State v. Diamond, 22041
| Decision Date | 14 February 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 22041,22041 |
| Citation | 312 S.E.2d 550,280 S.C. 296 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. William DIAMOND, Appellant. |
Jack B. Swerling, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Sol. James C. Anders, Columbia, for respondent.
Appellant William Diamond was convicted of selling heroin and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. The main issues on appeal concern the trial judge's refusal to charge the law of alibi and his refusal to require the State to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Phillip Wilkins, an undercover police officer, allegedly purchased heroin from Diamond, after being introduced to Diamond by a confidential informant. Five months later Diamond was arrested. Eleven months after the sale he was tried.
Diamond first argues the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the law of alibi. We disagree.
"To establish an alibi, the accused must show that he was at another specified place at the time the crime was committed, thus making it impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime." State v. Robbins, 275 S.C. 373, 271 S.E.2d 319 (1980). Diamond concedes in his brief that he could not recall at trial his whereabouts at the time of the crime, but simply testified he had never seen Wilkins. Mere denial of one's presence at the scene of a crime does not constitute an alibi. Id. We find no error.
Diamond next argues the trial judge erred in refusing to require the State to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. We agree.
The leading case on the informant's privilege is Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). To determine whether disclosure was necessary, the Court balanced the public interest in protecting the flow of information of criminal activities against the individual's right to prepare his defense. In Roviaro, only the accused and the informant actually participated in the drug transaction. A police officer and a federal narcotics agent observed the transaction, the officer through the slightly raised trunk of the informant's car and the agent from a sidewalk approximately 100 feet away. The Court held the government should have disclosed the identity of the informant, finding the accused's opportunity to cross examine the officer and agent was hardly a substitute for an opportunity to examine the man who had been nearest to him and took part in the transaction.
In McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.1973), the court stated a factor which tends to show the prosecution is not entitled to withhold from the accused the informant's identity is the qualification of the informant to testify directly concerning the transaction. The court distinguished "tipsters" from "participants" in determining whether to sustain the invocation of the privilege of nondisclosure, and held disclosure is required where an informant is an actual participant, particularly where he sets up the criminal transaction. See also State v. Bernotas, 277 S.C. 106, 283 S.E.2d 580 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1711, 72 L.Ed.2d 134 (1982).
This Court, discussing the informant's privilege in State v. Batson, 261 S.C. 128, 198 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1973), stated:
The disclosure of the identity of one who is merely an informer and not a participant nor a material witness is not generally required. Where, however, the informer is also a participant and/or a material witness on the issue of guilt or innocence, disclosure may or may not be required depending upon various factors and circumstances....
The record shows the informant introduced the undercover police officer to Diamond and told Diamond the officer wanted "to pick up a package." Diamond gave the informant the package of heroin, the informant immediately gave it to the undercover police officer, and the officer gave Diamond $25.00. The informant was clearly a participant in the transaction, not a mere "tipster" or witness or, as the trial judge ruled, a "conduit."
During the drug transaction, another police officer, Lewis Johnson, allegedly cruised...
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State v. Jenkins
...not know who the informant was, they could not assert the informant planted the drugs. The State asserted that under State v. Diamond, 280 S.C. 296, 312 S.E.2d 550 (1984) and State v. Dennison, 305 S.C. 161, 406 S.E.2d 383 (Ct.App.1991) the informant had to be revealed only where relevant t......
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State v. Blyther
...involved since he introduced the SLED agent to the drug dealer and witnessed the drug sale. The recent case of State v. Diamond, 280 S.C. 296, 312 S.E.2d 550 (1984), dictates the result we must reach in the instant case. See Ghent, State v. Diamond: Compelled Disclosure of an Informant's Id......
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State v. Burney, 22803
...informant, disclosure may be required when the informant is an active participant in a criminal transaction. State v. Diamond, 280 S.C. 296, 312 S.E.2d 550 (1984); State v. Blyther, 287 S.C. 31, 336 S.E.2d 151 (Ct.App.1985). Appellant argues the informant's identity should have been reveale......
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State v. Kiser
...Court Rule 23 and the following authorities: Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Diamond, 280 S.C. 296, 312 S.E.2d 550 (1984); State v. Adams, 279 S.C. 228, 306 S.E.2d 208, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1023, 104 S.Ct. 558, 78 L.Ed.2d 730 AFFIRMED. ...