State v. Dhaliwal
| Citation | 150 Wn.2d 559,79 P.3d 432,150 Wash.2d 559 |
| Decision Date | 20 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 73220-5.,73220-5. |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Paramjit Singh DHALIWAL, Petitioner. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Cassandra Stamm, Richard Alan Hansen, Allen Hansen & Maybrown PS, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Lee Yates, Deputy, Seattle, for Respondent.
On December 28, 1999, Paramjit Singh Dhaliwal shot fellow Farwest Cab Company (Farwest) taxi driver and Sikh, Jasbir Bassi, at an intersection in downtown Seattle. Bassi died from the wound two days later. Dhaliwal was charged with murder in the first degree and carrying a concealed handgun. The jury found him guilty on both counts, with a special verdict that he was armed with a firearm. At trial, Dhaliwal was represented by Antonio Salazar, who was also simultaneously representing several of the State and defense witnesses in civil litigation involving Farwest. He had also previously represented two of the witnesses on an assault charge in which Dhaliwal had been a codefendant. Dhaliwal contends that his Sixth Amendment right to a conflict-free attorney was violated because of Salazar's concurrent and previous representation of these witnesses. He also claims that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by making prejudicial statements about the Sikh community and religion in its closing argument. Division One of the Court of Appeals found Dhaliwal's arguments to be without merit. We affirm.
Dhaliwal and Bassi, both Sikhs, owned and drove Farwest taxicabs in the Seattle area. At the time of the shooting, Dhaliwal was a member of Farwest's grievance committee and was a supporter of the current 1999 board of directors. The 1999 board had instituted some controversial changes, which caused serious unrest and disagreement among the cab drivers, who were split into two factions. Bassi was a member of the opposing faction, which supported the former 1998 board.
On the morning of the shooting, Dhaliwal assaulted Ranjit Kandola, a member of the opposing faction. Later that same day, Bassi, Kandola, and several other members of the opposing faction gathered to discuss the confrontation. They concluded that they should go to the Farwest parking lot to discuss the problems between the two factions with members of the Farwest board and the Sikh temple.1 Bassi and four others borrowed a white Honda and two others followed in a taxicab.2
While on Interstate 5, those in the white Honda spotted Dhaliwal's cab heading toward downtown. They followed him to the Westin Hotel, where Dhaliwal dropped off his fare. Meanwhile, Dhaliwal realized he was being followed and telephoned several of his friends, including Gurinder Grewal. Grewal was waiting at the Westin in his cab when Dhaliwal and Bassi's group arrived.
After leaving the Westin, Dhaliwal was forced to stop for a red light. Bassi's car stopped behind him and Bassi got out of the car and approached Dhaliwal's cab. Some of the eye witnesses reported that Bassi was screaming, waving his arms, and pounding his fists on the top of Dhaliwal's cab. From the window of his cab Dhaliwal fired his gun at Bassi, who was unarmed. Bassi returned to the Honda, stating " " State v. Dhaliwal, 113 Wash.App. 226, 230, 53 P.3d 65 (2002). Dhaliwal stepped out of his cab, firing several more shots in the direction of Bassi and the Honda. Bassi died from his wounds two days later.
Dhaliwal fled the scene in his cab, abandoning it near Garfield High School. Grewal also fled the scene, but was detained by police shortly thereafter. He gave the police a statement in which he claimed that Dhaliwal had received death threats and that the men in the cars following Dhaliwal had been armed.
Dhaliwal remained at large for several months before turning himself in. After being released on bail, he resided with Grewal. Their friendship dissolved, however, when Grewal was told that Dhaliwal was involved in distributing a letter reporting the alleged infidelity of Grewal's wife. At trial, Grewal testified for the State, recanting the statement he gave to police on the day of the shooting.3
The State charged Dhaliwal with murder in the first degree and carrying a concealed weapon. Dhaliwal claimed that he acted in self-defense because he feared for his life when confronted by Bassi. The jury found him guilty on both counts. Dhaliwal was sentenced to 300 months in prison, a standard range sentence.
Dhaliwal appealed to Division One of the Court of Appeals. He claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney free from conflicts of interest was violated because his trial attorney, Antonio Salazar, simultaneously and previously represented several of the witnesses at trial. At the time of Dhaliwal's trial, Salazar was also representing Gurcharan Saidpur, Resham Singh, Harbhajan Sidhu, and Surinder Sohal in a shareholder action against Farwest that contested their termination by the 2000 board of directors.4 Saidpur and Singh testified for the defense at Dhaliwal's trial while Sohal testified for the State. Salazar had also previously represented Grewal and Harbhajan Singh on an assault charge in which Dhaliwal was a codefendant. At Dhaliwal's murder trial, Grewal testified for the State and Singh testified for the defense.
Prior to Dhaliwal's trial, the prosecutor brought the potential conflict of interest to the court's attention outside of the jury's presence. The trial judge asked Salazar about his representation of the witnesses and accepted Salazar's assessment that there was no conflict. After briefly advising Dhaliwal about the need to be aware of the possibility of conflicts of interest, the court accepted Dhaliwal's statement that he wanted Salazar to continue representing him.5 At no point during his trial did Dhaliwal object to Salazar representing him.
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry into Salazar's conflicts of interest, but that Dhaliwal was not entitled to a new trial. Dhaliwal, 113 Wash.App. at 234,53 P.3d 65. Relying on Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002), the Court of Appeals held that reversal was not warranted unless Dhaliwal could demonstrate that his lawyer had an actual conflict of interest and that the lawyer's performance at trial was adversely affected by that conflict. Dhaliwal, 113 Wash.App. at 237,53 P.3d 65. Finding that Dhaliwal failed to show both an actual conflict and a negative effect on performance, the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court.
Dhaliwal also argued on appeal that the prosecutor made improper remarks about the Sikh community during his closing argument. Although Dhaliwal asserted that the prosecutor made comments suggesting that Sikhs are prone to violence, the Court of Appeals found the comments to be within the permissible scope of final argument and that any impropriety could have been cured by an instruction to the jury had Dhaliwal objected at trial. Id. at 242, 53 P.3d 65.
Dhaliwal filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on October 10, 2002. He then filed a petition for review with this court, which was granted. We now affirm the Court of Appeals.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right includes the right to the assistance of an attorney who is free from any conflict of interest in the case. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981); State v. Davis, 141 Wash.2d 798, 860, 10 P.3d 977 (2000).
Dhaliwal argues that Salazar had a conflict of interest because he also represented some of the witnesses at Dhaliwal's trial in other matters. Dhaliwal asserts that some of these witnesses had interests adverse to his and that Salazar's performance was negatively affected by these conflicts of interest. The State, on the other hand, maintains that Dhaliwal has not shown that his attorney represented actual conflicting interests or that any such conflict adversely affected Salazar's performance.
First, the State asserts that Dhaliwal waived his right to a conflict-free attorney. Even if an attorney has a conflict of interest, he or she may continue to represent the defendant if the defendant makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). Because both Dhaliwal and the trial court were aware of Salazar's representation of various witnesses, the State claims that the discussion between Salazar, the court, and Dhaliwal about the potential conflict constituted a waiver of Dhaliwal's right to choose an attorney free from conflict.
In Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1994), the defendant's attorney advised him several hours before the trial began that he had accepted a position with the prosecution to begin after the trial was over. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant had effectively waived his right to a conflict-free attorney because his comments on the record indicated his understanding of the situation.6 Id. at 1195-96. Furthermore, the trial court granted a five-day continuance so that the defendant could think about and discuss with other people whether he wanted to continue with his current attorney despite the conflict. Id. at 1196. By nonetheless electing to continue with his attorney, Garcia "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived any rights even potentially implicated" by his attorney's employment decision. Id. at 1197. Here, the Court of Appeals determined that although the trial court and Dhaliwal were aware of the potential conflict of interest, Dhaliwal's...
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