 53a-101(a)(2), ⁴ and larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-124(a)(1) and 53a-8. ⁵ During his trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to all the charges except felony murder, to which he asserted the statutory affirmative defense. See General Statutes § 53a-54c. ⁶ Thereafter, he was found guilty of felony murder and sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of imprisonment of sixty years.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b)(3). ⁷ Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c), ⁸ we transferred the defendant's appeal to the Appellate Court and thereafter granted his request to transfer his appeal from that court back to this court. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court: (1) violated his right to effective assistance of counsel under the federal and state constitutions by improperly denying his motion for a continuance and his motion to dismiss; ⁹ (2) violated his rights to due process and a fair trial under the federal and state constitutions by improperly denying his request to open and close the final arguments; and (3) abused its discretion by permitting the state to admit a videotape of the crime scene. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. In March, 1991, the defendant and two accomplices stole approximately $100,000 in cash from the victim's Glastonbury residence. On June 29, 1991, the defendant and three accomplices, Paul Eilerman, Joaquin Santiago and Juan Jimenez, returned to the same residence to steal additional cash. At approximately 12:30 a.m., the defendant and two of the accomplices entered the victim's residence through a front window.

At about the time the defendant discovered the victim's safe in the basement, one of the accomplices encountered the victim upstairs and a struggle ensued. During the struggle, the victim received two fatal gunshot wounds. Shortly thereafter, the defendant and the accomplices forcibly removed the victim's safe from the basement, placed it in the back of the victim's car and fled the scene.

When the police went to the victim's residence the following morning, they found the victim's body at the bottom of the basement stairs. Further, the police observed signs of a struggle throughout the residence and found bullets and bullet holes in the kitchen. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court violated his right to effective assistance of counsel under article first, §§ 8 and 10, of the Connecticut constitution and the sixth amendment to the United States constitution by improperly denying his motion for a continuance and his motion to dismiss. ¹⁰ We dismiss this claim as moot.

The following facts are relevant to the disposition of this claim. On October 9, 1991, the defendant filed a motion for discovery requesting the state to disclose, inter alia, any statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officers. In its response, dated November 22, 1991, the state contended that the defendant had admitted orally to ownership of a backpack, a handgun, ammunition and some cash.

On March 3, 1992, the defendant's counsel received notice that the joint trial of the defendant and his codefendant, Joaquin Santiago, would commence on March 10. Thereafter, during the afternoon of Friday, March 6, 1992, the state revealed to the defendant's counsel for the first time the existence of a statement made by the defendant to law enforcement officials. After learning of this statement, the defendant filed with the trial court a motion for a continuance and a motion to dismiss, dated March 9, 1992, and March 10, 1992, respectively.

During argument on the motion for a continuance, the defendant's counsel asserted that, in light of the state's late disclosure, he would require additional time to evaluate his defense of the case. Specifically, the defendant's counsel argued that he required additional time before trial to decide "whether or not [the statement] changes the nature of our defense; whether or not we're going to have [the defendant] testify; and whether or not I want to move to suppress [that statement]." In denying the defendant's motion, the trial court stated that during the voir dire, the defendant's counsel could discuss the defendant's defense and whether the defendant would testify at trial. Further, the trial court specified that it perceived no prejudice in requiring the defendant to bring his motion to suppress at an appropriate time during the trial.

In the motion to dismiss, the defendant's counsel contended that the statement received on March 6 constituted "[n]ew and substantial incriminating evidence" and that he was denied access "to consult with the Defendant regarding [the statement] and otherwise prepare a defense." Specifically, the defendant's counsel argued that the professional visitation policy in effect at the Hartford correctional facility's main building where the defendant was incarcerated pending trial, prevented him from having adequate time, prior to trial, to consult with the defendant concerning what effect the newly disclosed statement might have on his defense. ¹¹ Ultimately, the defendant asserted that in light of the impending trial date, the state's untimely disclosure of the defendant's statement, in conjunction with the restrictive professional visitation policy at the Hartford correctional facility, effectively denied the defendant his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

The state rejoined that the defendant would receive ample opportunity to confer with his counsel during jury selection at the outset of the trial. The state further asserted that the defendant could receive additional time to confer with his counsel within the courthouse by order of the trial court. In denying the defendant's motion, the trial court concluded that "I've heard arguments that your clients have been denied effective assistance of counsel without any concrete factual scenario."

On March 30, 1992, after the completion of jury selection for the joint trial, the trial court granted the state's motion to sever the trial. ¹² The state proceeded to trial first against Santiago. On May 14, 1992, after the conclusion of Santiago's trial, the trial court impaneled the defendant's jury and began his trial.

The defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance or dismissal on March 10, 1992, under the circumstances related above, violated his right to effective assistance of counsel under the federal and state constitutions. We reject this first claim without considering the substantive merits of the defendant's constitutional arguments, ¹³ however, because events following the trial court's denial of the defendant's motions rendered the issue moot.

"It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944); Phaneuf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 166 Conn. 449, 452, 352 A.2d 291 (1974); State v. Johnson, 11 Conn.App. 251, 256-57, 527 A.2d 250 (1987)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 178, 540 A.2d 679 (1988). Further, "[w]e ordinarily do not address constitutional issues unless it is necessary." Builders Service Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 267, 306, 545 A.2d 530 (1988).

In this case, no controversy exists for and no practical relief can follow from our review of the defendant's claim because the defendant, prior to his actual trial in May, 1992, received the additional time that he had requested from the trial court in March, 1992. In moving the court on March 10, 1992, for a dismissal, continuance, or delay of his trial, the defendant argued that he required additional time before his jury impanelment to confer with counsel, to decide whether to testify in his own defense and to afford his counsel an opportunity to decide whether to move to suppress the recently disclosed statement. In essence, the defendant contended that, under the totality of the circumstances, he lacked the time and opportunity to discuss and consider with his counsel before trial the overall impact of the statement.

Following the denial of his motions, however, as a result of the severance of the trial, the defendant received more than two additional months before the commencement of his trial. Within this period, the defendant and his counsel were afforded ample time to confer, to review the statement, to consider a possible revision of trial strategy and to decide whether the defendant would testify in his own defense. T...