State v. Delgado

Decision Date28 December 1984
Citation692 P.2d 610,298 Or. 395
Parties, 47 A.L.R.4th 643 STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. Joseph Luna DELGADO, Respondent on Review. TC CR83-946, CA A30962, SC S31059.
CourtOregon Supreme Court

Robert W. Muir, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause, for petitioner on review. With him on the briefs were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. Gen., and Lynn Torno, Certified Law Student.

Susan M. Garrett, Salem, argued the cause and filed briefs, for respondent on review.

Robert Dowlut, Washington, D.C., and Steven L. Krasik, Salem, filed a brief amicus curiae for Nat. Rifle Ass'n.

LENT, Justice.

The issue is whether ORS 166.510(1), insofar as it prohibits the mere possession and mere carrying of a switchblade knife, violates defendant's right to bear arms under Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution. We hold that in that respect the statute does violate defendant's constitutional right.

ORS 166.510(1) provides, in relevant part:

" * * * [A ]ny person who manufactures, causes to be manufactured, sells, keeps for sale, offers, gives, loans, carries or possesses an instrument or weapon having a blade which projects or swings into position by force of a spring or other device and commonly known as a switch-blade knife or an instrument or weapon commonly known as a blackjack, slung shot, sandclub, sandbag, sap glove or metal knuckles, or who carries a dirk, dagger or stiletto commits a Class A misdemeanor." (Emphasis added)

Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution provides:

"The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the State * * * [.]"

The accusatory instrument charged that defendant "did unlawfully possess and carry" a weapon commonly known as a switch-blade knife in violation of ORS 166.510. Defendant demurred to the accusatory instrument on the ground that the statute was overbroad as impinging on the right guaranteed to him under Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court overruled the demurrer. 1

Trial then proceeded on the basis of facts stipulated to be the same as those found by the trial court in the hearing on the motion to suppress mentioned in footnote 1, supra. Those facts are as follows.

On October 3, 1983, defendant was walking with a companion on a public street. The two appeared disorderly to an officer nearby, and when defendant reached up as he passed a street sign and tapped or struck it with his hand, the officer confronted both individuals and conducted a patdown search. Defendant was found with a switch-blade knife in his back pocket. Defendant told the arresting officer that he carried the knife "for protection" (defendant evidently feared attack by a jealous rival for his present girl friend). 2

Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, which was denied. The trial court then found defendant guilty and eventually sentenced defendant to jail "suspended on the condition" that defendant meet certain terms of probation.

Defendant appealed, assigning as error the trial court's overruling of his demurrer and denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. The Court of Appeals, 69 Or.App. 254, 684 P.2d 630, per curiam, reversed on the basis of our decisions in State v. Blocker, 291 Or. 255, 630 P.2d 824 (1981), and State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P.2d 94 (1980). We allowed review to determine whether a switch-blade knife is within the constitutional guarantee. 298 Or. 37, 688 P.2d 845 (1984).

In State v. Kessler, supra, this court for the first time considered the scope of Article I, section 27. There, following the discovery by police officers of two billy clubs in his apartment, defendant was charged with the possession of billy clubs in violation of ORS 166.510(1), the same statute at issue in the case at bar. On appeal defendant argued that the statute violated Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that ORS 166.510(1) was within the reasonable exercise of what the court called the state's "police power" to control crime. 43 Or.App. 303, 307, 602 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1979). We reversed.

In Kessler, we examined the historical roots of Article I, section 27. We concluded that the drafters of Oregon's constitution did not wish to limit the right to bear arms to a citizen militia, but rather intended that the private citizen also have the right to "possess certain arms for the defense of person and property." 289 Or. at 371, 614 P.2d at 98.

Our analysis in Kessler of the meaning of the term "arms" is central to the case at bar and so merits a further discussion. We reasoned that because settlers during the revolutionary era used many of the same weapons for both personal and military defense, the term "arms," as contemplated by the constitutional framers, was not limited to firearms but included those hand-carried weapons commonly used for personal defense. 289 Or. at 368, 614 P.2d at 98. Thus, the term "arms" "includes weapons commonly used for either purpose, even if a particular weapon is unlikely to be used as a militia weapon." 289 Or. at 369, 614 P.2d at 98. On the basis of this historical examination, we held that the possession of a billy club was constitutionally protected:

"Our historical analysis of Article I, section 27, indicates that the drafters intended 'arms' to include the hand-carried weapons commonly used by individuals for personal defense. The club is an effective, hand-carried weapon which cannot logically be excluded from this term."

289 Or. at 372, 614 P.2d at 100. 3

The state argues that a switch-blade is not a weapon "commonly used for personal defense," and is therefore not an "arm" within the meaning of the Oregon Constitution. It insists that the switch-blade is an offensive weapon used primarily by criminals. In support of this argument we are referred to various authorities, especially the Federal Anti-Switchblade Act, 15 USC §§ 1241-44 (Supp. IV, 1980), which is aimed at prohibiting the introduction of switch-blade knives into interstate commerce because they are "almost exclusively the weapon of the thug and the delinquent." S.Rep. No. 1980, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3435, 3437.

We note, first, that that material offers no more than impressionistic observations on the criminal use of switch-blades. More importantly, however, we are unpersuaded by this distinction which the state urges of "offensive" and "defensive" weapons. All hand-held weapons necessarily share both characteristics. A kitchen knife can as easily be raised in attack as in defense. The spring mechanism does not, instantly and irrevocably, convert the jackknife into an "offensive" weapon. 4 Similarly, the clasp feature of the common jackknife does not mean that it is incapable of aggressive and violent purposes. It is not the design of the knife but the use to which it is put that determines its "offensive" or "defensive" character.

There are statutes now on the books that concern the manner in which weapons are carried, the intent with which they are carried, the use to which they may not be put and the status of a person that results in forbidding his possessing a weapon.

"This state has several such regulatory statutes, with which we are not concerned in this case: ORS 166.220(1) prohibiting possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to use such weapon unlawfully against another; ORS 166.240, prohibiting carrying certain weapons concealed about one's person; ORS 166.250, prohibiting carrying any firearm concealed upon the person or within any vehicle without a license to do so." (Footnote omitted.)

State v. Blocker, supra, 291 Or. at 259-260, 630 P.2d at 826. See, also, ORS 166.270, which prohibits an exconvict from possessing a firearm concealable on the person, which this court held not to offend Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution in State v. Robinson, 217 Or. 612, 619, 343 P.2d 886 (1959).

The appropriate inquiry in the case at bar is whether a kind of weapon, as modified by its modern design and function, is of the sort commonly used by individuals for personal defense during either the revolutionary and post-revolutionary era, 5 or in 1859 when Oregon's constitution was adopted. In particular, it must be determined whether the drafters would have intended the word "arms" to include the switch-blade knife as a weapon commonly used by individuals for self defense. To answer that question we must journey briefly into the history of knives. We have resorted primarily to three books by H. Peterson for that history: Arms and Armour in Colonial America, 1526-1783 (1956); American Knives (1958); Daggers and Fighting Knives of the Western World (1968). What we have to say generally in the next few paragraphs is drawn from those works.

The popularity of the fighting knife has had an uneven history, even to today. During the Roman civilization and for several centuries thereafter, for example, the knife was little appreciated as a tool of combat, but during the Viking Period of the 9th and 10th centuries large knives (scramasax), used for general purposes as well as for war, were popular among the Northmen, Germans, Franks and Anglo-Saxons. It was during the Middle Ages that the real flowering of the fighting knife and dagger occurred. New shapes appeared and the knife became part of the standard dress for all classes: from the knights and their men-at-arms as an adjunct to the sword, to the laborer and peasant for protection and convenience. During the 16th century the dagger came to be used by the aristocracy, mainly in conjunction with the sword, and was used primarily for combat; indeed, during the early part of that century the technique of fighting with sword and dagger developed, thus giving rise to the modern school of knife fighting. Through the 16th and 17th centuries knives and daggers...

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