State v. Deloney
| Decision Date | 18 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | APPEAL NO. C-190372 |
| Citation | 2019 Ohio 5213 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN DELONEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed and Cause Remanded
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. Springman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Faulkner & Tepe, LLP, A. Norman Aubin and Wilkes R. Ellsworth, for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant John Deloney has filed an interlocutory appeal from the decision of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to preclude the death penalty as a sentencing option on double-jeopardy grounds. We find no merit in Deloney's sole assignment of error, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
{¶2} On June 21, 2013, Deloney was indicted for aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(B), with accompanying death-penalty and firearm specifications. He was also indicated for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), with an accompanying firearm specification.
{¶3} Deloney's counsel subsequently filed a "Motion for a Suggestion of Mental Retardation." We note that the Ohio Supreme Court now uses the term "intellectually disabled" rather than "mentally retarded." See State v. Ford, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4539, ¶ 44. Therefore, we will also use the term "intellectually disabled."
{¶4} Despite the filing of the motion, Deloney and his family refused to cooperate with all evaluations and testing. Eventually, the trial court held a hearing using the evidence the parties had been able to gather without Deloney's cooperation. After the hearing, the trial court found that Deloney was intellectually disabled. Therefore, it held that subjecting him to the death penalty would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), and State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011.
{¶5} The state appealed the trial court's decision to this court. In State v. Deloney, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150619, 2017-Ohio-9282, we reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Deloney had failed to meet his burden of proof to show that he was intellectually disabled. We remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 30. The Supreme Court declined to accept the case for review. See State v. Deloney, 152 Ohio St.3d 1481, 2018-Ohio-1990, 98 N.E.3d 295.
{¶6} On remand, Deloney filed a "Motion to Preclude the Death Penalty," on double-jeopardy grounds. He argued that the trial court's decision finding that he was intellectually disabled was essentially an acquittal on the issue of whether the state could impose the death penalty. The trial court denied the motion. It found that the Atkins determination was unrelated to factual guilt and innocence, and therefore, it was not an acquittal for purposes of the double-jeopardy clause. The court also found that under the law-of-the-case doctrine, it was required to follow our mandate and proceed to trial.
{¶7} Deloney filed a timely appeal from the trial court's judgment. We note that the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds is a final, appealable order. See State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23, ¶ 60-61.
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Deloney contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the death-penalty specifications on double-jeopardy grounds. He argues that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not preclude the trial court from considering the double-jeopardy issue. He also argues that the trial court made a factual finding that he was intellectually disabled, which precluded the imposition of the death penalty and served as an "acquittal" on the death-penalty specifications. Therefore, regardless of our reversal of the trial court's previousdecision, trying him on the specifications would twice place him in jeopardy, and as a result, the state is precluded from seeking the death penalty. This assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶9} First, the law-of-the-case doctrine did not bar the trial court from deciding the double-jeopardy issue. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the decision of a reviewing court in an action remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in that case. Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984); Vonderhaar v. Cincinnati, 191 Ohio App.3d 229, 2010-Ohio-6289, 945 N.E.2d 603, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). The law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply when the subsequent proceedings involve different evidence or different legal issues. Vonderhaar at ¶ 13.
{¶10} In our previous decision, we decided only that Deloney had failed to meet his burden to show that he was intellectually disabled, and therefore, ineligible for the death penalty. Whether the state is precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause from seeking the death penalty is a separate issue that we did not decide, and thus, it is outside of our mandate. Therefore, the trial court was not barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine from considering the double-jeopardy issue.
{¶11} "The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal." State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 139, quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). The Double Jeopardy Clauseordinarily does not prohibit the imposition of an increased sentence on remand from an appeal. Hancock at ¶ 139. But in a line of cases beginning with Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that double-jeopardy principles may apply to bar a capital sentence on retrial. Hancock at ¶ 140.
{¶12} In Bullington, the jury originally returned a verdict rejecting the death penalty and imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 50 years. Subsequently, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on grounds related to statutory deficiencies in jury selection. The court refused to let the state seek the death penalty on retrial, and the state sought a writ of prohibition allowing it to seek the death penalty, which the Supreme Court of Missouri granted.
{¶13} The United States Supreme Court reversed that decision. It held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to capital proceedings where the proceedings "have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence." Bullington at 439. It identified several aspects of Missouri's sentencing proceeding that resembled a trial, including the requirement that the prosecution must prove certain statutorily defined criteria beyond a reasonable doubt to support a death sentence. Id. at 438. It stated that Missouri law "explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has 'proved its case.' " (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 444.
{¶14} Thus, the jury's decision to impose a life sentence meant that "the jury has already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence." Id. at 445. For that reason, the life sentence deserved the same degree of finality that an acquittal of the offense itself would have been given. Id. at 445-446.Nevertheless, in Bullington, it was not the mere imposition of the life sentence that raised the double-jeopardy bar. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 107, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003). An "acquittal" at a trial-like sentencing phase, rather than the mere imposition of a life sentence, is required to give rise to double-jeopardy protections. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270.
{¶15} Subsequently, the Court decided Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984), which involved a death sentence imposed by a judge rather than a jury. In that case, the trial court had found that no statutory aggravating circumstances existed, which precluded the court from imposing the death penalty under Arizona law. The state appealed, and the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances. It remanded the cause for a new sentencing procedure, which produced a death sentence.
{¶16} In reversing the Arizona court's decision, the United States Supreme Court stated that the "double jeopardy principle relevant to [the defendant's] case is the same as that invoked in Bullington: an acquittal on the merits by the sole decision maker in the proceeding is final and bars retrial on the same charge." Id. at 211.
Rumsey thus reaffirmed that the relevant inquiry for double-jeopardy purposes was not whether the defendant received a life sentence the first time around, but rather whether a first life sentence was an 'acquittal' based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence-i.e., findings that the government failed to prove one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶17} The Supreme Court reached a different result in Poland v. Arizona 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 80 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). That case involved two defendants convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court set aside the convictions because of a jury-room discussion of evidence not admitted at trial. It also found that there was insufficient evidence to support the one aggravating circumstance found by the trial court. But, it found there was sufficient evidence to support another aggravating circumstance, which the trial court did not believe was...
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