State v. DeWald

• Decision Date: 18 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. C5-89-2273,C5-89-2273
• Citation: 464 N.W.2d 500
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. James Albert DEWALD, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 500

464 N.W.2d 500

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. James Albert DEWALD, Appellant.

No. C5-89-2273.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 18, 1991.

Syllabus by the Court

The trial court properly admitted Spreigl evidence of a second homicide allegedly committed by defendant.

John Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Asst. State Public Defender, St. Paul, for appellant.

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Minnesota Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Thomas L. Johnson, Hennepin County Atty., Anne E. Peek, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

WAHL, Justice.

James Albert DeWald was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.185(1) (1990), and first degree felony murder, Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.185(3) (1990), in connection with the death of 74-year-old Marjorie Haugsrud on October 14, 1988. He appeals the convictions claiming that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of his participation in a second murder three weeks after the Haugsrud homicide. We affirm.

Mrs. Haugsrud's body was found at the foot of her basement stairs with a "Prince Devonshire" butcher knife in her back. She had been stabbed six times, strangled, and struck several times on the head with a blunt instrument. Police surmised that the motive for the murder had been robbery because a bedroom dresser drawer, where Mrs. Haugsrud kept her jewelry, and several kitchen drawers appeared to have been searched. Mrs. Haugsrud's billfold, driver's license, checkbook and credit cards were all missing. An empty purse was found back in a cabinet under the kitchen sink.

Other than the knife in Mrs. Haugsrud's back, there was little physical evidence at the scene. A partial footprint in blood was discovered near the body in the basement. One fingerprint was recovered from the cold water tap on the kitchen sink. A spot of what appeared to be blood was found at the top of the basement stairs, another spot two feet into the kitchen and a third on the rubber mat in front of the sink. The sink was damp and a damp paper towel was in a nearby garbage can. Three drawers in the kitchen were partially open. One of the drawers contained knives, but none of the knives matched the "Prince Devonshire" knife that was recovered from Mrs. Haugsrud's back. The front door to the Haugsrud home in south Minneapolis was unlocked and there were no signs of forced entry. Police therefore concluded that Mrs. Haugsrud knew her assailant, and that the assailant had entered and exited through the front door.

The police continued investigating the murder, but with little success. They could not locate the seller of the "Prince Devonshire" knife, and their attempts to identify the fingerprint taken from the kitchen tap were unsuccessful.

Three weeks later, on November 4, 1988, an elderly man, Walter Werdal, was found dead in his south Minneapolis home. He had been beaten on the head with a baseball bat. Werdal's home had been ransacked and police determined that the killer had entered the home at night by forcing in a basement window. Werdal's girlfriend named several possible suspects, including defendant. While comparing defendant's fingerprints to those lifted from the Werdal murder scene, the police positively identified the fingerprint taken from Haugsrud's faucet as the print of defendant's left thumb.

Based on the fingerprint match, the police obtained a search warrant for the apartment where defendant lived with his sister Linda. There police found a "Prince Devonshire" knife on the kitchen counter. Defendant's sister identified the knife as hers but later recanted her identification.

A number of items from the Werdal home were discovered in the defendant's apartment. Defendant was arrested and his blood-spattered tennis shoes were seized. Defendant denied ever having been in Mrs. Haugsrud's house, but police later learned that defendant had been in Mrs. Haugsrud's house on two occasions approximately a year earlier, once to clean her carpet and a second time to repair a carpet seam.

Defendant was indicted for two counts of first degree murder for Haugsrud's death and three counts of first degree murder for Werdal's death. The cases were tried separately with the Haugsrud case being tried first. The trial court allowed evidence of the Werdal murder to be introduced as Spreigl evidence in the Haugsrud trial, thus the Haugsrud jury heard evidence of both homicides. Defendant did not testify but presented alibi testimony that he had been sleeping at a friend's house at the time Mrs. Haugsrud was killed.

The single issue raised for decision is whether the trial court erred in admitting Spreigl evidence of a second homicide allegedly committed by defendant. The defendant argues that the prejudicial impact of that evidence outweighs its probative value.

We have recognized the validity of this concern. We have recognized, through the words of Dean Wigmore, that

The natural and inevitable tendency of a tribunal--whether judge or jury--is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.

State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 496, 139 N.W.2d 167, 172 (1965) (quoting 1 Wigmore, Evidence [3 ed.] Secs. 193, 194).

Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible under Minn.R.Evid. 404(b) to prove the accused's character in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith in the present case. Such evidence may be admitted, however, "to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, identity or common scheme or plan." State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn.1990) (citing State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 491, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965)). Admission of Spreigl evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and a trial court's ruling will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. On the other hand, this court has held that when the admissibility of Spreigl evidence is unclear, the accused must be given the benefit of the doubt and the evidence rejected. State v. Titworth, 255 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn.1977) (citing State v. Saucedo, 294 Minn. 289, 293, 200 N.W.2d 37, 40 (1972) ).

In determining the admissibility of Spreigl evidence, the trial court must find (1) that the evidence is clear and convincing that defendant participated in the Spreigl offense, (2) that the Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the state's case, and (3) that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. State v. Norris, 428 N.W.2d 61, 69 (Minn.1988) (quoting State v. Morrison, 310 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Minn.1981)). The trial court found evidence of the Werdal murder admissible because (1) it was related in time and place, (2) it established identity, motive and modus operandi and (3) the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect.

There was clear and convincing evidence that defendant murdered Werdal. The state's evidence was as follows: Defendant knew Werdal. A station wagon matching the color and description of defendant's car was seen leaving Werdal's back alley at approximately the same time as Werdal was murdered. Spots of blood consistent with Werdal's blood and inconsistent with defendant's blood were found on defendant's left shoe. Defendant's fingerprint was found on a cigarette carton on the floor of Werdal's bedroom. A bloody tee shirt with a "W" on the label, identical to the shirt found by Werdal's body, was found in the back seat of defendant's station wagon. Finally, numerous items belonging to Werdal were found in defendant's apartment as well as in his car.

The Werdal evidence was also "relevant and material" to the state's case in the Haugsrud murder. In order to be relevant and material, the Spreigl offense should be similar to the charged offense either in time, location, or modus operandi. Norris, 428 N.W.2d at 69. Here, there were several similarities between the Haugsrud and Werdal homicides. The homicides occurred within three weeks of each other and both took place in south Minneapolis. Defendant knew both victims, each of whom was elderly and living alone. Both victims were robbed, and both were struck repeatedly on the head with a blunt instrument.

Although there were some dissimilarities between the two offenses ¹, this court has never required absolute similarity between the charged crime and the Spreigl crime. See State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Minn.1983) (admission of Spreigl evidence upheld though different offense occurred four and a half years prior to present offense in another state); State v. Walker, 310 N.W.2d 89, 91 (Minn.1981) ("While there were some dissimilarities in the manner of commission of the charged offense and the Spreigl offense, the offenses were quite similar in a number of ways and were also committed within a month of each other and both in the Twin Cities.").

The most troubling question on review is whether the probative value of the Werdal evidence outweighs its potential unfair prejudice. On the one hand,...