State v. Demaray
Decision Date | 23 September 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 04-1613.,04-1613. |
Citation | 704 N.W.2d 60 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Jay Edward DEMARAY, Appellee. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Kasey E. Wadding, County Attorney, and Bryan Barker, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
James L. Wagner of Gartelos, Wagner & Ament, Waterloo, for appellee.
This case provides us with an opportunity to examine whether blood test evidence obtained by the State pursuant to a written release of medical records, independent of the implied consent statute, may be admissible at trial in an operating while intoxicated (OWI) case. The district court suppressed the defendant's blood test after concluding that a written release of hospital records executed by the defendant was insufficient to waive the physician-patient privilege. Upon our discretionary review of the district court's ruling, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In the early evening of February 11, 2004, Jay Demaray lost control of his car on an icy road in Bremer County. The car slid into the ditch and became immobile. After Demaray climbed out of the ditch, another driver lost control of his car and struck him. Demaray was injured.
Deputy Dennis Miller, of the Bremer County sheriff's office, was dispatched to the scene. He spoke to Demaray and noticed the smell of alcohol on his breath. Upon inquiry, Demaray admitted he consumed one beer. Demaray was then taken by ambulance to a hospital in Waterloo because of his injuries. Deputy Miller did not perform sobriety tests on Demaray at the accident scene, and he did not accompany Demaray to the hospital. He was the only deputy on call that evening and remained at the accident scene. However, Deputy Miller made a request for another law enforcement officer to go to the hospital to obtain a blood sample from Demaray.
Between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m., a deputy from the Black Hawk County sheriff's office went to the hospital to invoke implied consent. However, he was unable to see Demaray because a doctor was treating his injuries. Shortly after 11:00 p.m., Deputy Miller arrived at the hospital. Deputy Miller went to see Demaray, who was in the intensive care unit with a fractured pelvis. By that time, almost four hours had passed since he was originally dispatched to the accident scene. Deputy Miller believed it was too late to invoke implied consent, even though Demaray had not been arrested or asked to submit to a preliminary screening test. See Iowa Code § 321J.6(2) . Deputy Miller instead asked Demaray to give his consent for the hospital to release his medical records, which included results of a blood test the hospital performed for treatment purposes. At 11:06 p.m., Demaray signed a release form presented to him by Deputy Miller, which had been obtained from hospital personnel. The form stated:
Demaray's medical records showed he had a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 when the hospital collected his blood at 8:52 p.m.
On March 1, 2004, the State charged Demaray with OWI, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2. Demaray filed a motion to suppress the medical records obtained by Deputy Miller. Demaray argued that the blood test results were not admissible because the blood sample was not taken in compliance with the implied consent statute. See Iowa Code § 321J.11 . The State resisted the motion, arguing that the implied consent statute is not the exclusive means by which an officer can obtain blood test results in OWI cases.
The district court granted the motion to suppress. It held the blood test results were privileged, and that the consent by Demaray "did not constitute a consent" for the medical information to be used against him at trial and did not "constitute a waiver of his physician/patient privileges." The State applied for, and we granted, discretionary review.
"When the admission of evidence depends on the interpretation of a statute, we review for correction of errors of law." State v. Palmer, 554 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Iowa 1996) (citing State v. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d 195, 196 (Iowa 1994)). Accordingly, we review the district court's ruling on Demaray's motion to suppress to determine whether the court correctly interpreted and applied chapter 321J. Id.
Our implied consent law is found in chapter 321J of the Iowa Code. "[T]he general purpose of chapter 321J `is to reduce the holocaust on our highways'" due to drunk drivers, and the implied consent law is one means to achieve this goal. Id. at 860-61 (quoting Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa 1169, 1174, 152 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967)) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 861-62 ( ). The six conditions listed in the statute to invoke implied consent are:
The second condition was applicable to Demaray. See id. § 321J.6(1)(b) (). However, instead of invoking implied consent procedures to obtain a blood sample, Deputy Miller used a means not included within the statute: he asked for consent to obtain the blood test the hospital had taken earlier for treatment purposes. See id. § 321J.11 ; see also id. § 321J.6(1) ( ). Therefore, the first issue we face is whether section 321J.11 is the exclusive means by which law enforcement may obtain a blood sample from a defendant in an OWI case.
Section 321J.18 seemingly answers the exclusive-means question:
This chapter does not limit the introduction of any competent evidence bearing on the question of whether a person was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or a controlled substance or other drug, including the results of chemical tests of specimens of blood, breath, or urine obtained more than...
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